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ABSTRACT 
 
Arsenault, Adam M., M.Sc. University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, September 2007. 
A Multi-Agent Simulation Approach to Farmland Auction Markets: Repeated Games 
with Agents that Learn. 
Supervisors: J.F. Nolan, R.A. Schoney, D. Gilchrist. 
 
The focus of this thesis is to better explore and understand the effects of agent 
interactions, information feedback, and adaptive learning in a repeated game of bidding 
in farmland auction markets. This thesis will develop a multi-agent model of farm-land 
auction markets based on data from the Saskatchewan Dark Brown Soil Zone of the 
Canadian Prairies. Several auction types will be modeled and data will be gathered on 
land transactions between farm agents to ascertain which auction type (if any) is best 
suited for farmland markets. Specifically, the model gathers information for 3 types of 
sealed-bid auctions, and 1 English auction and compares them on the basis of efficiency, 
price information revelation, stability, and with respect to repeated bidding and agent 
learning.  
The effects of auction choice on macro-level indicators, such as farm exits, retirement, 
financial stability, average productivity, farm size, and participation were unknown at the 
outset of this thesis because of the complex dynamic nature of the environment. I find 
that the chosen learning mechanism employed here affects both price and variance of 
prices in all auctions. I also find that the second-price-sealed-bid auction generates the 
most perceived surplus, most equitable share of surplus, and also decreases uncertainty in 
the common-value element of prices. A priori it was believed that auction choice would 
have an impact on pricing efficiency, price levels, and shares of surplus generated from 
auctions as predicted by theoretical works. Surprisingly, auction choice does not 
influence market structure or evolution.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.0 Introduction 
Canadian farmers have witnessed a steady upward trend in farmland prices since 
January of 2000. Increases in some provinces have been as high as 8.2%
1
, while 
Saskatchewan farmland has been increasing in value at a rate of approximately 1% 
semi-annually for the past 5 years
2
.  
The steady increase is thought to be driven by high grain prices stemming from demand 
from the biofuels industry and interest from out-of-province buyers. This demand, 
coupled with access to credit and low interest rates has helped maintain farmland prices 
in the face of rising input costs
3
.  
In order for farmers, policy makers, and industry stake-holders to make informed 
decisions about investments and expectations, it is important to understand both the 
macro- and micro-economic factors that affect farmland prices and efficiency. Pricing 
efficiency in agricultural sectors is believed to be one of the key factors for competitive 
industry since farmland represents 21-25% of fixed costs and is the only true fixed 
factor in production (Ebmeyer and Schoney 2007).  
Optimal farmland pricing is essential because overpriced farmland can cause financial 
weakness and divert funds from areas with higher returns on investment. Alternatively, 
underpriced farmland may cause some land to gravitate away from its highest and best 
use and away from the most efficient producers.  
                                                 
1
 Farm Credit Canada Spring 2007 Farmland Values Report: http://www.fcc-
fac.ca/en/Products/Property/FLV/Spring2007/index.asp 
2
 Ibid 
3
 Ibid 
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This thesis will focus on the dynamics of farmland auction markets. It will incorporate 
elements of heterogeneity, feedback, strategic bidding and learning into traditional 
static auction models. In so doing, we will uncover the effects of agent-level specific 
decision making processes on the macroeconomic model for farmland markets, 
something that has yet to be considered in the literature. Furthermore, a variety of 
auction types will be compared to determine which is best suited to selling farmland 
based on pricing efficiency and surplus generation.  
I contend that the classic economic theory alone cannot adequately describe the land 
auction process since optimizing strategies and rational choice cannot completely 
explain the actions of individuals involved in the bidding process. And although 
rational choice and optimization lend themselves to deduction, the model is not fully 
specified. Rather, I assume that agents use adaptive behaviour, in conjunction with 
rational choice and optimization. In order to fully understand prices and pricing 
efficiency, the market must be modelled as an evolutionary process incorporating 
information sharing, heterogeneity, dynamics, uncertainty, complexity, space, and time. 
Only when the process is properly modelled will there be a fuller understanding of 
farmland markets.  
To date there has been no attempt to model farmland auctions in this manner. While 
there have been prior attempts to model farmland auctions using a Multi-Agent 
Simulation (MAS) (Balmann 1997, Freeman 2005), such modeling was not the focus of 
their efforts and several important factors were not included. Unlike these papers, I will 
examine the effects of auction choice on market structure and efficiency. For example, 
farm exits, financial stability, productivity, price levels, transaction surplus, and price 
variability will be tracked to determine which auction mechanism is best suited for 
selling farmland.  
This research also differs markedly significantly from anything done thus far because it 
incorporates time and space into the farmland auction framework. Some papers 
(Balmann 1997, Freeman 2005) have modeled “auction-like” land markets that 
incorporate time and space. Others have modeled farmland auctions (Colwell and 
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Yavas 1994). However, no one has yet combined a realistic farmland auction market 
with a dynamic model that includes space and time. Accordingly, this thesis is novel in 
that it provides both the proper context (farmland auction markets) and dynamic 
properties of space and time.  
1.1 Objectives 
The focus of this research is to better explore and understand the effects of agent 
interactions, information feedback, and adaptive learning in a repeated game of bidding 
in farmland auction markets. This thesis will develop a multi-agent model of farm-land 
auction markets based on data from the Saskatchewan Dark Brown Soil Zone of the 
Canadian Prairies. Several auction types will be modeled and data will be gathered on 
land transactions between farm agents to ascertain which auction type (if any) is best 
suited for farmland markets. Specifically, the model gathers information for 3 types of 
sealed-bid auctions, and 1 English auction and compares them on the basis of 
efficiency, price information revelation, stability, and with respect to repeated bidding 
and agent learning.  
The effects of auction choice on macro-level indicators, such as farm exits, retirement, 
financial stability, average productivity, farm size, and participation were unknown at 
the outset of this thesis because of the complex dynamic nature of the environment. I 
find that the chosen learning mechanism employed here affects both price and variance 
of prices in all auctions. I also find that the second-price-sealed-bid auction generates 
the most perceived surplus, most equitable share of surplus, and also decreases 
uncertainty in the common-value element of prices. A priori it was believed that 
auction choice would have an impact on pricing efficiency, price levels, and shares of 
surplus generated from auctions as predicted by theoretical works. Surprisingly, auction 
choice does not influence market structure or evolution.  
Interestingly, some of my findings support traditional theory (e.g. second-price auction 
performance), while others shed light on previously unknown areas of auctions and 
land markets (e.g. market structure and evolution). 
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1.2 Motivation for Study 
Recently, MAS has become the tool of choice for researchers seeking an inexpensive 
experimental „laboratory-like‟ setting to explore complex, dynamic systems of 
interacting agents. To date, MAS has been used by researchers in many of the physical 
sciences, including mathematics, biology, and chemistry with great success and is 
widely accepted in the literature as a valid tool for scientific analysis (Axelrod 2003). 
MAS has primarily been used by economists to examine large macroeconomic systems 
comprised of non-linear equilibrium conditions and disequilibrium processes. MAS is 
particularly useful in such scenarios because it can capture “emergent4” phenomena and 
out-of-equilibrium behaviour (Gintis 2005). These emergent, or otherwise inexplicable 
dynamic properties of a model, can be valuable tools in methodological advancement 
of policies and theories in economics that cannot occur in classical economic analysis 
(Tesfatsion 2005).  
In light of the insight generated by MAS models, agricultural economists have begun 
using it to model processes in the agricultural sector. Some of these topics include 
regional structural change (Balmann 1997, Freeman 2005), technology diffusion and 
resource usage (Berger 2001), and land-use management (Polhill et al. 2001).  
This research will contribute to the literature in at least two ways. Firstly, I will extend 
the work on farmland auction markets to include heterogeneous agents, learning, 
feedback, and agent interactions. Secondly, I will apply MAS to auction theory in a 
manner that has yet to be attempted in the literature. This includes making assumptions 
about information and decision parameters that reflect real-world behaviour.  
Much of the MAS based farm land auction work that currently exists (e.g. Balmann 
1997, Freeman 2005) assumes an extremely simple auction environment without 
feedback and learning. To their credit, the auction mechanisms included in these 
models were designed to be simple in order to allow for a macro model that functioned 
as smoothly as possible. Since our model will focus exclusively on auction 
                                                 
4
 A detailed description of emergent phenomena will be given in subsequent chapters.  
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mechanisms, this aspect of farm operations will be significantly more detailed and 
better capture the essential decision making elements of real-life land auction markets. I 
propose that it is the rudimentary agent-level components of the decision making 
process that drive the observable macro-level results in these land markets.  
1.3 Thesis Organization 
This thesis is divided into 7 chapters. This first chapter serves as an introduction to the 
issue. The second chapter will review the relevant literature on auction theory, agent-
simulation, and land markets. Chapter 3 develops the structural model and equations 
that underlie the simulation. Chapter 4 discusses the data used for initialization. Chapter 
5 outlines the criterion by which the auctions will be compared and measured. Chapter 
6 provides the results and Chapter 7 concludes and discusses limitations to the model 
and future research.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter will serve as a review of the literature to familiarize the reader with the 
basic concepts of MAS, Farmland Markets, and Classical Auction theory. The 
remainder of this thesis will be based on the concepts discussed here.  
2.1 Introduction to Multi-Agent Simulations (MAS) 
This section introduces the basic concepts and terminology used in MAS. MAS is one 
of many names for a set of modeling techniques used to explore phenomenon in the 
realm of distributed artificial intelligence (DAI). Agent-based Computational 
Economics (ACE) is an alternative name for the computational studies of economies 
modelled as evolving systems of autonomous interacting agents (Tesfatsion 2002).  
MAS and ACE research seeks to understand why certain global regularities have 
persisted in decentralized economies despite the absence of top-down planning. In 
effect, MAS and ACE use a bottom-up approach to explain these global regularities by 
modelling the repeated local interactions of autonomous agents acting on simple rules 
(Tesfatsion 2002). The following will discuss simulation in a more general context, 
covering a comparison of simulation to experimental economics, heterogeneity and 
simulation, as well as learning and information feedback in simulation. The chapter will 
close with a discussion of some challenges faced by researchers when using MAS. For 
the interested reader, a detailed introduction to MAS and ACE can be found in 
Tesfatsion (2002).   
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 2.1.1 Simulation: An Alternative to Reductionism  
Much of what is known about science is a result of using reductionism - studying the 
components of a system in an attempt to figure out how the system works as a whole. 
The limitation of this method is that systems are often larger (and more complex) than 
the sum of their parts. This idea is referred to as Holism and was first summarized by 
Aristotle in Metaphysics. Holism arose from the view that much of the world is not 
machine-like and many systems are inherently complex.  
In light of this, recent research on complex systems
5
 is based on a common goal of 
understanding how a system can be characterized with respect to its individual 
components in a non-reductionist manner (Manson 2001). Simulation is one means by 
which to do this. Traditionally, models of systems are simpler than the system itself; 
models make assumptions that allow for the removal of component interactions that do 
not affect (or that are believed not to affect) variables of interest. Simulation models on 
the other hand, can be as complex as the system that they represent. In many cases, 
researchers can only observe one state of the system, but by using simulation, they are 
able to create hypothetical situations under which various states can exist.  
Simulation is often used to model complex systems that seem to portray self-
organization characteristics that could not have been foreseen by examining the 
elements of the system. The idea of self-organizing systems was made popular in 
economics by Adam Smith and his invisible hand guiding the economy (Smith 1776). 
Self-organizing systems are often described as adaptive, dynamic, and emergent, three 
concepts that will be highlighted in subsequent chapters (Tesfatsion 2001).  
 2.1.2 Simulation versus Experimental Economics: Why Use MAS? 
Experimental economics has gained popularity as an economic methodology because 
classical economic analysis techniques are limited to examine only a subset of all 
possible exogenous “influences”. In contrast, experimental methods rely on controlled 
laboratory settings to test economic theories by controlling the number of influences. 
                                                 
5
 Complex systems will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent sections. 
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Experiments in economics are often constructed to capture data about preferences and 
examine if those preferences actually influence economic decisions.  
In general, experimental methods have generated considerable insight into human 
behaviour. There are a few problems with experimental economics as a methodology 
however. The most significant problem with economic experiments is that it is never 
possible to know exactly why a person has made a particular decision. Rather the 
individual‟s beliefs and preferences must be inferred from the choices she has made 
(Tesfatsion 2002). Also, human heterogeneity raises theoretical problems. That is, if 
individuals differ, similar experimental treatments can lead to different observed 
behaviours. An analysis of the aggregate effect could then suggest that a variable is 
irrelevant, since positive and negative effects cancel each other out, while the “mean 
agent” effect of the variable may not make rational sense (Novarese 2003).  
To summarize, possible problems associated with experimental economics specific to 
this research program are: 
 
 Data generation is limited to the number of participants 
 Costly 
 Time consuming 
 Limited control over utility function or risk aversion factors 
 Limited control over learning process and rate of learning 
 Strategies and rules may not always be understood by all 
participants in complex games 
 Very difficult (impossible?) to achieve asymptotic results 
 Difficult to ensure all control parameters are in fact controlled 
 
Learning and a lack of asymptotic results are particularly serious issues with respect to 
this thesis. As previously noted, agent learning is one of the key features of this 
research that helps to improve upon previous farmland auction models. Adjusting the 
learning process will go a long way to understanding the salient features of the decision 
process that affect bids and subsequent outcomes. Furthermore, it is important that 
asymptotic results are available to ensure that a valid trend in the data is observed, and 
the proper limit behaviour is deduced. 
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MAS modeling offers solutions to many of the problems associated with experimental 
methods. As we shall see, advantages to using MAS models include:   
 Asymptotic results are generally easy to achieve 
 MAS is relatively cheap 
 Offers control over parameters 
 Logical flow: No “black box” element  
 All agents understand the rules of the game and the decisions 
available to them 
 Learning, and learning rates, can be controlled to compare a 
variety of alternate conditions 
 Long trial periods do not become tedious for agents 
 Once initial conditions are set and model evolution occurs, we 
can often trace the path of evolution back to the root cause in the 
initial parameters 
 Risk aversion factors are known and can be controlled 
 Utility functions can be based on classical economic theory and 
results from experimental economics  
 2.1.3 Heterogeneity  
The issue of individual heterogeneity and its impact on economic systems has received 
considerable attention in the literature. In standard economic models, heterogeneity is 
typically introduced in a very structured manner whereby individual characteristics are 
drawn from a set of known values. However, assumptions like this can be problematic 
because any variance in individual behaviour is necessarily small and behaviour is very 
predictable. Moreover, in order to keep models tractable, it is commonly assumed that 
heterogeneity among agents does not change over time. Parker et al. (2003) note that 
heterogeneity across real agents can manifest in their biophysical environment, in their 
values, their ability, and their resources. Note that these characteristics can change over 
time as a result of learning and environmental changes. The literature is also quick to 
note that when heterogeneity and interdependencies (feedback) are combined, 
traditional analytical solutions are nearly impossible to attain
6
. 
Within the scope of MAS models, it is crucial to understand the importance of 
heterogeneity. Novarese (2003) suggests that it is the underlying heterogeneity of 
                                                 
6
 See Sections 2.1.4 and 2.1.5 for more information. 
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human agents that has led to so misunderstanding of theoretical and empirical 
economic research. He suggests instead that hypotheses should not be posed and 
accepted but tested and verified. The only way to accomplish this is to understand the 
implications of differences between economic agents, and not simply assume away true 
heterogeneities for tractability. Novarese (2003) also notes that this goal will require 
new instruments of analysis. In this light the ability of MAS to model complex systems 
of heterogeneous agents has been well documented in the literature (Tesfatsion 2000, 
2001, and 2002, Parker et al. 2003, and Janssen 2005) and as such, offers advantages 
over classical economics and experimental methods in the study of human behaviour.  
 2.1.4 Agent Learning and Information Feedback 
The issue of learning in economic theory is one that has only just recently begun to 
receive attention. Mainstream studies in economics often assume simple interactions of 
unboundedly rational agents that instantaneously achieve a common consistency – 
usually a Nash best response. Classically, this method sufficed for shedding light on the 
salient features of the model at hand, and the related outcomes (Friedman 1998). 
Evolutionary economics on the other hand (of which MAS is a subset) emphasizes the 
importance of adaptation processes of boundedly rational, imperfectly informed agents. 
These models do not assume that all agents have common, perfect knowledge about the 
strategies and information of all other agents. Clearly, agents in a well designed MAS 
may have incomplete information about the preferences and rationality of other agents. 
As such, formally computing equilibria can be extraordinarily difficult and choosing an 
equilibrium concept can be equally difficult (Parkes and Ungar 2003).  
A review of the types of learning mechanisms used in evolutionary economics is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. As such, this section will highlight the importance of 
learning for evolutionary economics and MAS. Learning and other adaptation strategies 
necessarily constitute feedback mechanisms that facilitate movement towards steady-
states in dynamical economic systems in the absence of assumptions about rationality 
and perfect information. In classic analytical economics, equilibria are founded upon 
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such assumptions in the face of strategic interdependence
7
. Evolutionary economics on 
the other hand assumes that the actions taken by one agent directly affect the decision 
set of all other agents ad infinitum (Parkers and Ungar 2003).  
The importance of time and system evolution is highlighted when feedback is 
considered. In evolutionary models, feedback is assumed to occur as the model evolves, 
not once all agents have acted rationally. Because agents are assumed to be imperfectly 
informed, feedback is necessary for model evolution, in contrast to a situation where 
agents instantaneously achieving a mutual consistency (Friedman 1998, Richter 2004). 
More details regarding learning and feedback as assumed in this thesis will follow in 
subsequent chapters.  
 2.1.5 Complexity and Emergence
8
 
The study of economics has historically focused on studying equilibria, and typically 
these are static patterns that do not account for temporal or behavioural adjustments. 
This type of analysis requires making simplifying assumptions in order to arrive at 
analytical solutions. However, incorporating feedback and learning into economic 
problems has been shown to modify strategic behaviour that had otherwise been 
assumed fixed or was simply ignored in classical models. To this end, static patterns 
may not be sufficient for explaining strategic behaviour in the face of learning and 
information feedback (Arthur 1999).  
Some economists have begun studying how relaxing assumptions within general 
equilibrium, game theoretic, and rational expectations models might affect the 
individual actions, strategies and expectations as well as the aggregate patterns these 
create. The result, complexity economics, is not considered an accessory to traditional 
economic theory, but a general out-of-equilibrium theory (Arthur 1999).  
                                                 
7
 This occurs in systems where the actions of one agent may affect the utilities of other agents. 
 
8
 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss the mathematics of complexity in detail. As such, this 
section will provide the reader with the basic intuition necessary to understand the fundamental elements 
of complexity. The interested reader should see Day (1994) for a more detailed description of the 
mathematics of complexity. 
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Complexity economics requires the characterization of a system in a non-reductionist 
manner (Manson 2001). Simply put, a system must be more than the sum of its 
individual components. The “complexity outlook” requires that we emphasize the 
formation of structures rather than their given existence. When this is done, economic 
problems can be modeled differently. For example, rational expectations assumptions 
can be valid, but they imply that agents deduce what theoretical model will work and 
that all agents know that all other agents know what model will work (Arthur 1999). 
Assuming that such a knowledge structure exists may be unrealistic. 
Complexity economics considers the evolution of systems as opposed to a focus on the 
steady state
9
. Economics has generally been studied under the lens of general systems 
theory - whereby systems are typically studied as static entities linked by linear 
relationships defined by stocks and flows of information, energy, or matter. Systems 
theory says nothing about the quality of the stocks or flows. On the other hand, 
complex systems are characterized by non-linear flows of constantly changing entities. 
Using complex systems analysis means it is possible to examine the qualitative 
attributes of the flows, such as learning and communications (Parker et al. 2003).  
One important characteristic of complex systems is the inherent non-linearity of the 
way features of the system move together. As a result, inferences about complex 
systems must be derived in a manner that differs from classical models in which the 
variables in the system are mostly linear. In addition, complex systems are often 
characterized by feedback effects that generate non-linearities, even when individual 
behavioural rules are simple in structure (Durlauf 1997). To that extent, even simple 
assumptions about learning can lead to models that are complex in nature and 
impossible to solve analytically (Parker et al. 2003).  
A final point is that history matters in complex systems. Intuitively, this means that 
long-run outcomes are influenced by short-run behaviours – a condition also referred to 
as “path dependence”. Path dependence implies that particular events in a system have 
                                                 
9
 Note here that “steady state” does not refer to equilibrium but rather that the behavioural characteristics 
embedded in the system are dynamically evolving in a certain fashion (Durlauf 1997). 
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long-run consequences or that particular events (shocks) are not completely self-
correcting (Durlauf 1997).  
From this discussion about complexity emerges the following question: What results 
can we expect from the modelling of economically complex systems? The answer to 
this question is both exciting and daunting. Expect the unexpected. Durlauf (1997) 
states: “a system is said to be complex when it exhibits some type of order as a result of 
interactions of many heterogeneous objects.” Order in the complexity is often referred 
to as “emergence” or “emergent behaviour” and a process is generally considered to be 
emergent if “interactions occur at a level of description other than that at which the 
patterns occur” (Durlauf 1997).  Alternatively defined, for an incident to be deemed 
emergent it should be unpredictable from a “lower level” (i.e. the summation of the 
elements of the system). Regardless the definition, it is important that the emergent 
phenomenon be irreducible to the basic elements which formed it.  
In MAS, emergence occurs when agents interacting in a system behave in ways that 
could not have been foreseen a priori. One of the first such examples in the social 
sciences literature is the work of Schelling (1971). Although Schelling did not use 
computational MAS, his work as been reproduced in several MAS settings. Schelling 
showed that a small preference (behavioural rule) for one‟s neighbours to be of the 
same ethnicity can lead to total segregation of the population, which was an unexpected 
result. To this end, Schelling concluded that when individual agents behave according 
to a simple rule, the collective behaviour of the system can produce a drastically 
different, more complicated behaviour – self-organization.  
Complexity and emergence are clearly important concepts for consideration in 
economics when one considers issues of multiple-equilibria, non-predictability, 
inefficiency, historical path dependence, and asymmetry (Arthur 1999). Over time, the 
culmination of random events and positive feedbacks result in dynamic, non-linear 
processes that cannot be adequately described in a static environment (Arthur 1999).  
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 2.1.6 Challenges with MAS 
As a modelling tool, the use of MAS raises issues that need to be highlighted. To start, 
several researchers note that modeling learning using MAS, as well as the results 
obtained from simulating learning, must be interpreted with caution. This is the case 
particularly because many of the learning mechanisms employed in MAS are simply 
optimization strategies modified to suit an MAS framework. In effect, the use of such 
strategies may lead to results similar to neoclassical economics, negating some of the 
benefits of using MAS. In light of this, it is vital that research continues into the choice 
of learning mechanisms and how such decisions will affect results obtained in a 
simulation (Tesfatsion 2002).  
Another issue with MAS is the use of behavioural rules. Autonomous agents within an 
MAS act/react to their environment through a series of behavioural rules bestowed 
upon them at the beginning of the simulation. Therefore, agents‟ decision strategies are 
limited by the set of behavioural rules in which they are contained. It is particularly 
important that behavioural rules reflect, as closely as possible, the behaviour of human 
subjects making the same decisions.   
Some MAS models can also be sensitive to initial parameter settings (Gilbert et al. 
1999). Although MAS is designed to limit the influence of path dependence by 
allowing emergent behaviour, some systems can be seriously affected by the initial 
parameter values chosen. Such problems can be overcome by running several tests with 
alternate initial parameter settings and testing the significance of such parameters on 
the results. In fact, all of the major issues with MAS can be mitigated with careful 
planning and consideration of causalities before any conclusions are drawn. 
Finally, Parker et al. (2003) highlight some more philosophical issues with MAS. They 
note that some have criticized MAS as not being a valid way of doing science since it 
does not fall into the deduction/induction framework and results cannot be proven in a 
mathematical sense. They also note that there are still limits to understanding 
complexity and that the science of both complexity and MAS are still in their infancy. 
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While these issue are interesting and worthy of further exploration they are beyond the 
scope of this thesis.  
2.2 Farmland Markets  
This section will review applicable literature pertaining to farmland markets. Specific 
attention will be paid to the uniqueness of farmland and how it differs from other goods 
that are sold through auctions. There will also be a review of the literature that deals 
specifically with theories about farmland auction mechanisms and bidding schemes.  
The literature on farmland markets is rich and deals mostly with the influences of 
production characteristics that affect farm income, government payments, capital gains 
(e.g., Shi, Phipps, and Colyer, 1997; Alston, 1986). It should be noted here that the 
purpose of this thesis is not to develop alternative methods of price formation in 
farmland markets; this topic has been thoroughly discussed (see King and Sinden, 1994 
for a review).  Rather, the focus of this thesis will be to determine the effects of auction 
choice on price level, auction efficiency, and industry evolution.  
 2.2.1 “Flowers versus Farmland”: Why is farmland so special? 
Auctions have traditionally been used to sell a variety of goods. Most famously perhaps 
have been the recent flurry of US radio spectrum licences and off-shore oil licences, as 
part of the deregulation of network industries all around the world. When Vickrey 
(1961) developed the Revenue Equivalence Theorem (RET) for auctions he did so 
under the assumption of independent private values, a phenomenon that may not 
always be applicable with goods to be auctioned. Nevertheless, many auctions are still 
designed with independent private values
10
 in mind. 
Farmland is one good that does not fit into the independent private values model. 
Firstly, farmland is a capital asset that can be resold in the future. It is long-lived and 
generates income over that time; it is also spatial in nature and cannot be transported. 
For these reasons, time and space matter when pricing land. There is speculation about 
                                                 
10
 Under independent private values, goods to be sold have a definite subjective value to each bidder that 
is know with certainty by that bidder. 
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the price of land, and the revenues it will generate long into the future. Land is also 
scarce, especially in a spatial fashion – there are only so many acres available in a 
given radius surrounding any particular location
11
. It is the combination of these 
qualities that make farmland unlike fine art or flowers; and a one-shot independent 
private values model of farmland auction markets may not function as expected. 
One of the most important features of farmland however, is its affiliated-values 
characteristics (a full description private-, common-, and affiliated-values will follow in 
later sections). Affiliated values in our context means any given agent‟s valuation for a 
plot of farmland is a function of their private-value, plus a common-value that is 
observed from other auctions and bidding behaviour. Incorporating the notion of 
affiliated-values greatly complicates the theoretical auction literature, as will be seen in 
later sections, since noisy common-value observations cause uncertainty and decrease 
efficiency (Goeree and Offerman 2002).  
Because of farmland‟s unique characteristics, designing an optimal auction mechanism 
for it is likely to be a daunting task. Instead, this thesis will attempt to incorporate the 
characteristics that are unique to farmland and we use simulations to draw conclusions 
about the comparative utility of various auction mechanisms.  
 2.2.2 Models of Farmland Auction Markets 
There have been few attempts to model farmland auction markets. One of the best 
known was by Colwell and Yavas (1994). They developed a model of strategic bidding 
in farmland markets when auctions are two-staged. In the first stage, land is divided 
into equal tracts and auctioned off independently. The second stage involves auctioning 
off the entire plot of land as one piece
12
. The authors assume independent private 
values and arrive at a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategy assuming agents 
behave non-cooperatively, meaning there are no collective bidding agreements. A 
                                                 
11
 Although fine art (e.g. a Picasso) can also be considered scarce, scarcity in farmland markets arises 
from spatial scarcity – because it may not be profitable to farm land 200 kilometers away. 
12
 This two stage game resembles a combinatorical auction, a topic that will not be considered in this 
thesis. Combinatorical auctions are known for generating bidding strategies that are complex and very 
difficult to solve.  This thesis will examine repeated 1 stage games in an attempt to shed light on auction 
design issues, not optimal bidding strategies.  
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subgame Nash equilibrium strategy is used because land is auctioned off in multiple 
stages and a solution concept requires that an equilibrium must found in stages of the 
game, not the extended game itself.  
Given that information in their model is perfect and private-values is assumed, players 
in the Colwell and Yavas auction are capable of formulating best response strategies 
based on their information, and the known best responses of other agents. A subgame 
perfect Nash equilibrium exists when an agent‟s strategy leads to an optimal outcome 
for every agent in the game based on a given strategy for all other players at each node 
of the extensive form game. This type of game is solved using backwards induction and 
relies on perfect information and finite number of possible strategies, or moves, for 
each player.  
Although interesting, this work makes assumptions about bidder private-values in order 
to arrive at a computable equilibrium strategy. As noted above, it is believed that 
farmland does not display the elements of the private-values assumption. As such, the 
results generated in Colwell and Yavas (1994) would seem to have limited value in the 
real world.  
There is another distinct thread of literature that attempts to explain price dynamics in 
farmland, but none of these deals specifically with the structure and dynamics of 
auction markets. Furthermore, there are no known papers that employ MAS to examine 
farmland markets. Freeman (2005) and Balmann (1997) use an auction-like mechanism 
in their research, but it is extremely simple and it is worth noting that the auction 
market is not the main focus of their work.  
 2.2.3 The Next Step in Farmland Auction Market Design 
This section outlined the features of farmland that make it different from traditional 
private-values goods in effect motivating the need for a non-traditional approach to the 
study of auctions. The literature on farmland auctions has not addressed the issue of 
affiliated-values adequately. I endeavour to enrich the literature to include evolutionary 
economics principles to the study of farmland auction markets in order to develop a 
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more complete understanding of the effect that farmland characteristics have on prices, 
variance, and efficiency when land is sold via auction.  
2.3 Mechanism Design:  Auctions 
Mechanism design is a subfield of economic game theory. Its goal is to  design rules of 
an asymmetric information game so as to elicit a desired response from players, 
generating the desired (most efficient) outcome. One of the most frequently studied 
branches of mechanism design by economists is auction theory. Proper mechanism 
design relies heavily on the solution concept chosen to arrive at the desired result. 
Economists have traditionally used Nash solution concepts when designing auction 
mechanisms. This section will examine the role that Nash solution concepts have 
played in sculpting current auction theory.  It is important to note that there is a well 
understood sense of what can and cannot be achieved with mechanism design of 
auctions using Nash solution concepts because of the strong assumptions it makes 
about agents‟ information and beliefs about other agents (Parkes and Ungar 2003). The 
limits to a Nash solution should be apparent after reading this section. 
 2.3.1 Roots of Classical Auction Theory 
This section will serve as an introduction to basic auction theory: where it originated, 
some of the assumptions underlying it, and the importance of risk preference and 
valuations. A discussion regarding optimal auctions and efficiency will highlight some 
of the advantages and drawbacks of examining auctions through a game theoretic lens. 
Finally, a review of literature on mechanism design enrichment and feedback and 
learning in experimental economics highlights some of the issues relevant to traditional 
Nash solution concepts.   
  2.3.1.1 William Vickrey and the Revenue Equivalence Theorem 
The Revenue Equivalence Theorem that has been so widely celebrated in economic 
literature for a half a century was first formulated by Vickrey (1961) and later 
generalized by Myerson (1981). Vickrey showed that, given the following assumptions, 
certain auctions will yield the same expected seller revenue and allocation of goods.  
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 Highest bidder wins the auction and receives the good 
 Bidders have independent private values and drawn from the same, commonly 
known distribution - values and bids are IID 
 Bidders are risk neutral 
 Bidders are not budget constrained 
 Bidders are perfectly rational and know that all other bidders are also perfectly 
rational, ad infinitum.  
 
The Revenue Equivalence theorem was developed under rather strong assumptions -  
risk neutrality, IID, perfect information, and homogeneity - in order to ensure that 
players could find a Nash Equilibrium bidding solution. This last point is particularly 
important to this thesis because auction theory has traditionally been examined using 
Nash Equilibrium bidding functions (Richter 2004).  
Vickrey‟s work showed that under the assumptions listed above, all private-valued 
auctions, including the well known English, Dutch, FPSB, or SPSB auctions yield the 
same expected seller revenue and allocation of goods. It was this single piece of work 
that gave birth to modern auction theory.  
  2.3.1.2 Risk Preferences 
Risk preference for buyers (and sellers) in auctions is a topic of importance to this 
thesis. It is now commonly known that any degree of risk aversion invalidates Revenue 
Equivalence and results in first-price auctions (Dutch) to be more profitable than 
second-price auctions (English) (Smith and Levin 1996)
13
. Intuitively, this would 
suggest bidders prefer second-price auctions relative to first-price, but in fact such a 
result does not always hold. For example, Matthews (1987) showed that if bidders 
exhibit decreasing absolute risk-aversion (DARA), a second-price auction is preferred, 
while the opposite is true if bidders have increasing absolute risk aversion (IARA). 
There are currently a number of papers examining alternative risk preference schedules 
under alternative auction mechanisms - for further reading see Maskin and Riley 
(1984). However, the literature tells us nothing about heterogeneous agents, either 
buyers or sellers, whose risk preferences can change over time.     
                                                 
13
 In much of the literature it is commonly assumed that sellers are risk neutral. 
  
20 
 
  2.3.1.3 Private, Common, and Affiliated Values  
Another of Vickrey‟s original assumptions about auctions that is often the topic of 
extensionary research is the independent private-values assumption (IID). Originally, 
Vickrey assumed that bidders would value a good independently of how other bidders 
valued the same good. Clearly, this assumption however does not apply to all goods 
that are sold by auction. In light of this, Wilson (1969) suggested what is known as the 
common values approach. Common-value means that all bidders value a good equally, 
but its actual value is unknown to all agents. Individual values are therefore based on 
each agent‟s best private information about the good. In effect, these values can differ 
between agents, but they are solely a function of the information available to each 
agent. The common values assumption is best known for generating the so-called 
winner’s curse situation: in common-value auctions with imperfect information, the 
winner tends to over pay for the good since the actual value of the good is likely to be 
closer to the average of all values.  
There is a third type of values model that is commonly modeled in auction theory. It 
uses elements of both private and common values to generate bidder valuations.  
Milgrom and Weber (1982) proposed a model of competitive bidding that accounts for 
personal preferences, preferences of others, and the intrinsic qualities of the good bid 
on. They developed what is called the affiliated-values model. Affiliated-values depend 
directly on the private information of all bidders; high valuation by one bidder makes 
high valuations by other bidders more likely. Their model yields higher prices in an 
English auction than a second-price auction, a result that contradicts standard private-
value auction theory. It should be noted that the majority of analytic auction theory 
relies on the private-values assumption because common- and affiliated-values models 
significantly increase the algorithmic complexity of the problem because of the need to 
incorporate these interdependencies (Matthews 1987). As such, little is understood 
about the effects of using common- and affiliated-values assumptions for bidding 
agents.  
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 2.3.2 Optimal Auction Design 
The literature on optimal auctions is vast and continually evolving. As such, it is 
impossible to discuss all avenues of research in this thesis. Alternatively, this section 
will comment on the literature in general and highlight a select few papers that relate to 
important issues not raised in this thesis.  
Since Vickrey (1961), much of the work on optimal auctions (and auctions in general) 
has focused on maximizing revenue for the seller given either; 1) the classical IID 
assumptions laid out by Vickrey and alternative types of auctions, or 2) abstractions 
from the IID assumptions.  
Riley and Samuelson (1981) highlight optimal auction conditions under IID 
assumptions and discuss the implications of relaxing these assumptions. Unfortunately, 
they address only a small subset of all possibilities. And Klemperer (2002) discusses 
some of the institutional issues associated with optimal auction design, such as entry 
and collusion. By using the lens of antitrust theory, he is able to comment on the likely 
success of different types of auction in the face of practical “auction failures” such as 
too few bidders or high information costs. Klemperer contends that what is important in 
auction design is not a one-size fits all auction, but rather a particular auction‟s 
robustness against these factors and its attractiveness to potential bidders. That is to 
say, “in practical auction design, local circumstances matter, the devil is in the details” 
(Klemperer 2002). 
Alternatively, in spite of the overwhelming trend to study optimality on behalf of the 
seller, i.e. revenue equivalence, a few papers addressing the bidder have emerged. One 
such paper is by Matthews (1987), where he compares bidders‟ preferences for 
different auctions dependent on their risk preference and the assumption that values are 
independent and private. He suggests that in order to examine auctions that are optimal 
for the buyers, it may be useful to examine revelation mechanisms that maximize the 
weighted sum of ex ante utilities subject to: i) a constraint binding expected utility from 
below; ii) interim participation constraints requiring the buyers to be willing to 
participate once they know their types; and iii) incentive constraints requiring that 
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truth-telling be a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Matthews also notes that in the face of 
private-, and in some cases affiliated-values, little can be said if bidders are risk averse 
without making strong assumptions.  
The literature on optimal auctions is extensive and encompasses a variety of cases 
based on the original framework put forth by Vickrey. Nevertheless, very little of this 
research comments on the applicability of such schemes in the real world and only 
recently has work on learning and the evolution of repeated auctions begun to appear in 
the literature. As such, there is much work to be done if theory is to give practitioners 
insight into real life auction design.    
 2.3.3 Auction Efficiency 
Along with auction optimality (maximizing seller revenue or buyer utility), the notion 
of auction efficiency is used as a means by which to rank alternative auctions. 
However, unlike the case of auction optimality, there is a more general consensus about 
the meaning of efficiency. For the purposes of this research, efficiency will be defined 
as in Maskin (2001). Assuming no ties for the highest valuation, and if bidder i is the 
winner, an auction is considered efficient if: 
 1 1
( ... ) [ ( ... )]i n j j n
i j
V S S Max V S S  (2.1)  
Thus an auction is efficient if the winner of the auction is the bidder with the highest 
valuation, conditional on all available information – all buyers‟ signals. This type of 
efficiency is referred to as ex post efficiency and it assumes that the social value of the 
good is equal to the maximum of the potential buyers‟ valuations. This definition of 
efficiency is chosen because it is the one that is most often used when evaluating actual 
auctions, like the well-publicized auctions for spectrum licenses and electricity 
capacity. In these types of auctions, the good being purchased is used to produce a good 
that is subsequently sold in a market without significant externalities. In this light, a 
definition of efficiency for auctions that sell spectrum licenses could well map on to the 
definition of efficiency for auctions that sell agricultural land as an input for producing 
agricultural commodities.  
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It is well established that sufficiently many buyers and values guarantee that the 
Vickrey auction is efficient. However, the  efficiency criterion fails when the private 
values assumption does not hold. In this regard, Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) proposed 
a new type of auction that maintains efficiency in the face of common-values. Their 
research shows that a generalized Vickrey (second-price) auction can be fully efficient, 
even with multiple goods and common-values, provided that the signals between 
players are one-dimensional. They also show that if signals are multi-dimensional, full 
efficiency is unattainable by any type of auction. This result is particularly important 
because it demonstrates that, with the current theoretical tools, it will not be possible to 
solve more complex common- and affiliated-value auction problems. Their result raises 
a serious question since many real life auctions do not meet the private-values 
assumption. Once again, it appears that there is a need to develop new avenues for 
studying more complex applied auction problems.  
 2.3.4 Experimental Auctions 
  2.3.4.1 Enrichment of Mechanism Design 
Enriched models attempt to use existing theories to make complicated extant auction 
frameworks applicable to everyday use. Many academics contend that current 
“optimal” auction frameworks are too difficult for bidders to use efficiently. Milgrom 
and Weber (1982) suggest that in order for the practical literature to catch up with the 
theoretical, more emphasis must be placed on realistic auction designs that make 
bidding and selling strategies more user-friendly. Rothkopf and Harstad (1994) offer a 
similar message. The theme of the latter work is that increasing the realism of existing 
auction models yields a tendency to change the results of theoretical predictions. They 
suggest there is a gap in the literature as a source of directly applicable models and that 
better modeling improvements would be more useful than additional equilibrium 
concepts under hypothetical situations.  
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  2.3.4.2 Bid Feedback and Learning in Experimental Economics 
There is a growing literature in bidding theory that uses experimental economics to 
compare individual bidding behaviour against the risk-neutral Nash equilibrium model 
(RNNE) proposed by Vickrey (1961).  However, much of the empirical evidence 
suggests that winning bidders in experimental auctions are significantly overbidding 
relative to what RNNE assumptions would predict (for a review, see Kagel 1995). In 
response to this, the constant relative risk aversion model (CRRAM) was developed by 
Cox et al. (1988). This model generalizes Vickrey‟s original work and allows for a 
degree of heterogeneity of bidders. The CRRAM model did not solve the problem; it 
merely opened up a discussion concerning CRRAM‟s ability to adequately explain 
overbidding.  
In response to the debate over CRRAM, an alternative bidding theory has recently been 
developed. It is called Impulse Balance Theory and Learning Direction Theory (LDT) 
(see Selten (2004) for an overview) and is an attempt to explain systematic overbidding 
by individuals in experiments. Neugebauer and Selten (2006) have also developed an 
experimental individual choice framework under which to test RNNE, CRRAM, 
impulse balance theory, and LDT.  
LDT is based on the concept of bounded rationality. After a subject experiences a loss, 
LDT assumes that the subject tends to increase his bid in hopes of producing the 
winning (highest) bid in subsequent auctions. Following a successful (winning) bid, the 
theory postulates that the subject would tend to decrease his bid in order to capture the 
entire surplus available in subsequent auctions while still winning the auction. On the 
other hand, impulse balance theory (Selten 2004) permits quantitative predictions of the 
long-run effects of LDT. Impulse balance theory applies to those economic situations in 
which clear activity impulses exist. Simply put, the theory hypothesizes that impulses 
involving greater gains are relatively more important to individuals. Impulse balance 
theory also suggests the existence of an impulse balance point at which upward and 
downward impulses cancel out in the long run.   
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Using this framework, Neugebauer and Selten (2006) find that the general one-shot 
Nash equilibrium game assumed in most auction models does not apply in a repeated 
game setting and they offer that information feedback leads to the overbidding 
behaviour that is often observed in experimental auction games. More specifically, they 
find that individuals with different ex post information bid differently in subsequent 
games and that those who have been given clear impulses or signals offered bids that 
were closer to the impulse balance point than either RNNE or CRRAM in over 50% of 
the cases.   
2.4 Multi-Agent Simulations of Auction Markets 
Using MAS to explore auctions is not a new avenue of research; in fact, there are a 
number of papers that have used MAS to examine the effects of learning, 
heterogeneity, or affiliated-values on classical revenue equivalence theories. Much of 
this literature has been fuelled by the realization that bidders cannot, in almost all cases, 
bid homogeneously according to their Nash bidding strategies (Richter 2004).  
There is a growing literature on auctions conducted with artificially intelligent agents. 
The following sections will highlight the benefit of using MAS for research into 
auction theory based on a selected few of these papers.  
 2.4.1 Benefits to Using MAS for Auction Simulation 
The following sections will highlight some of the advantages to using MAS for auction 
simulation. It will begin with a discussion about evolution and “steady-states”. Next, 
asymmetries in auctions will be considered, and this is followed by a description of the 
out-guess-regress problem, and finally, learning in auctions. In all cases, this section 
points out the advantages of using MAS in place of analytic game theory to examine 
auction mechanism design. The issues discussed below are of great importance to 
mechanism design, but at the present, game theory is unable to model them 
appropriately (Parkes and Ungar 2003).  
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  2.4.1.1 System Evolution and “Steady Sates” 
I have already described one of the major advantages of using MAS for auction 
analysis. Equilibria in MAS do not simply occur, but in fact, they are evolved (if they 
are achievable at all). Friedman (1998), Parkes and Ungar (2003), and Richter (2004) 
all speculate that assuming Nash behaviour overlooks the reality that in real world 
auctions, repeated playing is required if any sort of efficient equilibrium is ever to be 
reached.  
Richter (2004) tested the results of the revenue equivalence theorem (RET) with static 
auctions against results from evolutionary agent auctions. Results indicated that when 
agents are unable to instantaneously, and simultaneously behave Nash-like, RET fails 
for a variety of auction mechanisms.  
Evolutionary economics seeks to understand if and how a priori heterogeneous bidders 
arrive at Nash equilibria. By simulating evolutionary games, researchers are able to 
observe if and how such equilibria are achieved, and in their absence, if a “stable 
steady-state” of the system evolves. By definition, a steady-state in this sense “… is 
stable if, loosely, all nearby trajectories go to it.
14” 
The primary difference to note between evolutionary steady-states and standard 
equilibria is the element of time. In most cases, equilibria are assumed to happen 
instantaneously, and remain so until an element of the system changes, at which point a 
new equilibrium is found. Steady-states incorporate the element of time, and evolve 
with the system. Complex systems can be in or out of a steady-state. Systems that start 
in a steady-state will remain so certain factors are changed, at which point, the system 
evolves again over time until a new steady-state is reached (if at all). Complex systems 
that begin out of steady-state will attempt to evolve over time towards a steady-state, if 
one exists. Some complex systems contain no steady-state, and these systems can cycle 
back and forth with constant or increasing intensity.  
                                                 
14
 Definition taken from: http://economics.about.com/od/economicsglossary/g/stabless.htm 
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It is important to understand that the term steady-state in the evolutionary or complex 
sense does not imply static behaviour; a steady-state as referred to in this thesis implies 
an out-of-equilibrium system (i.e. the system does not assume instantaneous 
equilibrium) that demonstrates a converging trend or displays patterns of consistency 
(Arthur 2005). The very nature of MAS lends itself to out-of-equilibrium analysis 
where systems are analyzed to uncover the existence of steady-state characteristics.  
  2.4.1.2 Information Asymmetries  
Game theoretic models necessarily make assumptions about the commonality of 
individual knowledge to ensure that equilibrium is reached. Namely, either the 
preferences and rationality of agents of all agents must be common knowledge, or the 
agents must know each other‟s choices. These assumptions are often impractical since 
it is often the existence of private and asymmetric information that motivates market 
decentralization (Parkes and Ungar 2003).  
MAS systems are capable of dealing with asymmetries in information by assuming 
either; 1) the system has a dominant best-strategy for all agents in the game (i.e. 
bidding in a Second-Price Auction); or 2) the play of repeated games where agents 
learn and adapt to the asymmetries and try to move towards a steady-state (Parkes and 
Ungar 2003). Attempts to model information asymmetries under a classical game 
theoretic lens either require unrealistic assumptions, or result in a complex problem that 
is unsolvable analytically. The issue of asymmetries of information brings us back to 
evolutionary game concepts and evolving systems of autonomous, interacting economic 
agents.  
  2.4.1.3 The “Out-Guess-Regress” Problem and Bounded Rationality 
Economic theory offers little insight about how to model behavioural norms, such as 
learning and the speed of the learning process, both of which are known to be present in 
almost all real auction markets. In fact, game theory tends to abstract from such 
difficulties due to the complexity that they bring to the analysis. Theoretical results 
about behavioural norms are limited to very simple models and are still incomplete 
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(Zeng et al. 1998). In fact, even simple models of learning become complex and 
analytically impractical very quickly (Tesfatsion 2002). But a properly designed MAS 
enables researchers to examine the effects of behavioural norms in repeated auctions 
and observe the negotiation process in real time. Others offer  that MAS allows a focus 
on formulating protocols to emulate the negotiation process and also mimics sequential 
decision making techniques used in actual auctions (Zeng et al. 1998). 
Currently, game theoretic models developed with assumptions about highly rational 
agents cannot properly model the negotiation process when strategic interactions and 
learning are incorporated. Incorporating such assumptions into game theoretic models 
results in a problem called outguess regress, whereby individual agents anticipate the 
movements of others, knowing that others are anticipating these movements, knowing 
that other agents know about anticipating movements, and so on. Assuming bounded 
rationality (i.e. an agent with incomplete information or capabilities for solving a 
desired problem) in MAS eliminates one part of the “strategic” element and replaces it 
with uncertainty and beliefs about other players, thus leading to system convergence in 
a finite number of steps. This view is supported by Selten (2001), who argues that 
while rational choice models can have considerable explanatory power, some of the 
axiomatic assumptions of rational choice are contradicted by experimental evidence 
and may not translate to individual behaviour. In addition, Parker et al (2003) believe 
that a boundedly rational behaviour set that represents goal oriented decision making 
should be preferred to an optimization strategy resulting from fully rational agents. 
Despite the limitations of game theoretic models for accommodating behavioural 
norms, they are still useful for developing a foundation upon which MAS of auctions 
can be constructed. In this thesis, game theory will aid in forming the general outline of 
the auction markets and agent behaviour.  
  2.4.1.4 Learning in Auctions 
MAS learning has been a topic of increased exploration since researchers have realized 
that rational behaviour and optimization were not a complete and robust algorithm for 
generating simulated behaviour that mimics real world behaviour (Tesfatsion 2002). 
  
29 
 
Research on learning in artificial intelligence (AI) and MAS simulations began by 
endowing agents with genetic algorithms
15
 (GE) as learning mechanisms. However, 
many GE‟s in this sense were originally developed with assumed optimality conditions 
in mind, and as a result, they sometimes fail to capture the salient features of decision 
making processes in a social setting (Tesfatsion 2002).  
In order to more accurately reflect real economic learning processes, a number of 
suggestions have been made about how to model learning mechanisms. Gintis (2000) 
suggests “departing from the traditional view of game theory as a formal study of 
rational behaviour among strategically interacting agents”. Rather he promotes an 
“embodied mind” approach, whereby games are strategic interaction problems rooted 
in natural and social processes. He offers that economic agents repeatedly wrestle with 
a series of problems over time and slowly evolve the ability to play games successfully.  
Weiß (1995) believes that MAS learning is possible only when several agents are 
present. To that extent, economic learning more closely resembles learning from the 
existence of societal structures surrounding agents. In fact, there are numerous classes 
and categories of learning mechanisms used in MAS. Learning mechanisms are often 
grouped under one of two general headings; (1) logic based learning, and (2) biology 
based learning (Alonso et al. 2001).  While a complete overview of suggested learning 
mechanisms in MAS is beyond the scope of this thesis, several important examples of 
learning mechanisms need to be discussed.  
Zeng et al. (1998) developed a Bayesian method of learning in MAS where agents 
update their prior beliefs (distributions) based on newly acquired information. Their 
model investigates a competitive bidding negotiation process where agents are self-
interested and update their perception of other agents based on bids and counter offers 
in the negotiation process. Their results show that efficiency, speed and joint utility 
increased with learning relative to no learning in a sequential negotiation model. This 
finding certainly suggests that learning can be applied to MAS simulation and that 
                                                 
15
 A genetic algorithm is a technique used to find exact or approximate solutions to search or 
optimization problems.  For more information on GE‟s see: Goldberg, D. E. (1989) Genetic Algorithms 
in Search, Optimization and Machine Learning, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, MA.  
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simple forms of learning - updating beliefs - can greatly improve the efficiency of 
economic interactions. 
I suggest the effects of learning in MAS have a far greater impact on the system than is 
initially apparent. One of the side effects of learning agents is the manner in which they 
affect each other. Consider the case of a Bayesian learning environment, as discussed 
above, with several agents. Actions taken by the first agent will force all other agents to 
update their beliefs about this agent. However, since every agent knows that every 
other agent is updating their beliefs, all agents must update their beliefs about all other 
agents. Consequently, all subsequent actions taken by other agents will be affected by 
the actions of the first agent because this action altered the beliefs (and subsequent 
actions) of all other agents. This type of reasoning can be applied to every action that 
every agent takes, meaning that the actions of all agents are affected by the actions of 
all other agents. This is a classic example of dynamic feedback.  
While the Bayesian learning approach may be considered a „direct‟ information 
feedback mechanism because feedback comes from other agents, such mechanisms 
need not be direct to have observable consequences on the evolution of a repeated 
game. Hailu and Schilizzi (2004) provide a prime example of such a result. They 
develop a simulation model of agent bidding where agents learn based only on the 
consequences of their own actions. That is, agent‟s bids in time t + 1 are affected only 
by their bid in t and whether or not they won the auction. In this case, agents are not 
updating their beliefs about other agents, or using bidding information provided by 
other agents to adjust their bids. In their model, agents adjust their bids based on the 
following simple rule, with probabilities p and 1 - p respectively:  (1) if the previous 
auction was won, the agent bids the same or increases her bid by 10%; or (2) if the 
previous auction was lost, the agent bids the same or decreases her bid by 10%. Clearly, 
agents change their bids based only on their previous bids and the state of the outcome 
of the auction in the previous round. Yet despite its simplicity, this learning scheme 
results in indirect feedback that affects the behaviour of all agents and the evolution of 
the game.  
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At the heart of an MAS is the autonomy of individual agents, and it is this autonomy 
that permits agents to act – at least in part - on the actions of others in the system. This 
notion is quite different from the majority of traditional economic models in which 
agents interact only via market clearing prices (Durlauf 1997). Such direct interactions 
in turn allow economic MAS models to capture far more behavioural norms than their 
traditional counterparts. It is these interactions between agents that generate called 
feedback. In turn, systems containing feedback can exhibit multiple types of self-
directed behaviour on an aggregate level. In other words, feedback permits agents in a 
population to learn and make similar types of decisions, without knowing exactly what 
decision will be made or imposing constraints on the set of decisions to be made 
(Durlauf 1997). Making similar choices and conformity as a result of feedback from 
learning is another potential source of emergent phenomena in complex systems.  
2.5 Summary 
This chapter has laid the groundwork for the model that will be developed in this thesis. 
I have also motivated the use of MAS for studying the complexities of farmland auction 
markets. The simulation model that follows is developed using ideas from MAS, game 
theory, and farmland markets and as such calls on diverse threads of literature to 
capture all of the salient features observed in real world farmland markets.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
3.0 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the conceptual model that underlies this multi-agent simulation. It 
begins by rhetorically describing the model and the assumptions that govern its 
function. The agents (players) are described, followed by a description of the 
behavioural and structural equations that make up the simulation model.  
This simulation is comprised of a series of relatively simple behavioural equations for 
each agent, and each agent makes calculated decisions based on experiences and 
expectations that affect the decision set of all other agents in every time period to come. 
The informational asymmetries, agent heterogeneity, feedback, and the importance of 
time and space create a complex economic environment that benefits from the use of  
MAS as a tool for analysis.  
3.1 Model Flow 
This section illustrates the general flow of the simulation model of farmland auctions. 
Understanding the flow of the simulation will greatly aid in understanding how, when, 
and why agents make certain decisions. Later sections will describe in more detail the 
agents in the model (farmers and retirees) and the assumptions guiding their behaviour.  
Figure 3.1 is a flow diagram outlining the major steps taken by agents in the simulation. 
Farmers start at time t = 0 in the Crop Production Module, where all production, 
harvesting, and crop sale activities take place. Farm agents then move on to the Farm 
Finances Module where agents determine if they should remain in the market or exit. 
Exit can occur for a variety of reasons discussed in more detail below. Farmers who 
exit the industry become retirees and move to the Auction Module, where they remain 
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until all their land is sold, at which point they exit the simulation completely. Farm 
agents who decide to continue farming will then enter the Expectations Module where 
they update their expectations about future crop prices and yields. They subsequently 
attempt to purchase land if they are financially able. Otherwise, they do not purchase 
land and wait until the next growing season. All farmers remaining in the simulation 
receive farmland price information from auctions via an information diffusion 
mechanism. This diffused information becomes the learned price information upon 
which individual bids are based. 
Finally, farm agents who meet the necessary criteria enter the Auction Module and bid 
on plots of land as they become available until they have purchased all the land that 
they require, at which point they exit and wait until either; 1) all land is sold, or; 2) 
there are no bidders remaining. Subsequently, all remaining farmers proceed to the 
Crop Production Module and another simulated year begins. Additional detail about 
each module is provided in subsequent sections.  
3.1.1 Farmers 
Farmers are the first breed or type of agents in the model. Farm agents are assumed to 
produce crops on their land and sell them at market prices. All farmers aged < 55 are 
assumed to want to expand their farm size by purchasing land from farmers who are 
exiting the market.  
In contrast to some other related work on farmland markets, this model assumes no 
leased land or leasing market. This assumption is made so that emphasis can be put on 
the market for buying and selling land, as is typically the case in North America and the 
region under analysis
16
. Farmers in the simulation are initially endowed with land, 
machinery and cash. I also assume that there is no government support for farmers and 
no off-farm income. Income is generated based solely on a farmer‟s ability to farm the 
land successfully
17
. Farmers seek to invest positive income streams by purchasing land 
                                                 
16
 This is in contrast to European markets where most farmland is leased by producers.  
17
 It is important to note that the author has considered the implications of making these assumptions. 
They are made in order to focus the analysis on the issue at hand – farmland auction markets. Without 
leasing, farmers are forced to pay larger lump sums of cash if operations are to be increased. It also 
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at the lowest price possible, farming it until they exit, and then selling their land at the 
highest price possible through specified auction markets.  
Figure 3.1 Simulation Flow Diagram 
 
Farm agents farm all the land they own in each period until they are either forced out of 
the market for credit reasons, equity protection, or old age. In the simulation, a random 
percentage of farmers pass down their land to an heir if the farm is financially viable. 
Furthermore, farm agents are assumed to be rational and act upon the best information 
(albeit incomplete and asymmetric) available to them.  
 3.1.2 Retirees  
Retirees are the second breed of agents in this model. Retirees are farmers who have 
left the industry and want to sell the land that they own. In this sense, once a farmer 
                                                                                                                                              
implies that farmers take on long-term investment, as opposed to signing short term leases. The author is 
also aware that optimal farm scale and risk incentives are altered when government support and off-farm 
income are removed.  
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becomes retired they can be considered land owners who wish to sell their land once 
the right price arrives. If a retiree is unsuccessful in selling all her plots of land (due to 
a lack of local buyers or her reservation price not being met) in the first year of 
retirement, she is assumed to hold on to land that has not sold. Furthermore, it is 
assumed that she does not farm this land, nor does she lease the land
18
. All remaining 
plots of land go up for sale again in subsequent periods, but at a discounted price, and 
the agent further reduces her reservation price. This process continues each simulated 
year until all plots are sold. I also assume that farm agents pass on any unsold land to 
an heir when they die, and these agents in turn put the land up for sale. As such, there is 
no need to specify who actually holds the land once an agent retires, only that the land 
is for sale and the maximum price is desired by the owner. In other words, retirees have 
different incentives than farmers because they seek only to maximize cash sales of land. 
To this extent, it will be important that retirees set optimal reservation prices to extract 
the maximum amount of surplus from the buyer.  
3.2 Commodity Production Factors  
Farms are assumed to produce their crops using 3 inputs; land, labour, and capital. This 
section will highlight the importance of each of these inputs and how each input is 
characterized in the model. Much of this portion of the simulation is based on the work 
of Balmann (2000) and Freeman (2005).  
 3.2.1 Land 
Each plot of farm land is assigned to 1 of 4225 plots on a 65 X 65 simulated grid that 
comprises the farming landscape. Each plot represents one quarter-section or 160 acres. 
In this model, plots are heterogeneous in cultivatable acres and quality. Cultivatable 
acres represent the number of acres that a farmer can use for growing crops, and this 
value is fixed throughout the simulation. For reference, the mean of cultivatable acres 
in the simulation is 150 with a natural upper bound of 160. Plot quality is also fixed and 
represents the soil quality of a specific plot of land. Quality is homogeneous within a 
                                                 
18
 We understand that this assumption is unrealistic; however to reiterate, the assumption is made so that 
emphasis can be placed on the sales market.  
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plot, but varies across plots. In turn, each plot has a quality that is correlated to the plots 
surrounding it. Quality is tracked using a relational variable. Plots with higher quality 
(quality > 1) will have higher yields than plots with lower quality (quality < 1) ceteris 
paribus. Plots of average quality have quality normalized to unity.  
Farmsteads are dispersed randomly across the landscape and physically situated on one 
plot. That plot is considered to be the farmstead plot until the farmer exits the industry 
and sells the plot containing the farmstead, at which time it is assumed that the new 
farmer of that plot utilizes it for cropping. Each plot can be owned by only one farmer 
at any time and all plots are assumed to be farmed in each period by their owner.  
In each period plots are also randomly assigned a weather variable that affects yields in 
the same manner as quality. Weather is assumed to be diffused and, correlated across 
plots, in a similar manner as quality.  
 3.2.2 Labour and Capital 
Similar to the work of Freeman (2005), I assume that farm agents supply most, but not 
all, of the required labour for crop production. Additional farm labour is purchased on 
the open market and family withdrawals are made to compensate farm agents for 
supplying labour. These issues will be discussed again in subsequent sections. For 
tractability, non-land capital costs are assumed to be in constant, fixed proportions 
relative to land usage.  
3.3 Farm Agent Productivity 
One of the key components of heterogeneity among farmers will be in their 
productivity measure - Skill. Farmers will inherently have different levels of 
productivity that I assume remain constant over time; productivity could be thought of 
as an exogenous variable like managerial ability. For our purposes, we will assume that 
farmers with higher skills are capable of altering crop mixes more effectively so as to 
extract more output than lesser skilled farmers
19. Farmers of average „skill‟ will have a 
                                                 
19
 Allowing for information diffusion in the form of skill sets would be an extension to this thesis.  
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productivity level of unity. The distribution of skill level is chosen to be η ~ (1, 0.05) 
with upper and lower bounds of 1.2 and 0.8 respectively. 
Productivity is important for several reasons. Farmers who are more productive (Skill > 
1) will produce greater yields, and thus more income, than farmers who are less 
productive (e.g. Skill < 1), ceteris paribus. Farm income is one of the key drivers in a 
farm‟s ability to purchase more land and grow. Also, by holding farmer productivity 
constant it will be possible to examine to what degree more productive farmers grow 
their land base faster than less productive farmers and if more skilled farmers have a 
higher success rate than less skilled farmers.  
3.4 Entrepreneurial Attitude and Risk Preference 
I assume that farmers are also heterogeneous in entrepreneurial attitude, and thus their 
risk preference. Farmers‟ risk preference, and therefore their willingness to assume risk, 
will be a function of their assumed goals and objectives for their farm enterprise. A life-
cycle process, similar to that developed in Freeman (2005), is developed and will 
determine the level of risk that each farmer is willing to undertake. Farms in the 
simulation will operate in one of three phases: 1) Growth and Expansion, 2) 
Development, and 3) Maintenance. Phases are directly correlated to the age of the 
farmers. A fourth phase, Exit and Retirement, is also incorporated in the model and 
means that farmers who are close to retirement do not purchase any more land. 
However, this phase has no additional bearing on their risk preference.  
During the Growth and Expansion phase, farmers will be mostly concerned with 
increasing farm size and subsequently will be willing to take on greater risk than a 
farmer in the Maintenance phase whose main objective should be equity protection 
(Olson 2004). Demographically, as farmers age they pass from the least risk averse 
phase to the most risk averse phase and finally on to the Exit and Retirement phase.  
A risk neutral farmer (of which there are none in this model) would have a risk 
preference equal to unity. I also assume that all farmers within a prescribed age range 
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(Life Cycle Phase) have the same risk preference
20
. Farmer risk preference is important 
in the land bidding process because farmers with higher risk avoidance preferences will 
tend to discount their maximum bid more than farmers will lower risk preferences. To 
this extent, risk preference and associated degree of bidding success can affect a 
farmer‟s ability to meet their goals and objectives. A farmer‟s risk avoidance 
preferences will also affect her risk aversion for losing an auction.  
Farmers in this model are endowed with very simple goals and objectives. Primarily, all 
farmers desire to increase the number of plots owned throughout their lifecycle, until 
they reach the Exit and Retirement phase. One salient feature of this assumption is that 
farmers‟ utility is derived not by cash stocks, but by the number of plots managed. 
However, during the Exit and Retirement phase, it is assumed that farmers seek to 
maximize the revenue from selling their plots
21
.  
3.5 Farm Agent Activities and Decision Parameters 
Section 3.5 presents the equations that govern the actions of each agent throughout the 
simulation. Each sub-section will discuss equations that constitute the modules in figure 
3.1. Given the discussion in the previous chapter, I aim to convince the reader that this 
economic system is complex. Many of the behavioural equations are very simple, but 
because of the bottom-up nature of the simulation, determining  analytic solutions to 
this system, especially when agent interactions are considered, would likely be 
impossible.  
 3.5.1 Crop Production and Revenue 
Farmer agents are assumed to generate gross crop revenue through the sale of their 
crops. All farmers are assumed to crop the same four types of crops, but in different 
mixes. As previously noted farmers with greater skill choose better crop mixtures and 
thus have better aggregate yields. Crop yields are composed of the weighted average of 
                                                 
20
 Although not realistic, this assumption is made for computational simplicity and tractability. It is also 
based on work by Freeman (2005).  
21
 Farmers who do not sell their plots and pass them down to next generation farmers as assumed to 
derive utility from passing down the greatest number of plots possible.  
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4 different crop types. That is, average yields realized by farmers with the same skill is 
the same for their given crop mix, ceteris paribus. Multiple crops in the mix are chosen 
in order to reflect realistic farm operations, including hedging against production and 
price risk. Diversification of crops is also necessary for crop rotational purposes. Total 
individual crop prices and yields for each farmer are composed of a weighted average 
of the four types of crops that are assumed to be grown. Equations 3.1 and 3.2 illustrate 
the relationship between individual prices (yields) and weighted average prices (yields) 
respectively; 
 1 2 3 4
t t t t tP P P P P  (3.1)  
 1 2 3 4
t t t t tY Y Y Y Y  (3.2)  
with 1  and , , , 0 .  
Both prices, iP , and average yields, iY , are assumed to be exogenously determined. 
Yields are affected by random weather patterns and prices are determined in the world 
market - no one farmer has an influence on prices. As such, price and yield vectors are 
imported into the model.  
Total production for farm agent k in year t is: 
 
t t t t
k k kTP M A Y  (3.3)  
, ,t tk kM A and 
tY  are the annual multiplier of farmer k, cultivatable acres belonging to 
farmer k, and average yield in time t, respectively. The annual multiplier of farmer k is 
defined as:  
 
xyt t
k xy kt
k
K
M PI Sk
K
 (3.4)  
where  
t
xyPI  is the productivity of plot xy in time t, equal to ( )
t
xy xyRain Quality  
 
xyK is the crop acres of plot xy 
 t
kK  is the total crop acres managed by farm agent k 
 kSk  is the productivity (skill) measure for agent k 
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Total production for farmer k is a function of the number of cultivatable acres owned, 
average crop yield, and the annual multiplier of farmer k. The annual multiplier is a 
function of the farmer‟s skill, the quality of their cropland, and the weather variable 
(rain), while this latter is responsible for differentiating average yields between farmers. 
So part of the annual multiplier is random and exogenous (rain), while the remainder is 
dependent on a farmer‟s initial endowment (quality and skill).  
Gross revenue received by farmer k in year t when price is equal to tP  is  
 
t t t
k kGR TP P  (3.5)  
which is simply the total product produced by the farm agent on all plots of land 
managed multiplied by the exogenous price in that year.  
 3.5.2 Costs of Production 
Total cost of production for farm agent k is composed of fixed and variable costs. 
Variable costs are a function of area cultivated, yield realized, and distance from plot xy 
to agent k‟s farmstead. Similar to the work of Freeman (2005), farm agents do not 
decrease variable costs incurred if yield is expected to be poor. Fixed costs are constant 
in year t but can vary across years t and t + 1 and include cost of capital, debt 
payments, and capital replacement. For simplicity, family/management living 
withdrawal is also considered as a fixed cost.  
Variable costs are computed as the sum of all variable costs for all plots of 
land, (1 ,..., )k k ki I , managed by farm agent k in year t, and includes any non-family 
labour that is used;  
 
1
( ( ) )
I
t acre vol
k k i i i
i
VC A VC W V VC  (3.6)  
where: kA  is cultivatable acres belonging to farmer k,  
 acre
iVC is the variable cost per acre of plot i 
 W is the non-family labour per acre for agent k 
 iV  is the production volume for plot i 
 vol
iVC  is the variable cost of production for plot i 
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Travel and transportation costs consist of the costs for farmer k to check on his crops as 
well as the cost of hauling the product back to the farmstead once it is harvested. 
Consequently, there is an incentive for farmers to purchase additional plots near to the 
farmstead as possible – and this effect will be captured in expected land values and 
bidding strategies. Total transportation costs are computed as the sum of the travel and 
trucking costs to all plots currently managed for agent k;   
 
1
I
t
k xy
i
TV TE  (3.7)  
and  
 ( )xy xy xyTE D Travel V Truck  (3.8)  
where:  kTV  is the total transportation costs incurred by agent k in year t 
 
xyTE  is the transportation cost associated with plot xy in year t 
 
xyD  is the distance from plot xy to farmer k‟s farmstead 
 Travel is the annual cost of travel and transporting equipment per unit of  
  distance 
 
xyV is the volume of all crops (weighted average) of plot xy 
 Truck is the annual cost of transporting crop output per unit of distance 
 
Thus, the total variable costs incurred by farmer k in year t are Total t t
k k kVC VC TV . In 
order to calculate the total costs incurred by farmer k in t, fixed costs and family 
deductions must also be included. Since there is no land leasing market, there is no 
annual fixed cost to leasing land. As such, only the fixed costs of replacing machinery 
and buildings, family living withdrawals, and debt servicing payments are included in 
this simulation. And as mentioned earlier, lumpy investments are not modeled, but 
annual reinvestment requirements are set equal to the economic rate of depreciation.  
 Recapital placementFC C  (3.9)  
The family deduction is the minimum amount of cash that must be withdrawn from 
farm operation to cover living expenses, managerial costs, and family labour (Freeman, 
2005). I assume here that farms do not have access to off farm income, allowing them 
to reduce their family deductions.  All farms have the same minimum family 
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withdrawal and marginal propensity to consume from gross revenues. However, annual 
withdrawals increase in farm size as a result of additional managerial and labour 
burdens.  
 
min t
k k k kFW FW GR K  (3.10)  
where:  FW is the total family withdrawal for farm agent k 
 minFW  is the minimum family withdrawal amount for agent k 
  is the marginal propensity to consume for farm agent k 
  is the management/labour cost adjustment for an additional plot of land 
 
Total fixed cash commitment for a farm operator becomes;  
 
Total capital
k k k kFC FC FW DebtService  (3.11)  
where DebtService is the total debt payment in time t. Therefore, total costs sustained 
by farm agent k in time t are Total TotalFC VC . Any revenues generated above and 
beyond this amount are carried over to year t + 1 and are subject to interest accrued. 
Once farmers have succeeded in saving a threshold level of cash and assets, they are 
able to seek out land to bid on in hopes of expanding their farm operations
22
.   
 3.5.3 Farm Exits and Farm Expansion 
Over the course of their lifecycles, farm agents take part in production activities that 
may allow them to acquire the funds to purchase additional land, thus expanding their 
farm. It is assumed that in time t = 0 all farm land is owned, so for any one farm agent 
to purchase land in subsequent time periods, at least one other farm agent must be 
willing to sell land. Farm agents sell land when they exit the market. Market exit in the 
model occurs for one of 3 reasons - Retirement, Forced Exit, or Voluntary Exit.   
Retirement occurs when farmers reach a critical age and no longer wish to farm. The 
probability of retirement increases in age. The retirement phase begins when farmers 
reach the age of 55 and ends with forced retirement at the age of 80. Forced exit occurs 
when a farmer fails a test for financial solvency - if a farmer has debt that exceeds 90% 
of their asset value, they are deemed insolvent and forced out of the market. Their land 
                                                 
22
 Assuming that they are not in the Exit and Retirement phase of their lifecycles and have no children to 
pass the land on to; at which point farm agents attempt to save as much cash as possible for retirement.  
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is then sold on the open market. Voluntary exit occurs when a farmer calculates that it 
is no longer profitable to farm and chooses to exit to protect their equity. Farmers 
choose to exit the market when they have had Net Cash Flow Before Investment 
(NCFBI) < 0 for 4-9 (random) years in a row.  
 ( )
t Total Total
k k k kNCFBI GR FC VC  (3.12)  
After retirement or a voluntary exit, farmers can choose to sell their land on the open 
market or hand it down to an heir. The probability of farm take-over by an heir is set 
prior to initializing the model and remains constant throughout the simulation. In order 
for a farm to be taken over, farm equity must be at least 60% of farm assets. If this 
condition is met, a farm will be passed down to an heir with some predetermined 
probability, ρ. Again, if land is not passed down, it is sold on the open market. Here I 
also make the assumption of no “arms-length” sales, and all plots that are sold are sold 
on the auction block and there are no private sales.   
Land that becomes available for purchase and is bid on by farmers aged 54 (or 
younger) who have been deemed credit worthy for a loan. Credit worthiness is 
determined by a debt to asset ratio (D/A ratio) check and a minimum amount of cash to 
cover down payment and cropping costs for the following year. Farmers also are 
monitored to ensure that expected production margins are sufficient to cover family 
withdrawals and future debt payments. Expected production margins are calculated as 
follows (Freeman 2005):  
 1 1[ ] (1 ) [ ]t t tE PM E PM PM  (3.13)  
Famers who meet all 4 criteria are free to make bids on available land. Issues 
surrounding bid formation and credit constraints are discussed below. 
3.5.4 Expectation Formation 
In light of the evolutionary characteristics of this model, farm agents will be forced to 
make a series of decisions over time; decisions that will affect their welfare, and the 
welfare of others in their local and global environment. In order to make these 
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decisions, it is important for farm agents to form expectations about a number of 
unknown parameters.  
For instance, farmers who decide to buy (or sell) land will be forced to formulate 
expectations about future yields and prices to determine the expected profitability of a 
plot of land. The maximum willingness to pay (WTP) for a plot of land is based on 
expectations about future yields and prices, and the costs associated with these 
expectations. Price and yield expectations are formulated as follows
23
:  
 1 2 3 4 5[ ]t t t t t tE P P P P P P  (3.14)  
 1 2 3 4 5[ ]t t t t t tE Y Y Y Y P P  (3.15)  
with 1 and , , , , 0 .  
I assume that ε is decreasing in Skill level. In other words, for each agent the error term 
ε is independently and identically distributed each time it is used for calculation24. 
It is important to note differences in prices versus yields. Prices are a global parameter 
(the same for all agents) and thus all farmers will have the same information and 
predicted price in t. This price is then multiplied by ε to account for variations in 
expectations. Yields however, are a local parameter (they vary across agents) due to 
exogenous factors like weather and managerial skills. I assume that farmers only have 
yield information (or trustworthy yield information) for their own crops. As such, the 
information used by farm agent k will be the average of farm agent k‟s yields for time 
periods t - 1, t - 2, and t – 3, t – 4, and t - 5 adjusted for the average soil quality of their 
land.  
 3.5.5 Land Market 
The following  will motivate  a farm agent‟s decision to buy or sell land and discuss 
how a farm agent calculates their maximum willingness to pay (WTP) and minimum 
                                                 
23
 Equations 3.13-3.15 are based on the work of Freeman (2005) and were chosen because he found them 
to be acceptable means of formulating expectations when regional structural change in agriculture was 
examined.  
24
 ε ~ η (0, ώ) where ώ is a function of skill. More details are available in the simulation code in 
Appendix A.  
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willingness to accept (WTA) for a plot of land
25
. This section will end with a discussion 
about agent learning.  
  3.5.5.1 Maximum WTP, Credit Constraints, and Bid Formation 
Since I assume that farm agents derive utility from acquiring as much land as possible, 
a farm agent‟s utility is based partly on their ability to make a few key judgments. 
Explicitly, these include calculating maximum WTP, deciding on an optimal bid, and 
learning from past experiences. Aside from a skill parameter that only affects 
agricultural production, farm agents are assumed to be homogeneous in other skills; 
this includes their ability to make the aforementioned decisions. As such, farm agents 
will only gain advantages over one another in their experiences and learned price 
information from experience. In effect, farmers who make these decisions more often 
will have more information on which to base future decisions, allowing them to make 
more accurate expectation calculations. Farm agents who meet all four criteria outlined 
in section 3.6.3 can take part in the land market as buyers and thus they need to make 
the following calculations.  
When a buyer calculates maximum WTP, she uses her expectations about prices, 
yields, and the future price of land. Bidding more frequently allows farmers to obtain 
more accurate information about the expected price of land, and this can decrease error 
in maximum WTP estimation. Equation 3.16 illustrates this:  
 [[ . Re ] ]kMaxWTP PVInc E saleValue CapitalInvestment Risk  (3.16)  
where:  
 
[ ]1. 1
(1 )T
E
PVInc
r r
 and r is the interest rate, T is the year in which 
the agent expects to leave the industry. This is simply her discounted present 
value of expected future income streams. 
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 WTP is the amount that a farmer is the maximum that a farmer is willing to pay for a plot of land when 
purchasing it. WTA is the minimum a farmer is willing to accept in exchange for a plot of land when 
selling it.  
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  [ ]E  is the annual expected net revenue of owning the plot of land, using 
expected prices and yields from (3.14-3.15) and adjusted for quality. 
 [Re ]
(1 )
T
T
V
E saleValue
r
 and TV is the expected price of land in T 
calculated from learned information about prices. TV is used to estimate the 
value of land in T since agents have no other information upon which to base an 
estimate. In effect, I am assuming that land in T will be valued the same as it is 
in t and only simply needs to be adjusted for the time value of money. Agent 
learning from experience in the auctions plays a large role in determining how 
well TV   is estimated. 
 
xyCapitalInvestment K C  where C is the non-land capital requirement per 
acre for land farmed.  
 is defined as above 
 Risk is the risk aversion parameter associated with entrepreneurial attitude and 
is strictly < 1 
Farmers are sometimes also constrained by a maximum borrowing limit. Similar to 
reality, I assume that farmers make a 25% down payment on any land purchases. This 
implies that farmers must borrow 75% of the purchase price from lending institutions. 
To that end, lending institutions place a maximum borrowing limit on farmers who 
wish to bid. This maximum borrowing limit is determined as follows: 
 20
1
1
(1 )
MeanNCFBI
r
MaxBorrow
r
 
(3.17)  
Where MeanNCFBI is the average of a farmer‟s previous 5 years NCFBI, and r is the 
interest rate which in turn makes 3.17 the capitalized value of cash flows. MaxBorrow 
represents 75% of the maximum credit constrained bid a farmer can make. Therefore, 
the maximum credit constrained bid is:  
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 / (1 .25)MaxBid MaxBorrow  (3.18)  
If MaxBid lies below MaxWTP, MaxBid becomes the upper bound for a bid; otherwise 
MaxWTP is a farmer‟s upper bound.  
Since farmers know their absolute upper bound for a bid, they must determine their 
valuation for a plot of land. In order to compute this, a farmer relies on prior experience 
and learned price information. Additionally, individual valuation is also determined by 
risk preference.  
A farmer‟s risk aversion to losing an auction will be reflected in their valuation of the 
land. This type of risk is inversely related to expectation risk and is captured by placing 
upper and lower bounds on a farmer‟s expected value of land. This is shown in Table 
3.1. Farmers in the Growth and Expansion Stage are considered to be the least risk 
averse farmers and aggressively seek to expand their farms. I assume that these farmers 
are the most risk averse to losing the auction. Farmers in the Development Stage still 
seek to expand, but not as aggressively. Finally, farmers in the Maintenance Stage still 
seek expanding, but do so very cautiously and are the least risk averse to losing of all 
farmers.  
In this model no one farmer knows the value of a plot of land, and must rely on their 
learned information to estimate a value of a plot of land
 26
. Farmers will use their 
learned information to pick their valuation from a distribution of values, an idea 
motivated in part by the work on Bayesian updating by Zeng et al. (1998). These values 
are normally distributed about a farmer‟s learned mean price and standard deviation of 
land.  
In order to reflect a farmer‟s risk aversion to losing an auction, these distributions are 
truncated as shown in table 3.1. 
A farmer then selects a value, X, from the corresponding distribution. If X lies above 
the upper bound, X is set to Min(MaxBid, MaxWTP), otherwise the estimated value of 
the land remains at X.  
                                                 
26
 Learned prices are adjusted to reflect different qualities of land. 
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Table 3.1 Farm Agent Valuation Distributions 
 Distribution Truncation 
Stage  Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Growth and 
Expansion ~N(Est.Mean, Est.Std.Dev) Mean - (1 Std.Dev) Mean + (3 Std.Dev) 
Development ~N(Est.Mean, Est.Std.Dev) Mean - (2 Std.Dev) Mean + (2 Std.Dev) 
Maintenance ~N(Est.Mean, Est.Std.Dev) Mean - (3 Std.Dev) Mean + (1 Std.Dev) 
Source: Author‟s calculations.  
  3.5.5.2 Reservation Price  
All land that is submitted to auction by either retirees or voluntary exit farmers is 
assigned a reservation price and is put up for sale each period until it sells at a price 
equal to, or above its reservation price. I assume that farmers who are forced out of the 
market have all their assets, including land, repossessed and sold by the bank who then 
assigns a reservation price. Reservation prices are not revealed to the bidders at any 
point. Farm agents have incentives to receive the highest price possible for their land 
since the cash generated; 1) is an asset, and 2) goes towards retirement where more 
cash is desirable. 
Reservation prices are calculated based on a seller‟s perceived price of land at time t. 
Perceived prices are a function of learned information about current average price per 
acre. Farm agent k will set  
 [ (1 )]
t
kk kMinWTA V Sk  (3.19)  
where 
t
kV  is seller k‟s learned price of land adjusted for acres and quality, and  is a 
measure of urgency. I also assume that retired farmers frequently attend auctions 
seeking to sell their land, and that their price information, 
t
kV , is at least as accurate as 
the best informed farmer.   
As a retiree becomes more urgent to sell their land,  increases, leading to a reserve 
price decrease. Farm agents will have different degrees of urgency under different 
situations. The longer a plot is held for sale without being sold, the higher the seller‟s 
urgency. This is intended to capture the effect of retirees who are seeking to sell of all 
  
49 
 
their plots in a reasonable time so as to obtain the equity stored in these plots. Urgency 
parameters are distributed as follows:   
Table 3.2 Distribution of Urgency Parameters 
Years Retired Urgency Parameter 
≤ 2 0.85 
> 2 0.80 
> 5 0.75 
         Source: Author‟s Calculations 
  3.5.5.3 Farm Agent Learning 
The breadth of the agent learning literature has already been discussed. This section 
will focus on agent learning mechanisms specific to this thesis. Once again, a number 
of assumptions are made in order to make the model tractable and I will highlight the 
features that have been deemed most important to this research.  
The first set of assumptions concerns what agents can learn. All farm agents are 
assumed to have the capability to learn, and do so at an equal rate. Agents learn about 
prices of transacted land parcels, and how to increase 1) the probability of increasing 
rents when an auction is won, 2) the probability of winning an auction.  Furthermore, 
agents only learn information after an auction has been closed. In other words, farm 
agents are not able to use price information (bids) in the same auction in which it was 
revealed
27
. A second assumption I make is that for each auction, m M , only 1 plot of 
land is sold. There is a separate auction for each plot of land for sale. Finally, all 
auctions are assumed to be conducted precisely on the plot being sold. The location of 
any auction m is exactly equal to the (x,y) coordinates of plot xy being auctioned.  
When agents learn, they will do so via two separate mechanisms called Local and 
Global Learning mechanisms. Local learning occurs when an agent participates in an 
auction; agent k is said to learn locally from auction m when she is a bidder in auction 
m. Local Learning takes place by means of two pathways; 1) Price Information, 2) 
Optimal Bidding Information. Price information learning means that agents 
                                                 
27
 This assumption is relaxed slightly for English auctions. This issue is discussed below. 
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participating in auction m learn the final price (Price Information) of the plot of land 
sold in auction m
28
. This information is perfect and known to all bidders in m. Optimal 
Bidding information is slightly more complex and is discussed in detail below.  
Global Learning about auction m occurs for all agents who do not take part in auction 
m. All agents k K  who do not participate in m will receive final price information by 
means of a diffusion process. Specifically, final price information from auction m will 
diffuse through the population, getting noisier as the agent‟s distance from (x,y) 
increases, according to the following equation;  
 ( ) ( ) ( )
t t
xy xyP m P m m  (3.20)  
where:
 
t
xyP  is the noisy signal heard by agent k from auction m 
 
t
xyP  is the true final price of plot xy in auction m 
 ( )m is the noise term. This is (0, ( ))S m  and S(m) is increasing in distance 
 from the location of auction m to the farm agent k.  
 
It is important to note that all farm agents possess a limited memory. They are only 
capable of holding a finite amount of price and bid information. Once their memory 
capacity is full, new information replaces the oldest piece of information.  
Optimal bidding is modeled after Neugebauer and Selten‟s (2006) Learning Direction 
Theory (LDT) and is a qualitative behavioural theory based on bounded rationality. 
LDT is motivated by ex post rationality and forces agents to ask themselves if a 
different action might have produced a better result.  
For example, consider farm agent k who wishes to bid on plot xy during auction m. 
Agent k estimates her value, X , and depending on the auction mechanism used and her 
information, calculates her optimal bid B(X). Now consider the following cases; 1) 
agent k wins the auction; and 2) agent k loses the auction.  
Case 1: Agent k wins auction m in t and has incurred surplus 1S . In her next auction 
agent k will bid:  
 
                                                 
28
 This is true only for auction designs that allow such information. i.e. sealed bid auctions only reveal 
the final price; where as an English auction reveals the bids and the final price.  
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 i) B(X) with probability  
 ii) B(X) - % with probability 1-  so as to potentially receive more surplus 
 
Case 2: Agent k loses auction m in t and bids B(X) + % in her next auction so as to 
increase her chances of winning in t.  
The model will be simulated with and without LDT for each type of auction in order to 
determine the effects of LDT in this repeated game setting. I expect that incorporating 
LDT in the model will alter  the results since  agents are able to adapt and use ex post 
information to increase their chances of success. Understanding the effect of an 
adaptation and learning strategy in a repeated game setting is very important for auction 
design in land markets if optimality and efficiency are to be achieved.  
 3.5.6 Capital Investment 
In cases where agents are successful in winning an auction and purchasing land, they 
must purchase additional non-land capital to farm that land. I assume that non-land 
capital requirements are perfectly divisible and that agents purchase only the quantity 
of capital they need. As in equation 3.16, agents will purchase additional non-land 
capital according to the following relationship so as to maintain the necessary non-land 
capital stock to acre ratio:  
 
t
xyCapitalInvestment C K  (3.21)  
3.6 Optimal Bid Formation 
During the course of the simulation, I assume that all farmers will act similarly – 
regardless of the type of auction mechanism employed – to determine their maximum 
WTP and their estimated value of the plot of land. After this point however, farmers are 
assumed to formulate bids strategically depending on the type of auction mechanism 
they will face. This section will discuss the optimal bidding mechanisms used by 
farmers for each type of auction. These optimal bidding strategies are based on 
theoretical work in the auction literature. I offer that  the bidding model proposed here 
is too mathematically complex to derive an agent‟s optimal bid analytically, so I need 
to approximate bid behaviour using known bidding algorithms that are easily 
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computable. Ease of computation is especially important because optimal bidding 
strategies should be tractable in real world settings
29
. 
Before beginning, I shall discuss a few assumptions I have made that are common to all 
auctions. First, farmers will be made aware of the number of bidders participating in the 
auction. Secondly, if an auction has only 1 bidder, it automatically converts to a 
bargaining solution between the bidder and the seller where the final price paid is the 
mid-point of the bid/ask spread so long as the initial bid is above the reservation price. 
Lastly, any Third-Price-Sealed-Bid auction with less than 3 bidders is not carried out 
and the land is not sold. 
 3.6.1 First-Price-Sealed-Bid (FPSB) Auction 
In a FPSB auction, farmers submit a sealed bid to the auctioneer. After all bids have 
been received, the auctioneer ranks all bids and awards the plot to the bidder with the 
highest bid at the price they bid. It is commonly known in auction theory that in a one-
shot or static FPSB, agents have incentives to bid below their valuation of the good if 
they believe they can submit a winning bid that is just higher than the next highest bid. 
Therefore, bidders trade-off increasing their probability of winning the auction with 
reduced surplus received from a win. That is, as their bids increase they have a higher 
probability of winning but will receive less surplus because the transaction price is 
closer to their actual valuation.  
In order to capture this, farmers in this simulation will bid according to the following 
rule (which is the optimal bidding scheme for this auction under IID assumptions - see 
Kagel and Levin 1993).  
 1( ) ( 1) /B X X N N  (3.22)  
                                                 
29
 Optimal bidding functions used herein are based on well-known best-response functions in theoretical 
auction literature (Kagel and Levin 1993). As noted above, these functions are not optimal in a 
mathematical sense, but are aligned with incentives that all bidders are assumed to have. It should also be 
noted that the bidding functions used in this thesis are not likely to affect the outcome of the auctions 
relative to the case where agents bid their WTP. The optimal bidding functions employed in this model 
serve as a tool for agents to bid strategically. Bidding via optimal best-response functions lowers average 
price in auctions, thus yielding more buyer surplus. They should not affect the outcome of the auction or 
the general outcome of the simulations because the agent with the highest WTP always wins.  
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where X is a farmer‟s value for the plot of land and N is the number of bidders bidding 
on the plot of land. Clearly, as the number of bidders increases, the bid approaches the 
farmer‟s true value. This incorporates the notion that as N increases, farmers must bid 
higher in order to increase the probability that their bid will be the highest.  
 3.6.2 Second-Price-Sealed-Bid (SPSB) a.k.a. Vickrey Auction 
The strategy in a SPSB is similar to that of a FPSB except that in a SPSB farmers have 
the incentive to bid their true valuation, X, for the plot of land (Vickrey 1961). This 
occurs because the price that the winning farmer pays is not a function of her bid. A 
winning bidder will pay the second highest bidder‟s bid, thus she has no incentive to 
increase or decrease her bid above or below her true valuation. As such, in a SPSB we 
have 
 2( )B X X  (3.23)  
 3.6.3 Third-Price-Sealed-Bid (TPSB) Auction 
A TPSB is again similar to the FPSB and SPSB auctions in that it is a single round 
sealed bid. However, in a TPSB the bidder with the highest bid does not pay their bid, 
nor the second highest bid, but the third highest bid. In this case the winning bid will be 
above X and is decreasing in N. For more information regarding this bidding scheme 
see Kagel and Levin (1993). In effect, bidders in the simulation will bid according to 
the following formula; 
 3( ) ( 1) / ( 2)B X X N N  (3.24)  
For comparative purposes figure 3.2 shows the optimal bid functions for all 3 sealed-
bid auctions assuming agent k has a value X = 375. 
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Figure 3.2 Optimal Bidding Schemes for Sealed-Bid Auctions 
 
 3.6.4 English Auction 
The English auction bidding mechanism is the most difficult of the auctions to model 
because this type of auction is evolutionary and subject to feedback – farmers have the 
ability to make a bid, then re-evaluate their bid based on other farmers‟ observable bids 
and submit a new, higher bid, if desired. In addition, there is a very subtle but important 
element in the English auction mechanism that is not observed in the sealed-bid 
auctions – revelation of others‟ bids.  
The structure of the sealed-bids auction means that bid re-evaluation is not possible. 
But I argued earlier that farmland is a good with affiliated-values elements. In effect, 
knowing that another agent values the land more (or less) than you do can affect 
whether or not you submit another (higher) bid in the English auction.  
For computational purposes several assumptions about the rules of this English auction 
are different than a typical English auction. Nevertheless, the auction algorithm used 
here captures all the important components of an English auction.  
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Bidding is divided into 2 rounds. In the first round, all bidders are assumed to submit 
oral bids until the bid reaches their personal valuation for the good, B(X). At this point, 
the bidder with the highest valuation will have submitted a bid equal to the second 
highest bidder‟s bid plus a minimum bid increment, ζ, and thus would be considered 
the winner of the auction. Up to this point we have an auction that resembles the SPSB. 
 But after the first round of bidding, all farmers are allowed to re-evaluate the common-
value element of their bid now that more information is available. This occurs because 
of the affiliated-values assumption on farm land. If they have reason to believe that 
they have undervalued the land, farmers may choose to submit a new, higher bid. Those 
who do not submit a new bid drop out of the auction. 
A farmer will increase her valuation, and her bid, for the plot of land to her MaxWTP 
(if her MaxWTP is greater than the current winning price) with some probability ρ. In 
turn, the probability that a farmer will choose to increase her valuation is dependent on 
her risk preferences.  As described earlier, farmers in the Growth and Expansion Phase 
are more risk averse to losing the auction than a farmer in the Maintenance Phase and 
will subsequently have a higher probability of increasing their valuations to 
MaxWTP
30
.  
Once all farmers have determined whether or not to increase their valuation, bids are 
submitted again. The farmer with the highest MaxWTP wins the auction and pays the 
second highest MaxWTP + ζ. Finally, note that the probability of bids increasing past 
farmers‟ valuations to their maximum WTP is dependent on the number of bidders in 
an auction and the risk preference of those bidders.  
 3.6.5 Summary of Optimal Bidding Schemes 
It is easy to see that different auction mechanisms would affect resultant bids in 
different ways if auctions were highly formalized and individual bids were always 
optimal. What is more interesting is how these “less than optimal”, but theoretically 
                                                 
30
 It should be noted that farmers do not change their risk preference, but are more or less likely to 
change the common-value element of their valuation based on their preferences towards risk, and losing 
an auction.  
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accepted static bidding algorithms fare in a dynamic environment with feedback and 
learning. Current theory is unable to tell us what will happen to prices and stability 
when the auction environment is analytically complex and evolutionary. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 MODEL INITIALIZATION AND DATA 
4.0 Introduction 
"Our simulations are not meant to replicate the price dynamics observed in real 
markets, but to compare the performance of three different mechanisms given 
the same flow of orders." - Pellizzari and Dal Forno (2007)  
Until this point, this thesis has outlined the theory and the structure of the behavioural 
and financial equations that form the backbone of this simulation model. A simulation 
model however, requires data for initialization both for endogenous and exogenous 
variables. This chapter will discuss the data used to initialize the model, as well as the 
methods by which the data were generated. It is important to note that since the focus 
of this thesis is on the auction mechanisms used by farmers for land transactions, it is 
essential that a stable global simulation environment be created. This stable 
environment ensures a ceteris paribus situation that farm agents need only react to 
farmland price fluctuations, information about farmland prices, and the auction 
mechanism. By eliminating factors such as boom/bust crop cycles, proper initialization 
will more accurately allow us to focus on the desired behaviour. Therefore, unlike 
previous related work by Freeman (2005), I will utilize an artificial set of prices, yields, 
and farm profiles to ensure long term market stability. 
Netlogo© version 3.1.3 was the MAS simulation platform chosen for this analysis. This 
software offers a number of advantages over other MAS simulation packages 
commercially available – most notably ease of use and simple programming functions. 
Netlogo© is a windows based software that is provided free of charge from Center for 
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Connected Learning and Computer-Based Modeling in the Department of Computer 
Science at Northwestern University in Evanston, Illinois
31
.  
4.1 Initialization of the Model  
Each iteration of the simulation begins with a similar market structure. Farm operator 
attributes including; 1) age, 2) farm size, 3) attitude, 4) financial information, and 5) 
learned price information are homogeneous across iterations. In other words, between 
simulations of the same auction type, the only factors that change are the location of the 
farmsteads and the location and quality of the owned plots of land
32
.   
4.2 Initial Farm Population Profile  
This section discusses in detail those variables that constitute the initial farm profile, 
including their distributions, and methods used for their generation. All data is adjusted 
with 2004 prices and was created with a random number generator using estimated 
means and standard deviations compiled from a variety of sources.  
       4.2.1 Operator Age and Cultivated Acres 
Farmer age and land area owned were generated by means of a random number 
generator. Here, farmer age is distributed as η (38.2, 9.32) while plots owned is η (10.0, 
5.94). Means and standard deviations were estimated using data from various census 
agricultural regions in the 2005 Farm Financial Survey (FFS). The simulation is 
initialized with 422 farmers with a mean age of 38 and an average farm size of 1600 
acres. Plots owned by age category are shown in table 4.1.  
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 For more information see http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/ 
32
 Altering the landscape between iterations of the simulation will have little impact on the results. 
Running 100 iterations of each simulation also mitigates any such adverse effects. Further discussion and 
analysis is left to future research endeavors.  
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Table 4.1 Distribution of Initial Plots Owned by Age Group 
  Plots Owned 
Age 1 to 5 6 to 10 11 to 15 16 to 20 21 + 
20 - 29 15 20 25 17 4 
30 - 39 24 52 38 22 10 
40 - 49 49 49 37 13 9 
50 - 59 9 16 6 0 0 
60 - 69 5 2 0 0 0 
Source: Author, based on information from 2005 FFS 
        4.2.2 Operator Assets and Debt 
Initial farm agent assets are equal to the sum of all machinery, land, and cash held at t = 
0. Cash accounts are initialized at $75.00 per cultivatable acre while capital stocks, 
which include machinery, equipment, and buildings, are initialized at $100.00 per 
cultivatable acre. Note that learned price information at time t = 0 is adjusted for plot 
quality = 1 so that it reflects prices for land of average quality. Information regarding 
the Learned Price Information at time t = 0 will be described in subsequent sections. 
Cash accounts and capital assets are based on values from Freeman (2005) and adjusted 
to reflect 2004 prices.  
Farm operator debt per cultivatable acre was calculated based on estimated means and 
standard deviations from various census agricultural regions in the 2005 FFS. Farm 
operator debt per acre is distributed as η (101.77, 49.48). This translates to an average 
farm indebtedness of $165,643. Total farm indebtedness at time t = 0 for all 422 
farmers is $69,901,243.  A breakdown of farm debt by age group is shown in table 4.2.  
Table 4.2 Initial Farmer Debt by Age Group 
 Debt (thousands) 
Age 0 to $50 >$50 to <$100 $100 to <$300 $300 to <$500 $500 + 
20 - 29 13 14 42 10 2 
30 - 39 31 19 69 24 3 
40 - 49 37 29 65 23 3 
50 - 59 7 9 14 1 0 
60 - 69 5 2 0 0 0 
Source: Author, based on information from 2005 FFS 
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        4.2.3 Risk Attitude and Entrepreneurial Classification 
This section is also based on work by Freeman (2005) and has been adapted for the 
purposes of this thesis. As previously noted, I assume age determines a farmer‟s risk 
attitude and managerial characteristics. Most importantly, risk attitude determines how 
risk averse a farmer is when calculating their MaxWTP and estimating their value of 
the land bid. Growth and Expansion farmers will discount their MaxWTP less than 
farmers in other phases and will have a greater probability of attaching a high value to a 
given plot. This gives a farmer in the Growth and Expansion phase a higher probability 
of winning any given auction, but can also lead to over estimation of land values and 
over bidding. As age increases, farmers are less likely to over value and over bid on 
land, but they are also less likely to value land high enough to out bid aggressively 
expanding farm agents. Table 4.3 summarizes the managerial behaviour of farmer in 
each of the 4 phases.   
Table 4.3 Managerial Classification 
Managerial 
Classification 
Expectation 
Behaviour Bidding Behaviour 
Risk Aversion 
Factor 
Growth and Expansion Least Risk Averse Most Risk Averse To Losing 0.95 
Development Intermediate Risk  Intermediate Risk To Losing 0.90 
Maintenance Most Risk Averse Least Risk Averse To Losing 0.85 
Exit and Retirement All Farmers Aged ≥ 55 N/A 0.85 
Source: Author, adapted from Freeman (2005). 
       4.2.4 Initial Learned Price Information 
Economic theory suggests that the price dynamics observed under varying auction 
mechanisms are likely to be different. As such, it is necessary to initialize farm agents‟ 
memories (Learned Price Information memory banks) with a set of past land prices for 
each auction. Farm agents are initialized with Learned Price Information for t < 0 using 
the following methodology.  
I simulate 50 iterations of 35 years for each of the 4 types of auctions. This generates 
1750 years of price information. After all the information has been gathered, the first 10 
years of each simulation are dropped, leaving 50 iterations of 25 years, or 1250 years of 
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price information for each type of auction. Means and standard deviations are then 
estimated and a series of land prices are generated with this data. Once land prices have 
been generated for each type of auction using the auction specific means and standard 
deviations, these prices are sorted and compared against the simulated prices to remove 
any outliers. Finally, 100 randomly generated prices for each auction are selected and 
entered in to the farm agents‟ Learned Price Information memory bank. Table 4.4 
reports the means and standard deviations of the generated prices for each type of 
auction. It is important to note that like age, farm size, and financial information, the 
Price Information is homogeneous across iterations of the same auction type. 
Table 4.4 Initial Learned Price Information 
 Initial Learned Price Information 
  English FPSB SPSB TPSB 
Mean $  478.27 $  462.54 $  396.58 $  436.69 
Standard 
Deviation $    48.89 $    27.05 $    39.47 $    38.70 
Maximum $  580.54 $  511.83 $  468.66 $  503.51 
Minimum $  389.97 $  415.83 $  322.28 $  357.12 
Source: Author‟s calculations. 
4.3 Production Data  
This section will describe the data used for farm production activities. This includes all 
input and output prices, and quantities, and the methods under which they were 
generated. This data is used to generate cash flows both in and out of the farm 
household. Technology and inflation are assumed constant through the simulation and 
all prices are adjusted to 2004 levels.  
       4.3.1 Crop Mix, Yields, and Prices  
 4.3.1.1 Crop Mix 
Farmers are assumed to produce four crops - wheat, barley, peas, and canola. A farmer 
with Skill = 1 will produce these crops based on the percentages in table 4.5. 
  
62 
 
Recall that farmers with Skill > 1 are capable of making better managerial decisions 
than farmers with lower skill. I will assume that each farmer can adjust (implicitly) 
their crop mix to realize higher yields. For instance, a farmer with Skill = 1.04 receives 
a 4% higher yield than a farmer with Skill = 1. This results in higher gross revenue and 
higher NCFBI.   
Table 4.5 Crop Mix Weights 
Crop Mix Weight Crop 
40% Wheat 
15% Barley 
30% Canola 
15% Peas 
        Source: Author‟s calculations 
 4.3.1.2 Generated Prices and Yields 
In keeping with the need for a stable simulation environment, yearly crop prices and 
yields were generated in such a manner as to maintain constant long term trends with 
year to year price fluctuations. Ceteris paribus, a constant trend line is required to 
identify which auction mechanisms adjust to minor fluctuations in crop variables more 
readily, so that any observable trends in land prices as a result of exogenous crop price 
and yield information can be ruled out.  
Crop prices and yields used in the simulation were generated by assuming a crop mix 
as in Table 4.5 and analyzing price and yield data from Saskatchewan Agriculture, 
Food, and Rural Revitalization for the 4 crops during the 1985-2004 cropping years. 
Crop yields and prices for the 4 crops were used to generate means and standard 
deviations for each crop. The data was then combined into a weighted average price 
and yield for the crop mix in Table 4.5 based on equations 4.1 and 4.2. From this 
process, prices and yields were randomly generated. Minor adjustments were made to 
the data to ensure stability and remove any outliers. A full breakdown of crop price per 
acre and yield per acre are available in Appendix . 
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acre
 (4.2)  
As noted earlier about t = 0 in the simulation, farmers will require information about 
past crop prices and yields in order to form expectations. As a result, farmers are 
initialized with price and yield information corresponding to years t = -5 to t = -1. 
       4.3.2 Costs of Production 
Production costs are developed in a similar fashion as Freeman (2005), with variations 
made for assumptions specific to this thesis.  
  4.3.2.1 Fixed Costs of Production 
Fixed costs of agricultural production include farm machinery, equipment, and building 
replacement costs and debt servicing. Again, since it is assumed that investment in 
machinery, buildings, and equipment per cultivated acre remain constant throughout the 
simulation, the annual cost of capital replacement is $100 multiplied by the rate of 
economic depreciation (Freeman, 2005).  
Annual debt servicing costs are calculated at the beginning of each year and include all 
debt that is currently held by farm agents. All farm debt is treated identically, whether it 
is for capital purchases or land. Farmers carry one debt account which is refinanced 
each time a purchase is made. As mentioned earlier, farmers are assumed to pay a 25% 
down payment on any new purchases and finance loans based on a 20 year amortization 
period.  Interest is assumed to accrue at 8%, compounded annually on the balance of 
the debt account.  
  4.3.2.2 Variable Costs of Production 
Variable costs of crop production include the cost of production per acre, and 
transportation costs per ton. As in Freeman (2005) I assume that costs of production do 
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not vary with yield. In other words, farm agents have no foresight and do not cut costs 
if yields are expected to be low.  
Costs per acre of production include both hired labour and variable production cost. 
Variable production costs were estimated using Saskatchewan Agriculture, Food, and 
Rural Revitalization‟s Crop Planning Guides (2004-2007) for Dark Brown Soil Zone 
conventionally seeded stubble crops. Total variable costs are calculated by summing 
the weighted variable production costs for each of the crops seeded and multiplying 
that by the total acres cropped by each farmer. Estimated variable costs per acre for 
each crop, and in total, are listed in Table 4.6
33
. 
Table 4.6 Variable Production Costs per Acre 
Mix Weight Crop Cost/Acre 
40% Wheat  $        79.98  
15% Barley  $        77.51  
30% Canola  $      101.07  
15% Peas  $        81.39  
100% TOTAL $        86.15 
Source: Author‟s Calculations based on data from Saskatchewan Agriculture, Food and Rural Revitalization 1985-2004 
Hired labour costs, W, are derived from Freeman (2005) and are adjusted for inflation. 
Total hired labour for each farm agent is calculated as in (4.3) and is a function of total 
acres cropped, K. As can be seen, total cost of hired labour is characterized by a logistic 
growth function and is plotted in Figure 4.1. It is clear that the cost of hired labour 
increases drastically when farm size reaches 600 acres. This is because the farm 
household is typically no longer able to provide the majority of the labour and must 
hire off-farm labour in order to continue with production activities.   
 0.009
0.8
0.03 6.75
1 14500 K
W K
e
 (4.3)  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
33
 Variable costs are estimated by subtracting custom work and hired labour, crop insurance premiums, 
utilities and misc., and interest on variable expenses from Sask Ag and Food‟s estimated costs. 
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Figure 4.1 Hired Labour Costs by Acres Cropped 
 
       4.3.3 Family Withdrawal  
Family living expenses and managerial withdrawal are also based on Freeman‟s (2005) 
work but have been adjusted here to reflect a higher minimum withdrawal - $30,000. 
Family withdrawal, FW is a function of both gross revenue, GR and acres cropped, K. 
See equation 4.4. 
 30,000 (0.068 ) (0.834 )FW GR K  (4.4)  
As noted by Freeman (2005), FW is characterised by an L-shaped curve that represents 
economies of scale. 
4.4 Summary 
This chapter discussed the data that will be used for the initialization of the MAS 
simulation model, as well as yearly exogenous price and yield information. The data 
and data sources presented in this chapter were chosen in order to ensure that the model 
reflects, as closely as possible, a representative sample of the grain and oilseeds 
farming sector in Saskatchewan, Canada.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS 
 
5.0 Introduction 
“… (the) equilibrium approach lends itself to expression in equation form. And 
because an equilibrium by definition is a pattern that doesn’t change, in 
equation form it can be studied for its structure, its implications, and the 
conditions under which it obtains.” - Arthur (2005) 
This section will introduce concepts of economic efficiency and discuss which 
measures of efficiency can and cannot be used for analysis of complex dynamic 
economic systems. Particular emphasis will be placed on measures of pricing 
efficiency, surplus, and industry level indicators. This section will begin with a 
discussion of classical economic tools used for this kind of analysis, followed by an 
introduction to alternative tools that might be used in complexity modeling. After this, 
measures of industry performance and system evolution will be discussed. 
This section will refer to classical analysis in terms of equilibrium methods or steady 
state analysis, since the majority of neoclassical market analysis is grounded in 
equilibrium concepts. Even so, work done in the absence of such assumptions (e.g. 
dynamic macroeconomic systems) still assumes that there exists a set of underlying 
equations, including “equations of motion” which describe exactly the behaviour of a 
dynamic system over time. However, in complex systems analysis, underlying analytic 
relationships are unobservable due to the presence of feedback and individual 
interdependencies in the systems. Therefore, when considering complex system models 
such as this one, it is not feasible to use traditional economic tools to measure 
efficiency because economic equilibria are unobservable (Arthur 2005). In effect, 
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discussions in this section take as given the understanding that in or out of equilibrium, 
classical models rely upon assumptions that are not realistic when the system is actually 
complex in a mathematical sense.  
5.1 Definitions of Market Efficiency 
Much of neoclassical economic analysis is founded on the identification of efficiency, 
whether it is in production, trade, etc. The following sections will define and discuss 
various perspectives of economic efficiency and their place in different threads of 
economic literature, both classical and evolutionary.  
 5.1.1 Efficiency in Neoclassical Economics 
To start, much of the work on neoclassical market structure is based, at least in part, on 
assumptions of perfect competition. The assumptions of perfect competition are the 
following; 1) the existence of many buyers and sellers, none of which have a large 
share of the market; 2) the production of homogeneous goods; 3) perfect information 
for all agents; and 4) free entry and exit (Case et al. 2001). Collectively, these factors 
ensure tractability and lead to equilibrium states where goods are traded at P = MC
34
. In 
this spirit, measures of economic efficiency are typically derived from static 
equilibrium/steady states. When assumptions about information and homogeneity are 
relaxed, finding satisfactory measures of economic efficiency can be very difficult 
because the underlying system may be complex and not yield observable equilibria. In 
this case, traditional static equation based analysis of efficiency is no longer viable.  
 5.1.2 Neoclassical Auction Theory 
In much of auction theory, the term optimal has been used to mean maximizing seller 
revenues. A good deal of the literature has focused on designing optimal auction 
mechanisms that will produce the highest possible selling price (the alternative use of 
these mechanisms is in the event of some sort of market breakdown – e.g. buyer 
                                                 
34
 Furthermore, in the absence of perfect competition, i.e. monopoly markets, an equilibrium set of prices 
and quantities is generally assumed to exist. 
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collusion as a result of thin markets
35
). Efficient auctions are often considered to be 
those in which the bidder with the highest value for the good has the proper incentives 
and information to produce the highest bid.  
Despite efforts, auction theory has not been very successful in expanding the optimal 
auctions research to problems that include combinations of heterogeneous 
bidders/goods, affiliated values, imperfect information, and/or repeated games and 
learning. In fact, Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) show that under the assumption of 
affiliated-values, current methodologies cannot adequately describe solution concepts. 
In effect, deriving an efficient/optimal auction in this case relies on making 
assumptions that ensure a static “steady-state” condition can be achieved. In other 
words, efficiency and optimality are measured against some sort of assumed 
equilibrium state, generally a Nash equilibrium
36
. 
While I acknowledge the work done on dynamic sequences of well-defined allocations 
in analytic economics, the focus of this thesis is on analytically complex markets that 
are in constant disequilibrium and may never converge. To that extent, a lack of 
convergence, together with unobservable structural equations, leaves traditional 
measures of efficiency and optimality without explanatory power. 
 5.1.3 Dynamic Trading Mechanisms 
In recent years, there has been a trend towards identifying measures of efficiency in 
dynamic evolutionary models that are analogous to those developed for static models. 
In this thesis, the need for such measures results from out-of-equilibrium modeling 
techniques inherent in multi-agent simulations. Out-of-equilibrium economic models 
are especially important to develop since we rarely observe equilibrium steady states in 
nature. Consequently, understanding the complexities of out-of-equilibrium dynamics 
                                                 
35
 A market is referred to as thin when there are few bidders present. Alternatively, a thick market 
contains many bidders. The degree of thickness of a market is dependent on the type of market and the 
good to be auctioned. There is no specific number of bidders for thickness to be achieved that is common 
to all auctions. 
36
 In some sense, the formation of auction markets due to normal market failures could be seen as self-
organizing behaviour and movement towards an equilibrium market structure. However, this thesis is 
interested in steady states and equilibrium within a particular market structure, not as a market structure.  
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and evolution is important in the development of economic systems analysis (Arthur 
2005). Arguably, one of the most important elements of out-of-equilibrium dynamics is 
system performance, or lack thereof. Since traditional economic measures of efficiency 
and performance often rely on an assumption of equilibrium states, there is a clear need 
to find alternative measures of performance and efficiency for out-of-equilibrium 
modeling.  
At this point, I must note that in cases where out-of-equilibrium systems actually 
converge, or stabilize, classical economic measures of efficiency may suffice, provided 
the system is not complex and structural equations can be estimated (Arthur 2005).  
While there have been prior attempts to measure performance and efficiency in 
dynamical economic systems, much of the work has been developed using ideas from 
financial analysis. For instance, the work of Pellizzari and Dal Forno (2007) offers a 
few suggestions that will prove useful. They state that in the absence of static 
equilibrium, one should be interested in “provision of liquidity, continuity, and price 
stabilization”. These concepts are also echoed by Madhaven (2000). In general, 
measures of price stability, convergence, and speed of convergence have been found in 
the financial literature to be acceptable measures of a system‟s ability to evolve under 
exogenous shocks.  
5.2 Measureable Criteria 
In light of discussions about measures of efficiency under neoclassical assumptions, 
auction theory and dynamic trading mechanisms, it is time to develop measures of 
efficiency in the simulated auction market for farmland. This section will serve as an 
overview of the methods that will be employed in the thesis. 
This simulation model incorporates a number of dynamic elements that render 
traditional neoclassical measures of efficiency obsolete. For example, there is no 
observable equilibrium price (one price does not fit all) and there are considerable out-
of-equilibrium dynamics. In addition, unknown ex post realization of surpluses from 
the consumption of the good make traditional efficiency measures impractical.  
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 5.2.1 Allocative Efficiency 
Traditional measures of allocative efficiency applied to this simulated auction market 
require that bidders with the highest valuations for a good receive the good at the end of 
the auction, regardless of the price paid. As a result of the assumptions made for this 
farmland auction market, this outcome occurs with 100% certainty. This means from an 
allocative standpoint, all auction mechanisms compared in this study are by definition 
100% efficient
37
. However, standard measures of efficiency say nothing about the 
accuracy of the agents‟ valuations, a factor that is often assumed away under perfect 
information.  
If we consider an alternative description of allocative efficiency in this auction context, 
an auction is not allocatively efficient if there exists uncertainty in the common-value 
element of the affiliated-values signal (Goeree and Offerman 2002). From this 
standpoint, the auctions compared in this thesis may or may not be efficient. Simply 
put, due to the nature of the land market, and the ex post realization of value, it is not 
possible to know if a farm agent‟s valuation was correct38. Therefore, minimizing 
variance in auction sale prices has been suggested as one metric of minimized 
efficiency losses from an allocative standpoint (Goeree and Offerman 2002). To that 
extent, it will be possible here to ordinally rank the auctions based on allocative 
efficiency by measuring price variance in each simulated auction. And using 
Harberger‟s (1971) third welfare postulate, I can also rank auctions based on their 
surplus generating capabilities.   
 5.2.2 System Surpluses 
Market efficiency is often measured by an economic system‟s ability to generate 
maximum social welfare (or total system surplus). By definition, a static economic 
                                                 
37
 This result says nothing about a farmer‟s ability to generate wealth from any plot of land however. 
Although a farmer may value the land the most, he or she may not have the highest ex post wealth 
generating capabilities.  This is due to valuations on plots being sampled randomly from an agent-unique 
distribution it is possible that any farm agent can over estimate the value of any plot of land.  
38
 Recall that agents form expectations about future prices and yields, and the future price of land. And 
since the full value of a capital asset (farmland) is based on future income streams, it is not possible for 
agents to know the true value of any plot of land until it is sold and income no longer is generated from 
it. 
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equilibrium is efficient if total surplus (= consumer + producer surplus) is maximized 
and WTP = MC. However use of such a measurement criteria often requires the 
existence of an equilibrium state and price, something that is unobservable in our 
dynamic, out-of-equilibrium land auction market.  
In the absence of a static equilibrium, it is still possible to measure an agent‟s perceived 
surplus from a transaction in this simulation. In this model, transaction surplus is 
“perceived” because agents do not know with certainty the true value of the land 
purchased until it is no longer farmed and subsequently sold. Their best estimate of true 
value is the transaction price. Therefore, calculations of perceived surplus will be made 
based on the best information available in the current period – that is, the transacted 
price for land. This can be considered an ex ante calculation of surplus since the true ex 
post value of land is unknown. 
In the simulation, buyers will observe a perceived surplus equal to their MaxWTP 
(upper bound) less the price they paid, while sellers perceive their surplus as their 
reservation price less the sale price. Perceived surplus will then be used to examine 
both the total surplus generated by an auction, as well as the shares of total surplus 
generated by an auction. 
With reference to Harberger‟s (1971) first and second postulates concerning applied 
welfare economics, perceived surpluses will be summed and buyer/seller shares of 
surpluses will be compared to rank auctions based on equity. This is possible because, 
as noted by Harberger “the competitive demand price for given unit measures the value 
of that unit to the demander” and alternatively, “the competitive supply price for a 
given unit measures the value of that unit to the supplier”. Under this framework, it is 
not necessary to observe equilibrium prices and quantities in the classical static sense. 
We simply observe prices, and those prices are the true value of that good at the time of 
purchase.  
Total perceived surplus in each of these auctions will be compared in order to measure 
auction efficiency. To justify this, we refer to Harberger‟s (1971) third postulate – 
distributive neutrality - which suggests that a dollar is worth a dollar, regardless of who 
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it belongs to. To that extent, the auction that generates the most total perceived surplus 
will be considered the most efficient
39
. 
In spite of the latter postulate, I will also compare shares of perceived surpluses 
because this may be important from an agricultural policy perspective in future land 
markets. And although I make no claim about what is a fair distribution of surplus 
between buyers and sellers, knowing if an auction favours one of the transacting parties 
may be useful for future agricultural policy considerations.   
 5.2.3 Market and Price Stability 
The majority of the efficiency measures developed for comparative purposes in out-of-
equilibrium models to date are found in the financial market literature (see Pellizzari 
and Dal Forno 2007 for examples). Given the structure of the auction markets 
developed here, such out-of-equilibrium analysis will be necessary if any conclusions 
about market efficiencies are to be drawn or constructive suggestions made about the 
structure of these markets. As a result, the simulated auctions will be compared using 
measures of price stability as discussed in Pellizzari and Dal Forno (2007) and 
Madhaven (2000). Specifically, price level and variance over time will be used to 
evaluate market efficiency for each auction.  
 5.2.4 Industry Characteristics and Evolution 
A final point of comparison will examine to what extent, if any, choice of auction 
mechanism has on industry evolution at a macro level. Macro level market 
characteristics such as farm exits, farm size, financial ratios, and bidder participation 
will be tracked to determine the impact auction design has on the evolution of this 
agricultural sector.  
 
                                                 
39
 It should be noted that in financial markets, there is a thread of literature that deals with “informational 
efficiency”. This type of efficiency assumes that as WTP and WTA converge, market efficiency 
increases because information is being used more efficiently. Although interesting, this analysis is not 
considered in the thesis. 
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5.3 Summary 
Chapter 5 outlined the criteria by which traditional markets and efficiency in static 
economics are evaluated, in contrast to the criterion by which markets in this dynamic 
simulation model will be evaluated. This section has motivated various criteria under 
which the results for chapter 6 will be analyzed and from which conclusions in chapter 
7 will be drawn.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION 
 
6.0 Introduction 
This section discusses the results from the eight land auction simulations developed for 
this analysis. Initial parameters are set as discussed in Chapter 4. The only differences 
between simulations runs are the type of auction mechanism employed, and whether or 
not Learning Direction Theory (LDT) is activated or not (“On” or “Off”). When LDT is 
“On” agents are assumed to learn based on the algorithm outlined in Chapter 3. When 
LDT is “Off”, agents do not learn via LDT and are limited to simple information 
diffusion. Comparing similar auctions with LDT “On” and “Off” will help determine 
the effect that LDT has on each of the compared auction mechanisms. Table 6.1 shows 
the combination of auction mechanisms and LDT options comprising the eight 
simulations. 
Table 6.1 Simulations Run 
  Learning** 
  
LDT 
"On" 
LDT 
"Off" 
 English 1 2 
Type of FPSB 3 4 
Auction SPSB 5 6 
 TPSB 7 8 
 
* Information Diffusion remains “On” at all times 
                                                                ** LDT – Learning Direction Theory. 
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Each of the simulations is run for 35 years – 1 year is equivalent to 1 cropping and 
harvest year – and re-run for a total of 100 iterations. This yields 3500 years of data for 
each of the 8 simulations
40
.  
The results from simulations with LDT “On” and “Off” are compared first. 
Subsequently, the focus of this chapter will shift to a comparison across auction 
mechanisms with LDT “On”. At this point, auction efficiency, surplus, and industry 
characteristics will be examined in more detail. 
6.1 Auction Comparison by Type 
In the next four sections, auction mechanisms will be compared type-by-type to 
determine the effects of Learning Direction Theory (LDT) on variance, price levels, 
and normality. The next section will describe the comparative procedures for the 
English auction with and without LDT. Subsequently, results from each of the sealed 
price auctions will be presented and discussed.   
 6.1.1 English Auction 
Results from the English auction are presented here.  I will compare and contrast the 
results of farmland transactions carried out via the modified English auction 
mechanism described in Chapter 3, both with and without LDT. Descriptive statistics 
are presented first and discussed, while statistical significance tests for differences 
between sample means and variances follow. Finally, I will present a graphical 
representation of average sale price per acre and the standard deviation of price.  
Table 6.2 contains descriptive statics for the English auction with and without LDT. 
These statistics are based on the entire sample of data for each type of auction. Observe 
that the English auction with LDT On yielded 169,265 transactions, while the English 
auction without LDT resulted in 170,986 transactions. While small, this difference 
might be attributed to factors such as differences in initial random spatial distribution of 
farms, or the random order in which agents take turns performing actions. Nevertheless, 
                                                 
40
 Select simulations were run for 300 iterations of 35 years to ensure robustness. No significant 
differences were found. 100 iterations per simulation was chosen for data management reasons.  
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the difference represents only approximately 1% of total transactions and does not 
influence the overall results.  
The average price per acre of land with LDT On was $550.69, an amount equivalent to 
$82,603.50 for the average plot of land in this simulation. Average price per acre and 
plot price with LDT Off are $544.36 and $81,654.00 respectively. A two-sample t-test
41
 
assuming unequal variances was performed to test if the differences in means are 
statistically significant. Table 6.3 shows that the means are statistically different from 
one another at 5%, as are the variances (Table 6.4)
42
. Moreover, both samples have 
positive kurtosis, which implies a higher peak and fatter tails, where fat tails arise from 
relatively frequent extremes. So an English auction with LDT Off has slightly fatter 
tails and is less “normal” than an English auction with LDT On.  Both samples are also 
positively skewed, which suggests that the mass of the distribution is concentrated to 
the left – the lower end of the price/acre distribution. Note also that both auctions 
generate bids that range from the mid $200 range, to $1000 per acre.  
Table 6.2 Descriptive Statistics: English Auction with LDT On/Off 
English Auction  LDT On LDT Off 
Mean 550.69 544.36 
Median 549.15 542.89 
Mode 551.25 551.25 
Standard Deviation 71.42 69.19 
Kurtosis 0.64 0.95 
Skewness 0.26 0.29 
Observations 169265 170986 
Range 748.65 725.55 
Minimum 255.15 270.90 
Maximum 1003.80 996.45 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
41
 See: Snedecor, George W. and Cochran, William G. (1989), Statistical Methods, Eighth Edition, Iowa 
State University Press. 
42
 A Mann Whitney U Test (non-parametric) was also used and showed that the data are normal and that 
differences are significant, further buttressing the results from the T and F-tests. 
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Table 6.3 Two Sample T-Test: Means of English Auction LDT On/Off 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances  
df 339654 
t Stat 26.24 
P(T<=t) two-tail 0 
t Critical two-tail 1.96 
 
Table 6.4 Two Sample F-Test: Variance of English Auction LDT On/Off 
F-Test Two-Sample for Variances  LDF On LDF Off 
df 169264 170985 
F 1.07  
P(F<=f) one-tail 0  
F Critical one-tail 1.01   
 
Figure 6.1 maps the evolution of average price per acre over the simulation period and 
includes the average standard deviation in each period across the 100 simulations. 
Before this discussion, I would like to draw attention to the following point.  
Recall that data for periods t < 0 are estimated ex ante and are exogenous to the 
simulation. On one hand, given the exogenous initialization data, it may be acceptable 
to analyze simulation data starting at t = 0. On the other hand, it may be more accurate 
to divide the data from Figure 6.1 into 2 groups. The first group of data would be the 
years 0 – 10. In this stage of the simulation the model is working partly endogenously, 
and partly from data inputted at t = 0. Keep in mind that it appears to take some time 
for the simulation to stabilize and start working fully endogenously. For this reason, it 
may be more appropriate to consider years 0 – 10 as an adjustment phase, and years t > 
10 as the movement to steady state (if one exists).  
It is impossible to know exactly when the simulation becomes completely endogenous. 
As a result, t = 10 was arbitrarily chosen. I offer that, assuming that much of the 
exogenous data from t = 0 has dissipated by t = 10 is a reasonable assumption because 
agents use past data that is no more than 5 periods old to determine expectations in the 
current period and they are limited with respect to price information memory
43
. Early 
                                                 
43
 It is possible that data from t = -5 affect the results in t = 34. However, given the nature of the feedback 
mechanism and information diffusion it is impossible to know for certain. However, given the vast 
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data may tell us something about how changes in regime matter, while later years can 
tell us about the effects of different auction mechanisms occurring when the simulation 
is completely endogenized.  
Figure 6.1 Price Level and Variance: English Auction LDT On/Off 
 
To start, price/acre (LDT On/LDT Off) and standard deviations of prices (LDT 
On/LDT Off) track very closely together. This suggests that an English auction will 
perform similarly with and without learning using LDT. This result is likely attributable 
to the revelation of bids and the bidding structure in the English auction because values 
are affiliated. What is also clear from Figure 6.1 is that both price/acre and standard 
deviation of price/acre spike in the early stages of the simulation. This is likely a 
function of farm agents acting partly on learned information from both simulated and 
inputted data. But after 6 time periods, there is a fall in both price level and standard 
deviation. This is consistent with the assumption of limited agent “memory” and 
expectation formation assumptions. Observe that prices and standard deviations remain 
low until year 19, after which there is a slight increase in both variables. After year 19 
prices tend to rise, while standard deviation remains more or less constant.  
                                                                                                                                              
information flows in the model, any one observation is likely to have minimal impact after 11 time 
periods.  
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Trends in prices can be attributed to, at least in part, the assumed crop yields and crop 
prices. Cycling in prices and yields (and revenue) is expected to result in cycling in 
land prices. The degree of the cycling in land prices – and variance – may vary across 
auction mechanisms.  
  6.1.2 FPSB Auction  
Results from the FPSB auctions with and without LDT are presented here. Recall that 
under this mechanism bidders have incentive to shave their bids based on the number of 
bidders in the auction, and that only winning bids are revealed.  
In this auction, both price means are lower than the English auction and the variation in 
bids is almost half that of the English auction. But more important is the difference 
between the bids in the FPSB with LDT On and OFF. LDT Off generates bids that are 
on average almost $32.00 less per acre than FPSB with LDT. There is also a greater 
difference in the standard deviation, over $11.00/acre. Tables 6.6 and 6.7 show that 
there is a statistically significant difference in the means and variances at a 5% 
confidence level.  Both distributions also have positive kurtosis and skewness. The 
numbers of observed transactions are also similar, to each other and to the English 
auction. Notice as well that the ranges of bids for both FPSB auctions are nearly half 
the range of the English auctions. This means that the extreme bids are much closer to 
the mass of the distribution under FPSB.  
The average price/acre for an average plot of land under FPSB with LDT On is 
$502.07, which translates to $75,310.50 for an average plot of land. Without LDT, 
these prices are $470.74 and $70,611.00 respectively.  
Trends in prices/acre and standard deviations of prices are found in Figure 6.2. The 
directions of the trends are similar to those found in the English auction: prices start out 
high, fall around year 6, and then begin to rise again in year 19. 
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Table 6.5 Descriptive Statistics: FPSB Auction with LDT On/Off 
FPSB Auction LDT On LDT Off 
Mean 502.07 470.74 
Median 500.7 470.12 
Mode 484 485 
Standard Deviation 44.90 33.44 
Kurtosis 0.40 0.29 
Skewness 0.14 0.06 
Observations 173494 173914 
Range 470 341.68 
Minimum 263 288.68 
Maximum 733 630.36 
 
Table 6.6 Two Sample T-Test: Means of FPSB Auction LDT On/Off 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances  
df 320652 
t Stat 233.24 
P(T<=t) two-tail 0 
t Critical two-tail 1.94 
 
Table 6.7 Two Sample F-Test: Variance of FPSB Auction LDT On/Off 
F-Test Two-Sample for Variances LDT On LDT Off 
df 173493 173913 
F 1.80  
P(F<=f) one-tail 0  
F Critical one-tail 1.01   
 
However, the overall price level and variance are lower than under the English auction. 
More interesting is the gap between trends in price/acre and standard deviation between 
FPSB auctions with and without LDT. And while it was noted that the English auctions 
tracked rather closely with one another, this phenomenon is not observed in the FPSB 
auctions.  
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Figure 6.2 Price Level and Variance: FPSB Auction LDT On/Off 
 
The FPSB auction with LDT On is everywhere greater than with LDT Off with respect 
to both price and standard deviation of price. This implies that LDT has a more 
profound effect on prices and its variance in the FPSB auction than in the English 
auction.  
The sealed-bid auction decreased the variance and price level of land prices relative to 
the English auction. I suspect that the FPSB results in lower bids in the simulation than 
the English auction because farm agents have incentives to strategically undercut their 
true valuations to arrive at their optimal bid. Moreover, since bidding is single staged 
with no revealed bids, FPSB does not result in back and forth bidding between agents, 
as in the English auction, further driving up the price and the variance.  
It is quite apparent that the FPSB follows the same general trends in prices as the 
English auction, as expected, but does not generate the same price level and variance. 
And the most distinct difference between auction mechanisms is the gap between trends 
when LDT is On and Off.  
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6.1.3 SPSB Auction 
The next auction mechanism to be considered is the SPSB. As discussed earlier, it is a 
dominant strategy for farm agents to bid their true valuation in the SPSB since their 
valuation does not affect the final price paid. It should also be noted that under certain 
assumptions (i.e. private-values) the English auction and SPSB auction will generate 
similar results. Recall I assume that farm land possesses affiliated-values signals. To 
this extent, any differences in results from SPSB and the English auction may be 
attributed to, at least in part, the affiliated-values nature of farmland.  
Descriptive statistics for SPSB simulations with and without LDT are listed in Table 
6.8. Similar to the previous auctions, the SPSB auction with LDT yielded higher a 
mean price/acre and standard deviation. It should also be noted that the SPSB auctions 
produced the lowest means and variance (with respect to LDT choice) observed thus 
far. Average price/acre over the simulations were $451.94 and $421.94 with LDT On 
and Off respectively. This translates to final sale prices $67,791.00 and $63,291.00 for 
an average quarter section.  
When compared against the English and FPSB auctions (accounting for the choice of 
LDT) the SPSB resulted in lower standard deviations of prices - $39.76/acre and 
$31.26/acre. This is a difference of $8.50, which is less than the difference in standard 
deviations of the FPSB. Bids ranged from $233-$616 and $222-$582 per acre with 
LDT On/Off. Kurtosis was again positive for both auctions, while skewness was 
negative.  
Significance tests for differences in means and variance tests again showed a significant 
difference between auctions. These results are shown in Tables 6.9 and 6.10. 
Graphical representations of the results from the SPSB auctions are found in Figure 6.3. 
Upon first inspection it is evident that the SPSB auctions follow the same general 
trends as the previous two auctions; prices rise, then fall around year 6, and then rise 
again after year 19. 
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Table 6.8 Descriptive Statistics: SPSB Auction with LDT On/Off 
SPSB Auction LDT On LDT Off 
Mean 451.94 421.94 
Median 455.83 424.09 
Mode 446 421 
Standard Deviation 39.76 31.26 
Kurtosis 0.78 1.11 
Skewness -0.56 -0.56 
Observations 172073 175246 
Range 383 360.6 
Minimum 233 222 
Maximum 616 582.6 
 
Table 6.9 Two Sample T-Test: Means of SPSB Auction LDT On/Off 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances  
df 326322 
t Stat 246.93 
P(T<=t) two-tail 0 
t Critical two-tail 1.96 
 
 
Table 6.10 Two Sample F-Test: Variance of SPSB Auction LDT On/Off 
F-Test Two-Sample for Variances LDT On LDT Off 
df 172072 175245 
F 1.62  
P(F<=f) one-tail 0  
F Critical one-tail 1.01   
 
Also, note that prices and variance appear to track slightly closer with LDT On/Off 
than in the FPSB case, but not as close as the English auctions. Similar to the FPSB 
auctions, variance remains relatively constant after an initial increase in the first 6 
years, even in the face of rising land prices in the last 15 years of the simulation. It also 
appears as though average price/acre diverges when prices are rising in general. I 
speculate that LDT magnifies the effects of upwards trends in prices and causes 
divergence when compared against the LDT Off case. Returning to the FPSB, it is 
obvious that the same is true.  
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The SPSB auctions also generate an average price/acre and standard deviation with 
LDT is On that is everywhere above the LDT Off case. Overall, lower price levels than 
comparative FPSB auctions can be explained if one considers the optimal bidding 
functions. Higher prices in the FPSB auction suggest thick markets where bids (and 
final prices) are very close to true valuation, whereas in the SPSB auctions agents 
always set bids equal to their true valuations, but with final prices that are 
systematically lower. Had the FPSB auctions been faced with thin markets, observed 
price levels may have been lower, and closer to those in the SPSB.  
Figure 6.3 Price Level and Variance: SPSB Auction LDT On/Off 
 
  6.1.4 TPSB Auction  
The final pair of auctions to be analyzed is the TPSB auctions with and without LDT. A 
first glance at the descriptive statistics reveals that the TPSB auction fits somewhere in 
between the SPSB and FPSB auctions with respect to price level and variance. Average 
price/acre with LDT On and Off are $477.61 and $465.15 respectively. Average sale 
prices are $71,641.50 and $69,772.50. Standard deviations vary only by $5/acre 
($41.71 and $36.29). Both auctions again have positive kurtosis and, similar to the 
SPSB, have negative skewness. Significance test for differences in the mean and 
variance are again statistically significant at 5% (Tables 6.12 and 6.13)  
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Table 6.11 Descriptive Statistics: TPSB Auction with LDT On/Off 
TPSB Auction LDT On LDT Off 
Mean 477.61 465.15 
Median 480 467.11 
Mode 471 459 
Standard Deviation 41.72 36.29 
Kurtosis 0.20 0.38 
Skewness -0.33 -0.43 
Range 372.79 318.53 
Minimum 260 267 
Maximum 632.79 585.53 
 
 
Table 6.12 Two Sample T-Test: Means of TPSB Auction LDT On/Off 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances LDT On 
df 341808 
t Stat 94.07 
P(T<=t) two-tail 0 
t Critical two-tail 1.96 
 
 
Table 6.13 Two Sample F-Test: Variance of TPSB Auction LDT On/Off 
F-Test Two-Sample for Variances LDT On LDT Off 
df 174014 174765 
F 1.32  
P(F<=f) one-tail 0  
F Critical one-tail 1.01   
 
Finally, price level and variance for this auction are mapped in Figure 6.4. Results 
indicate that the general trend in price level is similar to the other auctions, further 
implying that overall trends in prices are driven not by choice of auction mechanism in 
the simulation, but instead by exogenous factors such as world prices and yields.  
Clearly prices and variance with LDT On and Off track very closely in this case, 
perhaps the closest of all sealed-bid auctions. I conclude that the TPSB is the most 
robust sealed-bid auction when LDT is the assumed learning mechanism.  
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Figure 6.4 Price Level and Variance: TPSB Auction LDT On/Off 
 
  6.1.5 Overview of Results 
The preceding discussion was aimed at comparing each of the auctions against itself 
with LDT On and Off. Some general results to be drawn include the following: 
 1) In each auction, LDT On resulted in a land price mean and variance that is 
statistically greater than the same auction without LDT. This is important because farm 
agents compete in a dynamic game and clearly LDT affects all of the auctions 
similarly
44
. 
2) All 4 auctions with LDT On can easily be ranked by mean price level and variance. 
3) All auctions seemed to follow the same general trends in prices – trends that appear 
to be driven primarily by exogenous world prices and yields. 
                                                 
44
 The observant reader will notice that LDT caused increases in variance for all auctions. This result 
appears to go against intuition since one would assume that learning would cause a convergence in 
prices. I believe that my choice of learning mechanism led to these results. By definition LDT has a one 
period lag; therefore agents are abruptly modifying their bids upwards and downwards based only on the 
information from the previous period. Had there been several lagged variables, one might have witnessed 
adjustments that were less abrupt and more informed, drawing on a larger set of learning possibilities. 
LDT is likely not the most appropriate learning mechanism for this analysis. Further research should 
search for a more appropriate learning mechanism, or seek to improve on LDT. 
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4) With respect to the effects of LDT on prices/acre, the SPSB and FPSB seemed to 
react similarly, while the English and TPSB reacted similarly to each other, but 
differently than the SPSB and FPSB auctions.  
6.2 Comparison of Auction Types with LDT “On” 
The following section will focus on comparing auction mechanisms when LDT is On. 
Results with LDT Off will no longer be discussed because I assume agents are able to 
learn from repeated experiences and that the repeated nature of the game is of particular 
importance. It should be noted again that real world agents do not learn exactly by the 
LDT algorithm. Rather, LDT is an abstraction and was chosen for this analysis as a 
strategic learning framework partly for its simplicity and because relevant research 
found it to be a relatively good predictor of experimental behaviour (Neugebauer and 
Selten, 2006).  In this light, one extension to this thesis would gather real bidding data 
from farmland auctions and use this to help determine the most appropriate learning 
theory to be employed in a simulated farmland auction. 
The next four sections will focus on results from the simulated auctions with LDT On.  
Auctions will be compared on the basis of perceived surpluses, price levels and 
variance, and industry characteristics and evolution.  
  6.2.1 Perceived Surpluses and Total Surplus 
This section will examine the perceived surpluses of both buyers and sellers in the 
simulated auction, as well as the total surplus generated by the auction mechanism. As 
stated earlier, the results of Harberger (1971) will be used to compare auctions on the 
basis of total surplus generated. For the remainder of this section, the terms surplus and 
perceived surplus will be used interchangeably.  
Buyer surplus is estimated by subtracting the price paid for a plot of land from the 
upper bound facing the buyer; recall this upper bound can be the π = 0 constraint, or a 
borrowing constraint. Effectively, this becomes (WTP – price paid). Seller surplus is 
estimated by subtracting the plot‟s reservation price from the final selling price, which 
is equal to (price-paid – WTA). Data presented here constitute the yearly average of all 
  
88 
 
land transactions for all 100 iterations of the simulation and represents the average 
perceived surplus, either total or shared, from the sale of 1 average plot of land (i.e. 
cultivatable acres = 150 and quality = 1).  
Figure 6.5 shows the average total perceived surplus generated by a transaction for an 
average plot of land. It is clear from figure 6.5 that all auction mechanisms follow a 
similar trend, beginning in the $50,000/sale range, and finally stabilizing around 
$25,000/sale. The same points made earlier about endogenizing the simulation model 
applies. If this is assumed to be the case here, we observe that after 10 years the 
simulations do level off and fluctuate about a mean that is in the vicinity of $25,000 of 
surplus generated per sale.  
Examining each auction mechanism independently, it is clear that after 10 years the 
SPSB auction generates the most total perceived surplus on average, followed by the 
TPSB auction, the English auction, and finally the FPSB auction.  
Based on grounds of distributional neutrality, I would suggest the SPSB auction 
because it generates the most total perceived surplus, followed by the TPSB, English, 
and FPSB auctions.  
Figure 6.5 Average Total Surplus Generated from Sale by Auction 
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Shares of the seller‟s surplus are represented in figure 6.6. Seller share is simply the 
surplus received by the seller divided by the total surplus generated from the sale. Even 
after the simulations endogenize, it is clear that the English auction favours the seller. 
Sellers received, on average, 60-85% of the surplus from land sales with the English 
auction. Once again, I offer that this can be explained by the nature of the English 
auction and the affiliated-values assumption. Since the English auction allows all 
bidders to see all bids, and the auction unfolds over time, agents have a chance to 
increase their bids if they believe (based on observing other agents‟ bids) that they have 
under-valued the land. This means prices can be driven higher, even up to an agent‟s 
upper bound. As a result, this process yields more seller surplus.  
Figure 6.6 Seller Share of Total Surplus from Sale by Auction 
 
Note as well that the FPSB also generates systematically higher seller surpluses than 
the other sealed bid auctions. This can be explained by the effect of the number of 
bidders on the optimal bid. Recall that as the number of bidders increases in a FPSB 
auction, it is in a bidding agent‟s best interest to bid closer to their true valuation. This 
means that a thick auction will generate higher prices than a thin auction and, as such, it 
appears that in the first 20 years of a simulation the number of bidders is greater than in 
the last 15 years. This point will be re-visited in the concluding section.  
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Finally, the SPSB and TPSB auctions appear to generate the most equitable distribution 
of surplus between buyer and seller, with 35-60% of the surplus going to the seller. In 
later years, the seller‟s share of the surplus falls to 40-50%, meaning that in some cases 
the buyer gains relatively more from the transaction. As mentioned earlier, the basis for 
any discussion on distribution of surplus, or equity in these auction markets, is because 
future agricultural policy decisions may be influenced by the distribution of surplus 
from land transactions.  
  6.2.2 Farmland Pricing and Variability 
This section will revisit the issues of farmland pricing and variability, but now I 
compare them across auction mechanisms. Average price levels over time are shown in 
figure 6.7. It is obvious that as time elapses, auction mechanisms can be readily ranked 
by price level from highest to lowest. The English auction tends to systematically 
generate the highest price, followed by the FPSB, the TPSB, and finally the SPSB.  
Closer inspection reveals that as price levels trend downward they seem to converge; 
the greatest level of convergence occurs at year 19, which also generates the minimum 
average price for all auctions. After year 19, price levels rise and all auctions trend 
upwards. While the sealed-bid auctions appear to trend together, the English auction 
diverges from the sealed bid auctions. This suggests again that the English auction 
exaggerates price increases – attributable to the 2 stage bidding process and information 
feedback. Fundamentally, this occurrence is due to the strong affiliated-values nature of 
the English auction, and this auction may even generate systematic over-bidding in 
periods of increasing average price.  
In standard auction theory, research has been done on increasing the efficiency of 
auction mechanisms. However, it is now known that when repeated bidding over time 
is coupled with an affiliated-values assumption, increasing auction efficiency (or even 
measuring it) can be very difficult.  However, there is one commonly held belief in this 
literature: if values are affiliated (private + common), decreasing the variance of the 
bids decreases the variance of the common element, in turn increasing the certainty of 
the affiliated-value and increasing efficiency (Goeree and Offerman, 2002). To this 
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extent, measures of price variance are important for considering which auction 
mechanism has the potential to lead to the most efficient outcomes.  
Figure 6.7 Average Price/Acre by Auction Type with LDT On 
 
Figure 6.8 plots the average standard deviation of prices over time for all 4 auction 
mechanisms with LDT. The English auction generates the highest variance. This means 
that the common-value elements in the simulation have more uncertainty attached to 
them than the sealed bid mechanisms. Since I argued that increased uncertainty is 
harmful to market efficiency, the English auction is the least dynamically efficient 
auction among the tested mechanisms. Alternatively, it is difficult to say which of the 
sealed-bids auctions is the most efficient. The results show that in the later years of the 
simulation, all 3 sealed-bids auctions are equally efficient.  
  6.2.3 Industry Characteristics and Evolution 
Until now, I have focused on the simulation results and the movement of prices, 
variance, auction surplus, and efficiency. However, I would like to consider the effects 
of auction choice on industry evolution. This final section will examine the effects of 
auction mechanism choice on agent participation in auctions, financial characteristics, 
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and on the evolution of market structure. More general conclusions will be drawn in 
Chapter 7.  
Figure 6.8 Average Standard Deviation of Price/Acre by Auction Type with LDT On 
  
Market participation is simply defined as the number of bidders who participate in the 
bidding process. Recent experimental evidence suggests that the type of auction used 
will affect the number of participants drawn to the auction (Klemperer 2002). While the 
farm agents in this simulation are assumed to be indifferent a priori with respect to the 
type of auction used, it is possible that the choice of auction mechanism may interact 
with certain farm agent characteristics, in particular those that could exclude them from 
bidding (i.e. liquidity and solvency). If this were to occur, there may be significant 
differences in bids due to the assumed optimal bidding functions applicable to auction. 
Figure 6.9 shows the average number of bidders who took part in each auction over the 
simulation period for each of the auctions under LDT.  
Observe that after year 5, there appears to be little difference between the number of 
bidders who participated in the auctions, regardless of choice. This is even more 
pronounced after year 19 when all auction mechanisms appear to generate, on average, 
between 25-30 bidders for each auction. This finding also reaffirms my discussion 
concerning the results shown in figure 6.6 and the dramatic change in surplus shares 
after year 19 when the auction mechanism is FPSB.  
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Figure 6.9 Average Number of Bidders per Auction by Auction Type 
 
In light of figure 6.9, I conclude that auction specification does not affect bidder 
participation in this land market simulation. This is an important outcome worthy of 
further consideration (but outside the scope of this thesis) because in contrast, there 
have been several documented cases of market thinning as a result of auction choice 
and rule specification (Klemperer 2002).  
The next issue to address is the role that auction choice may have on the financial 
health of the farm and agricultural industry. One of the most accepted measures of 
financial health is the debt to asset ratio (D/A Ratio).  Figure 6.10 shows the evolution 
of the average D/A ratio of remaining farmers in each of the simulated auctions. The 
same general pattern of convergence seen in figure 6.9 is apparent, where differences in 
the early years are likely caused by assumed average prices of land for years t < 0. The 
only other slight divergence visible in the diagram occurs for the English auction in 
years 20 – 28. I suspect this is due to the abrupt increase in land prices in the simulation 
(see figure 6.7) and the resulting higher level of debt that land buyers had to carry.   
Although initially somewhat unexpected, the data generated in figure 6.10 ultimately 
make intuitive sense. Debt is an amount that must be borrowed to invest in land and 
other capital items. Here, the level of borrowing is directly affected by the price paid 
for land, and the average market price of land determines the asset value of land. In 
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effect, increasing (decreasing) land prices leads to increasing (decreasing) debt levels 
so long as the increases (decreases) are moderate in nature. Figure 6.11 might look 
significantly different if there were other abrupt and significant changes in land prices, 
such as those in the English auction years 20 – 2845.  
Figure 6.10 Average D/A Ration by Auction Type 
 
Finally, farm agent exits and average farm size are graphed in figures 6.11 and 6.12. 
The data in figure 6.11 are from simulations under the English auction only. The results 
from sealed-bid auctions are not presented for graphical simplicity, and because there is 
no discernable difference between auction specifications. The graph shows the total 
number of exits by type, and the average skill level of remaining farmers.  
The number of retired exits steadily increases as farmers age. The number of forced 
exits (insolvency) begins and ends between years 3 and 9. On average, 20 farm agents 
(4.7%) are forced out of the industry, all in the early stages of the simulation. The 
largest type of exit is the voluntary exit (equity protection). In sum, over 35 years of 
simulation, a total of 120 (28.4%) farmers voluntarily exit the industry, most of whom 
do so through years 5 – 11.  
                                                 
45
 The overall decreasing trend may be a result of aging farmers, slowly paying off their debt and not purchasing 
any more land. However, the fact that all auctions trend similarly is of interest, not necessarily the trend itself. 
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Figure 6.11 Farm Exits and Average Skill of Farm Agents (English Auction)
46
 
 
Recalling the conditions for voluntary exit, this result implies that from year 1 
approximately 100 (23.7%) farmers are faced with NCFBI < 0 for 5 – 9 consecutive 
years. The cause of the exits can be explained, at least in part, by average skill. It is 
clear that in this simulation, as farmers voluntarily exit, average skill increases. This 
means that the majority of farmers voluntarily exiting have average skill < 1 as 
expected. Without income support, these below average skilled farmers do not stay in 
the market for equity protection purposes
47
. 
Figure 6.11 also shows that, on average, there are between 200 and 210 exits per 
simulation, representing 50% of the initial population. In effect, I would expect that 
average farm size would double over the duration of the simulation, as it does. And 
figure 6.12 shows that regardless of auction choice, average farm size evolves at the 
same rate.  
                                                 
46
 Other auctions are omitted from Fig. 6.11 for graphical simplicity and because they do not differ from 
the results obtained via English auction.  Sealed-bid auction data are available upon request.  
47
 It should be noted that this type of behaviour is not observed in actual markets for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, agents are not hyper-rational with respect to equity protection and may remain in the market even 
if NCFBI < 0. Secondly, producer supports often mitigate the effects of NCFBI < 0 and allow marginal 
farmers to remain in the market. Thirdly, there is an element of luck that is coupled with skill to 
determine farmer revenue - this is not explored here. Lastly, the simulation is without exogenous shocks 
(border closings, new policies). Such shocks change the evolutionary path, causing one-time mass exits 
or more favourable conditions for marginal farmers. Removing the effects of such shocks is difficult and 
the “natural” exit trend is forever changed.  
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Overall, my results strongly suggest that, under the given assumptions, choice of land 
auction mechanism has almost no effect on agricultural market structure, farm financial 
characteristics, or farm agent characteristics. This is a strong conclusion resting upon 
some strict assumptions, but the choice of auction mechanism has little effect on the 
macroeconomic characteristics of this industry in these simulations. This stands in 
contrast to other primary results where I found that auction specification does play a 
large role in pricing efficiency and surplus allocation
48
. 
Figure 6.12 Average Total Acres Cropped by Auction 
 
  6.2.4 Overview of Results 
A comparison of outcomes across auctions with LDT On were presented and examined 
in this section. To summarize: 
1) The SPSB generated the most perceived total surplus, followed by the TPSB, 
English, and FPSB auctions respectively. 
2) The SPSB and TPSB resulted in the most egalitarian distribution of surplus between 
the buyer and seller. While potentially important for policy analysis, I draw no 
conclusions about an “optimal” distribution of surplus in this land auction environment.  
                                                 
48
 It is also worth noting that the average distance between farmland and the farmstead decreased by 
approximately 25% during the course of the simulation. This result is similar for all auctions and LDT 
choices. It suggests that farmers try to purchase land close to the farmstead so as to minimize costs. 
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3) The English auction generated the most variability in prices. All the sealed-bid 
auctions performed equally well. This suggests that the common-value elements of the 
bids in an English auction generates higher price variability than the common-value 
elements in the sealed-bid auctions. 
4) The English auction generated, on average, the highest prices. This was followed by 
the FPSB, TPSB, and SPSB auctions respectively. The English auction also 
exaggerated upward trends in sales price more than the sealed-bid auctions.  
5) Contrary to my prior expectations, auction choice had no effect on aggregate market 
characteristics or industry evolution.  
6.3 Summary 
I described the results of eight simulations of farmland market auctions, each with 100 
iterations of 35 years. The results generated support certain aspects of existing theory, 
yet they also offer some insight into additional areas yet to be explored. All my findings 
suggest that auction or mechanism design has no effect on industry level indicators – 
the path is different for different auctions, but the final outcome is virtually the same 
for all auctions. Chapter 7 will examine these results and discuss them further with 
agricultural policies in mind.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 CONCLUSION 
7.0 Introduction 
This section will briefly review and summarize the results of this thesis. The limitations 
of MAS modeling will also be discussed within the context of farmland auction 
markets. Some general conclusions about farmland auction markets are made, staying 
mindful of the results and the limitations of the model. The chapter will conclude with 
suggestions for future research.  
7.1 Summary of Results 
 7.1.1 Learning Direction Theory 
Section 6.1 compared auctions of the same type with and without the imposition of a 
modern theoretically based individual learning scheme: LDT. All four auction types 
were found to generate greater means and variances when LDT was present. 
Differences between the means and variances were significant at a 5% level of 
significance. This result concurs with the work of Neugebauer and Selten (2006) who 
found that LDT explained, at least in part, some of the over-bidding phenomena 
observed in repeated auction experiments. As discussed in this thesis, my findings may 
run against intuition about the expected effect of a learning mechanism (increased 
variance), but I argue that LDT is not so much a true learning mechanism as it is a bid 
adjustment theory. In effect, to be a realistic learning mechanism (i.e. one that would 
decrease variance), LDT must be improved upon. 
Nevertheless, these findings are important because much of the research about land 
prices assumes that they are either influenced by speculation, hedonic pricing, 
capitalization, or expected revenue (Huang et al. 2006). My results suggest that a 
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portion of land prices in modern agriculture could be attributed to a strategic bidding 
component, where a strategic bidding component is a factor in price formation when 
there is repeated play. This is an aspect of land markets that is often overlooked in 
current analysis.  
Although LDT had a measurable effect on all auctions, it did not affect all auctions 
equally. For instance, I observed that LDT had a more noticeable effect on the SPSB 
and FPSB auctions than on the English and TPSB auctions. I cannot say exactly why 
this occurred. I speculate that it may be a consequence of the assumed bidding 
functions. In both the English and TPSB auctions, bids are generally equal to, or 
above
49
, an agent‟s valuation, meaning that there is less room for agents to ratchet up 
their bid using LDT because they are bounded by credit or profitability constraints. 
Whatever the exact reasons, it appears as though the English and TPSB auctions are 
more robust to LDT.  
 7.1.2 Auction Performance 
One goal of this thesis was to better understand the effects of learning, information 
diffusion, space, and time in a repeated farmland auction setting.  As a result, auction 
performance measures were applied to simulations with LDT On.  
The simulation results showed that price level was highest when an English auction 
was used, and lowest under the SPSB. This supports the work of Milgrom and Weber 
(1982) who use an affiliated-values model to explain the divergence from the 
traditional private-values revenue equivalence theory results. While this thesis in no 
way seeks to uncover an “optimal” price level, standard farmland research in 
agriculture is concerned about such issues.  
Concerns about optimal farmland prices arise because “overpriced” farmland can lead 
to financial weakness as well as divert funds from areas with higher returns on 
investment. Alternatively, “underpriced” farmland may cause some land to gravitate 
                                                 
49
 Recall that in a TPSB the optimal bid decreases the in the number of bidders to the true value, and that 
in the English auction bidders can re-evaluate their bids once they have gathered information, and bid 
higher in the second round.  
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away from its highest and best use and away from the most efficient producers. In light 
of this, auction choice and price levels are important for agricultural policy 
considerations.  
Farmland price variance was greatest under the English auction, implying that the 
English auction may be the least efficient mechanism for land markets. The sealed-bid 
auctions examined here all performed equally well under this efficiency criteria, 
implying that uncertainty in common-values might be reduced with the use of sealed-
bid auctions when farmland values are assumed to be affiliated in nature.  
I conclude that if it was in the interest of agricultural policy makers to reduce the 
overall variance (and increase market efficiency) of sale prices in the agricultural land 
market using auctions, I would suggest a sealed-bid auction.  
Conversely, the English auction was found to exacerbate upward trends in prices 
relative to the sealed-bid auctions. This effect is attributable to the presence of revealed 
bids coupled with the affiliated-values assumption. In turn, this suggests in times of 
rising land prices, the use of an English auction would contribute to increasing prices 
and could lead to over bidding.  
Under the assumptions made in this simulation, the SPSB was found to generate the 
most total perceived surplus of any auction, rendering it the most efficient auction 
mechanism considering Harberger‟s (1971) postulates. Furthermore, the SPSB resulted 
in the most equitable split in surplus between buyer and seller (followed closely by the 
TPSB). If total perceived surplus and equal share of surplus in land auctions is a 
concern for agricultural policy, it would be in the best interest of policy makers to adopt 
the SPSB auction as the standard.  
Although no “one-size-fits-all” conclusion about auction choice can (or should) be 
made based on the results generated here, from a sustainable policy standpoint it 
appears as though the SPSB auction is the best choice. That is to say that in the context 
of this highly stylized simulation model, the SPSB auction outperforms all other 
auctions in that it generates the most surplus, yields an even share of surplus, as well as 
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low transaction prices and low standard deviations of prices – all of which are factors 
that in the long-run would work to stabilize the economic health of real land market and 
the farming industry.  
 7.1.3 Market Characteristics 
The results of section 6.2.3 demonstrated clearly that the choice of auction design had 
little impact on market structure. While unexpected, this cannot be classified as 
emergent behaviour because upon closer inspection it appears that some of the 
assumptions made within the model likely contributed to this result (Tesfatsion 2002)
50
. 
I originally posited based on auction theory that mechanism design would affect prices 
(both levels and variance) as well as the quality of information. From this, it was 
believed that industry as a whole (the system) would evolve in a way that reflected the 
results of each type of auction. In addition, I originally speculated that higher prices and 
variance would lead to more market instability, leading to more exits and fewer active 
bidders than an auction that generated lower, more stable prices. However, this set of 
circumstances was not verified by my simulations. 
The fact that each of the four auctions systems evolved almost identically can be 
explained not by a single, but a number of factors. Each of these factors worked to 
nudge the industry along its path, despite the choice of auction design and the effect 
this had on prices and information. To begin to explain this result, I must go back to 
some key elements upon which this thesis was built. These are capital assets, income 
generating incentives, and optimal bids.  
Consider for a moment the nature of the land market. A farmland auction market is 
based on the underlying assumption that farmland is purchased to generate income and 
accumulate equity. This is in stark contrast to some markets for private-value goods, 
where often times the price paid for the good is a function of its private-value alone and 
there is no consideration for re-sale value or income generating ability.  
                                                 
50
 It should be noted that the certainty of this conclusion cannot be known until more research is carried 
out. 
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Agents who are concerned about the income stream of a capital asset are necessarily 
limited to transact at either the WTA or WTP for the good. As such, there are natural 
upper and lower bounds on these prices – unlike auctions for unique pieces of art. 
Moreover, income/productivity incentives signal agents to expand, or exit the industry 
and thus dictate the need for a market mechanism to sell farmland.  
The simulations showed that regardless of auction type, there are agents who are 
willing to exit the market and sell their land, and there are those who are willing to 
purchase land. Therefore, one could say that the path of the market is dependent on the 
rationality of agents in terms of income generating opportunity and equity protection.  
The natural upper and lower bounds on the price farmland, coupled with the fact that 
farm agents are (or should be) income/productivity driven causes the market to track in 
the same direction in the absence of exogenous shocks and in spite of auction choice. 
Thus, I conclude that the natural path of the model is driven by farm agents, a.k.a. 
homo economicus, and their desire to generate income. Ultimately, my findings imply 
that so long as the mechanism of choice supports income generating incentives, the 
system is robust to auction or mechanism design
51
. 
Finally, the assumed bidding strategies probably played an important role in the 
evolutionary paths of the simulations. Recall that for tractability, optimal bidding 
functions were assumed to be equal for all agents ceteris paribus. As a result, all agents 
bid in exactly the same manner as all other agents in the simulation. In retrospect, this 
assumption led to a degree of heterogeneity in bidding that may have been sufficient to 
suppress any phenomena that might be considered emergent. In light of the lessons 
learned here, it would be interesting to examine the effects of including a more realistic 
learning process (for instance, via a genetic algorithm) within the optimal bidding 
                                                 
51
 It should be noted that this stylized model does not allow for extreme deviations in prices due to the number of 
assumptions that are imposed. Real world markets however, may not operate as expected, and the effects of extreme 
deviations in prices and bids is still unknown in repeated games with information diffusion and learning. Allowing 
for exogenous shocks to the industry may result in shocks to land markets, changing the steady state path. In this 
case, using the most robust, efficient auction would be central to assuring that land markets do not crash or fluctuate 
out of control.  
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scheme. Future research could test to what degree truly heterogeneous bidding 
functions affect the results. 
Although macro level indicators in the simulation remained relatively unchanged, this 
result does not imply that auction choice does not matter. I find that auction choice 
clearly has an impact on the final price paid, the variance of those prices, and total 
surplus generated. Reducing variance and ensuring the stable function of land markets 
goes a long way to ensuring that the information passed is of good quality, and that 
market power is minimized. 
 7.1.4 General Results 
The simulations analyzed here generated certain results that buttress aspects of auction 
theory, e.g. the effects of learning, affiliated-values and overbidding. In this sense, my 
MAS simulations reaffirmed analytics. However, what was not expected was the 
impact, or lack thereof, of auction design on industry structure and evolution.  
The nature of the complex system modeled in this thesis means that analytics could not 
have been used to formally solve it due to the presence of dynamic games and 
individual feedback. As such, the results from this model must be seen as supporting 
the theory as well as providing insights into land market evolution with feedback and a 
repeated game setting.  
My results indicate that, in the absence of exogenous shocks, all auctions considered in 
the simulation appeared to be relatively robust in nature, ultimately resulting in the 
same land structure at simulation‟s end. The fact that all auctions produced a similar 
land structure suggests that even when bids are sub-optimal, well designed auctions can 
elicit good outcomes and nudge an industry in a competitive direction provided that the 
mechanism supports income generating incentives.  
Although I draw no conclusions about which auction is best as a one-size-fits-all 
design, my findings indicate that a SPSB auction, designed correctly, can mitigate 
overbidding in repeated games, provide an equitable distribution of surplus, generate 
the greatest surplus, and send good quality signals about prices when the good to be 
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auctioned displays similar characteristics to farmland. But as always, these findings 
must be interpreted with caution since there are documented cases where SPSB 
auctions, coupled with thin markets, resulted in market failures by facilitating collusion 
and low seller surplus due to lower than predicted transaction prices (Kemplerer 2002). 
7.2 Limitations of the Model 
While MAS and other agent-based simulation methods have garnered a large amount of 
attention recently for ushering in a novel way to do economic simulation, it would be 
irresponsible to assume that agent-based methods are without flaws. 
For instance, although extremely flexible, agent-based methods lead to debate about 
which factors to include in a model. The simulation described in this thesis is based on 
a set of assumptions about preferences, behaviours, and expectations that were 
ultimately used to make the model tractable, both in development and analysis of the 
results. As noted by Freeman (2005), researchers who perform this type of modelling 
are faced with a decision between including many realistic elements of the real-world 
against making some simplifying assumptions for the sake of tractability. Agent-based 
models have the flexibility to let the researcher decide what is, and is not, important. As 
such, researchers are sometimes faced with the daunting task of excluding certain 
elements of the model so that emphasis can be placed on others. The current literature 
on agent-based methods offers little guidance about how to make these decisions; one 
exception is Gilbert and Terna (1999).   
I also made various assumptions about agents, their behaviours, and their local 
environment. Most notable however, were my assumptions about agents‟ optimal 
bidding functions and the learning mechanism. It is important to note that the assumed 
bidding schemes and learning mechanism were based on theoretical work, and by no 
means are guaranteed to capture authentic behaviour. They are approximations, as 
developed in the literature, and served to approximate as closely as possible real-world 
behaviour. It will take some time to develop a model (even in an MAS framework) that 
mimics actual bidding schemes and learning mechanisms since there is clearly still 
much to be learned about these processes.  
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The purpose of this section is not to question all assumptions, or highlight the 
limitations of the model. This section should be considered a disclaimer. All of the 
results discussed in this thesis need to be viewed in light of the limitations of MAS. The 
data generated from the MAS result from agents acting on the assumptions imposed on 
them. Although some of these assumptions may not be sufficient to imitate real world 
behaviours, the flows of information, evolution of time, and the agent landscape have 
offered valuable insights about farmland auction markets that were not available before 
MAS.  
7.3 Suggestions for Future Work 
This simulation model should be considered the basis for what could be a series of 
projects examining the effects of learning, feedback, space, time, and repeated games. 
There are a number of interesting extensions to this thesis. These include; 1) the 
inclusion of exogenous shocks to the industry to examine the performance of auction 
types; 2) experimenting with different types of learning mechanisms or ameliorating 
LDT; 3) including a lease market and linking it to the sales market through the flow of 
information; 4) experimenting with adaptive bidding behaviour, where bidders can alter 
their optimal bid based on experience, and, 5) modelling other markets (e.g. pollution 
credits) to measure auction performance when strategies and incentives change.  
The extensions suggested would surely go a long way towards explaining observed 
bidding behaviour that cannot be explained using traditional equilibrium models. 
Furthermore, modeling auction markets using MAS has been shown to be extremely 
useful for enriching the literature when agents are endowed with characteristics similar 
to their real world counterparts, rather than the hyper rational economic agents that are 
typically assumed.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
Crop Prices and Yields Years t = -5 to t = 34 
 
 Price Yield Price/Acre   Price Yield Price/Acre 
Year $/Ton Tons/Acre $/Acre Year $/Ton Tons/Acre $/Acre 
-5 $224.84 0.64695 $145.46 16 $224.01 0.60725 $136.03 
-4 $216.84 0.7144 $154.91 17 $217.04 0.670365 $145.50 
-3 $223.73 0.64885 $145.16 18 $207.70 0.696598 $144.68 
-2 $218.06 0.61465 $134.03 19 $214.25 0.765343 $163.97 
-1 $225.26 0.69825 $157.29 20 $217.80 0.686854 $149.60 
0 $226.88 0.640594 $145.34 21 $218.56 0.649943 $142.05 
1 $209.79 0.67925 $142.50 22 $213.88 0.664478 $142.12 
2 $212.31 0.775882 $164.73 23 $218.10 0.765473 $166.95 
3 $214.88 0.60093 $129.12 24 $213.84 0.67051 $143.38 
4 $214.67 0.650015 $139.54 25 $197.30 0.781674 $154.23 
5 $216.84 0.713726 $154.76 26 $220.65 0.649113 $143.23 
6 $209.30 0.65892 $137.91 27 $217.37 0.726529 $157.93 
7 $208.89 0.775433 $161.98 28 $216.34 0.637302 $137.87 
8 $213.12 0.634687 $135.26 29 $217.26 0.694655 $150.92 
9 $207.48 0.656224 $136.15 30 $208.82 0.746869 $155.96 
10 $218.06 0.732204 $159.66 31 $209.63 0.691021 $144.86 
11 $213.89 0.632296 $135.24 32 $217.07 0.703168 $152.64 
12 $215.36 0.694461 $149.56 33 $228.17 0.691765 $157.84 
13 $230.71 0.634266 $146.33 34 $218.03 0.669873 $146.05 
14 $218.89 0.610859 $133.71      
15 $222.68 0.711077 $158.34 MEAN $216.46 0.682318 $147.57 
    STD.DEV $6.47 0.05 $9.71 
Source: Author‟s Calculations based on data from Saskatchewan Agriculture, Food and Rural Revitalization 1985-2004 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Simulation Code 
Netlogo© version 3.1.3 
Center for Connected Learning and Computer-Based Modeling in the Department of 
 Computer Science at Northwestern University in Evanston, Illinois 
 http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/ 
 
globals 
[  
simulation 
plots-for-sale                                                            ;;; counts number of plots set up for sale each year 
total-plots-sold                                                          ;;; counts number of plots that actually sold in that year  
total-plots-unsold 
plots-unsold-this-tick 
reservation-not-met 
plots-sold-this-tick 
land-price                           
price-crop 
yield-crop                          
year 
tot-vc-prodn 
avg-vc-prodn  
tot-prodn-crop 
avg-prodn-crop 
tot-crop-revenue 
avg-crop-revenue 
avg-cost-prodn  
tot-cost-prodn 
current-plot-bid-on 
current-list-of-bids 
current-winning-bid 
current-winner 
price-paid 
highest-bid 
second-highest-bid 
adj-winning-bid 
list-of-winning-bids-adj 
all-prices 
auction-winner 
auction-seller 
auction-plot-acres 
auction-plot-quality 
auction-plot-location                                            ;;; xcor ycor for easy calculation of distance to bidders farmsteads' 
past-crop-prices                                                     ;;; array of past crop prices, most recent first  
past-crop-yields                                                     ;;; array of past crop yields, most recent first 
xloc 
yloc 
bidders 
land-for-sale? 
dead 
retired-exit 
voluntary-exit 
forced-exit 
credit-constrained 
] 
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turtles-own 
[ 
age 
generation 
risk-aversion 
urgency 
skill 
attitude 
years-retired 
average-multiplier 
average-soil-quality 
buyer? 
exit 
type-of-exit                                                      ;;; 0 = no exit, 1 = retirement, 2 = voluntary, 3 = forced 
plots-owned 
plot-for-sale   
plots-sold 
plots-purchased      
land-value 
capital-value 
asset-value 
equity-value 
debt                                                                ;;; current debt remaining at year end 
cash 
NCFBI                                                               ;;; crop-revenue - tc-prodn - debt-payment-amount - family-
withdrawal 
list-NCFBI 
years-paid-debt                                                      
principal                                                           ;;; current at year end (refers to last starting principal amount after a 
purchase) 
debt-payment-amount                                  ;;; payment that is due at the end of next harvest (at year end this refers to 
coming year) 
principal-paid                                                   ;;; amount of principal paid to date (at year end this refers to yr that 
just ended) 
capital-purchases 
expected-production-volume 
residual-to-land-labor 
residual-to-land-labor-exp 
acres-total-crop 
prodn-crop 
crop-revenue   
tc-prodn 
variable-prodn-costs   
hired-labour     
travel-cost    
trucking-cost      
family-withdrawal 
capital-replacement-charge  
;avgall-adj-prodn-volume    
years-neg-ncfbi    
years-neg-cash    
credit-constrained?  
active-bidder? 
times-bid 
winning? 
winner? 
won-last                                                            ;;; 0 = na, 1 = true, 2 = false 
winning-bids 
expected-price                                                 ;;; expected price based on 3 yr weighted moving average of past crop 
prices 
expected-yield                                                  ;;; expected yield based on 3 yr weighted moving average of past crop 
yields 
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expected-price-per-acre-adj 
distance-to-plot-bid-on 
expected-variable-prodn-costs 
expected-hired-labour-cost 
expected-transport-cost 
expected-capital-replacement-charge 
expected-netrev-per-acre 
initial-capital-investment  
expected-gross-rev 
expected-net-revenue 
expected-salvage-value 
annuity      
local-price-info 
global-price-info  
max-bid-per-acre 
max-bid 
max-bid-credit-constraint 
value-of-land-bid-on-per-acre 
value-of-land-bid-on 
bid 
current-bid 
abs-max-bid    
error2          
initial-parameters   
list-prices   
std-dev-land    
upper-bound      
lower-bound                          
] 
 
patches-own 
[ 
annual-multiplier 
patch-id 
owner 
farmstead? 
for-sale? 
quality 
k-acres 
distance-to-farmstead 
rain 
prodn-volume    
on-auction-block? 
reservation-price 
times-sold 
expected-price-p 
expected-yield-p 
expected-price-per-acre-adj-p 
expected-gross-rev-p 
expected-variable-prodn-costs-p 
expected-hired-labour-cost-p 
expected-transport-cost-p 
expected-capital-replacement-charge-p 
expected-netrev-p 
initial-capital-investment-p 
expected-salvage-value-p 
annuity-p 
] 
 
breed [farmers a-farmer] 
breed [retirees retired] 
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  ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
  ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; INITIALIZATION-PHASE-CONTROL ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
  ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 
to initialization-phase-control 
             
      if user-yes-or-no? "Have Output Files Been Initialized?" 
               [ setup ] 
               
end 
 
to setup 
ca 
clear-output 
create-plots 
initialize-farm-agents 
import-crop-arrays 
delete-files 
set simulation 1  
prepare-output-files 
user-message "initialization complete" 
     
end 
 
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; RESET MODEL ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
  
 to reset 
  
 clear-all-plots 
 clear-drawing  
 clear-output 
 cp 
 ct  
 ask turtles [die] 
  set plots-for-sale 0                                                           
  set total-plots-sold 0                                                         
  set total-plots-unsold 0 
  set plots-unsold-this-tick 0 
  set reservation-not-met 0 
  set plots-sold-this-tick 0 
  set land-price 0                          
  set price-crop 0 
  set yield-crop 0                         
  set year 0 
  set tot-vc-prodn 0 
  set avg-vc-prodn 0 
  set tot-prodn-crop 0 
  set avg-prodn-crop 0 
  set tot-crop-revenue 0 
  set avg-crop-revenue 0 
  set avg-cost-prodn 0 
  set tot-cost-prodn 0 
  set current-plot-bid-on 0 
  set current-list-of-bids 0 
  set current-winning-bid 0 
  set current-winner 0 
  set price-paid 0 
  set highest-bid 0 
  set second-highest-bid 0 
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  set adj-winning-bid 0 
  set list-of-winning-bids-adj 0 
  set all-prices 0 
  set auction-winner 0 
  set auction-seller 0 
  set auction-plot-acres 0 
  set auction-plot-quality 0 
  set auction-plot-location 0                                                
  set past-crop-prices 0                                                     
  set past-crop-yields 0                                                     
  set xloc 0 
  set yloc 0 
  set bidders 0 
  set land-for-sale? 0 
  set dead 0 
  set retired-exit 0 
  set voluntary-exit 0 
  set forced-exit 0 
 
 end 
 
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; CREATE PLOTS  ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 
to create-plots 
  assign-patch-id 
  clear-land-tenure 
  set-quality-and-cultivated-acres    
end 
 
to assign-patch-id 
 
let counter [] 
set counter 1 
  ask patches [without-interruption [set patch-id counter set counter counter + 1]] 
  ask patches [ set pcolor black]   
end             
 
to clear-land-tenure  
set current-plot-bid-on [] 
ask patches [set owner "NA"  
             set for-sale? true 
             set farmstead? false 
             set on-auction-block? false 
            ]                 
end         
 
to set-quality-and-cultivated-acres 
  ask patches [set quality random-normal 1 0.05]                                            
    diffuse quality 0.75  
  ask patches [set quality precision quality 2]  
  ask patches [set pcolor green]                 
  ask patches [set k-acres random-normal 150 15] 
    diffuse k-acres 0.5 
  ask patches [set k-acres precision k-acres 0]    
  ask patches with [ k-acres > 160 ][set k-acres 160] 
  ask patches [set times-sold 0]   
end 
  ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
  ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; CREATE FARM AGENTS  ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
  ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
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  to initialize-farm-agents 
  
   create-farm-agents 
   assign-farm-agent-attributes 
   create-retirees                                                                                                             
          
 end      
 
 to create-farm-agents 
  
   create-farmers 422 
   ask farmers [set color red]   
   ask farmers [set type-of-exit 0] 
   ask farmers [set skill random-normal 1 0.05]                     
   ask farmers with [ skill > 1.2][set skill 1.2]  
   ask farmers [set skill precision skill 2] 
   ask farmers [set land-value 0] 
   ask farmers [set asset-value 0] 
   ask farmers [set debt 0] 
   ask farmers [set principal 0] 
   ask farmers [set years-paid-debt 0] 
   ask farmers [set list-NCFBI ["x" "x" "x" "x" "x"]] 
   ask farmers [setxy random-xcor random-ycor]                                                
   ask farmers [if any? other-turtles-here [ find-new-spot ]]  
   ask farmers [set xcor pxcor-of patch-at 0 0]   
   ask farmers [set ycor pycor-of patch-at 0 0]  
   ask farmers [set owner-of (patch-at 0 0) who]                                    
   ask farmers [set buyer? "NA"] 
   ask farmers [set credit-constrained? "NA"] 
   ask farmers [set won-last 0] 
   ask farmers [set winning-bids []] 
   ask farmers [set capital-purchases []] 
   ask farmers [set active-bidder? false set plots-purchased 0 set plots-sold 0] 
   ask patches with [owner != "NA"][set for-sale? false]  
   ask patches with [owner != "NA"][set farmstead? true] 
            
      
 end 
  
 to assign-farm-agent-attributes                                     
  
   ask farmers 
      [ 
       set generation 1        
       if Type-of-Auction = "TPSB" 
       [        
       set local-price-info [ 453.07 470.33 429.67 489.05 483.30 412.91 ]                             
       set global-price-info [ 386.19 489.70 430.60 469.52 411.88 409.35 ]     
       ]         
        if Type-of-Auction = "FPSB" 
       [        
       set local-price-info [ 418.44 438.81 502.74 510.69 435.78 448.48 ]                             
       set global-price-info [ 439.46 450.97 479.83 493.07 455.44 433.01 ]     
       ]        
       if Type-of-Auction = "SPSB" 
       [        
       set local-price-info [ 339.37 345.83 406.06 387.53 453.77 468.30 ]                             
       set global-price-info [ 468.66 416.59 377.23 347.46 439.05 439.31 ]        
       ]        
       if Type-of-Auction = "English" 
       [        
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       set local-price-info [ 397.11 489.25 559.01 418.57 460.15 534.89 ]                       
       set global-price-info [ 389.97 458.63 410.42 441.13 472.89 503.52 ] 
       ]                               
      ]                                                                    
           
   file-open "Initial-Population3.txt" 
   ask farmers [set initial-parameters file-read] 
   file-close    
   file-open "residual-to-land-labor.txt" 
   ask farmers [set residual-to-land-labor-exp file-read] 
   file-close    
   file-open "expected-crop-volume.txt" 
   ask farmers [set expected-production-volume file-read] 
   file-close    
   ask farmers 
   [ 
     set age item 0 initial-parameters 
     set plots-owned item 1 initial-parameters 
     set debt precision(item 2 initial-parameters)2 
     set debt precision(debt * 1.15)2 
     if age < 20 [set age 20] 
   ]     
     
   ask farmers [own] 
                        
   ask farmers [if age <= 30 [set attitude 3]]                                                                    ;;; least risk averse 
   ask farmers [if (age > 30 and age <= 40) [set attitude 2]]                                                     ;;;  
   ask farmers [if (age > 40) [set attitude 1]]                                                                   ;;; most risk averse 
    
   ask farmers [set urgency 1]   
    
   ask farmers [set years-paid-debt 1]                    
   ;;; This assumes that all loans were refinanced in t = 0                               
   ask farmers [set principal debt]                                
   ask farmers [set debt-payment-amount precision(principal * (Int-Rate / (1 - (1 / (1 + Int-Rate)^ repayment))))0] 
   ask farmers [set principal-paid precision(debt-payment-amount - (principal * Int-Rate))0 
               set debt debt - principal-paid] 
     
   ask farmers [set acres-total-crop sum values-from patches with [owner = who-of myself][k-acres]]               
   ask farmers [set capital-value (capital-per-acre * acres-total-crop)] 
   ask farmers [set cash precision(cash-per-acre * acres-total-crop)0] 
    
end 
 
to find-new-spot 
      fd random 20  
      if not can-move? 1 
      [ rt random 180 ]        
      fd random 15                                                       
      if any? other-turtles-here [find-new-spot]   
end 
 
to own 
  if ((count patches with [owner = who-of myself]) < plots-owned)[find-land] 
end 
 
to find-land     
  without-interruption [ask min-one-of patches with [for-sale? = true][(abs(pxcor - xcor-of myself) + abs(pycor - 
ycor-of myself))]            
      [set owner who-of myself 
       set distance-to-farmstead distancexy xcor-of turtle owner ycor-of turtle owner 
       set for-sale? false        
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       ]]        
  if ((count patches with [owner = who-of myself])< plots-owned)[find-land]   
end 
 
to create-retirees 
  ask farmers [if age >= 65 [set breed retirees]]                             
  ask retirees  
  [ 
    set color black  
    set exit true 
    set type-of-exit 1 
    set years-retired 1 
    set attitude 3  
    set urgency 0.85 
    set won-last 0 
    ask patches with [owner = who-of myself] 
     [  set for-sale? true 
        set pcolor blue 
        set farmstead? false 
     ] 
  ] 
   
end 
 
  ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
  ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; ASSIGN PARAMETERS  ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
  ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
   
to import-crop-arrays 
    
  file-open "yield crop.txt" 
  set yield-crop file-read 
  file-close   
  file-open "past crop yield.txt" 
  set past-crop-yields file-read 
  file-close   
  import-price-arrays 
end 
   
to import-price-arrays   
  file-open "price crop.txt" 
  set price-crop file-read 
  file-close   
  file-open "past crop price.txt" 
  set past-crop-prices file-read 
  file-close 
   
  if Type-of-Auction = "TPSB" 
       [        
       set list-of-winning-bids-adj [ 445.43 443.58 440.80 411.37 474.14 379.31 414.69 477.17
 465.46         
                                     361.86 398.46 413.82 396.28 501.12 502.99 426.78 443.93 362.56
         
                                     431.14 376.16 "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" 
                                     "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" ] 
 
       ]         
  if Type-of-Auction = "FPSB" 
       [        
       set list-of-winning-bids-adj [ 420.60 509.19 464.36 491.95 457.52 474.45 457.16 424.06
 422.57      
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                                     435.03 463.30 440.00 490.34 454.14 481.35 482.71 438.35 430.11
      
                                     457.07 486.77 "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x"
 "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x"  "x" "x" "x" "x"
 "x" "x" ]      
 
       ]        
  if Type-of-Auction = "SPSB" 
       [        
       set list-of-winning-bids-adj [ 385.31 459.87 345.24 356.71 398.99 384.87 454.83 370.96
 410.55  
                                      340.92 355.20 360.14 351.59 323.47 467.77 440.71 405.29 419.86
  
                                      433.11 464.87 "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x"
 "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x"
 "x" "x" ] 
 
 
       ]        
  if Type-of-Auction = "English" 
       [        
       set list-of-winning-bids-adj [ 494.59 527.13 554.63 460.17 558.53 503.82 511.33 507.25
 425.09      
                                     405.13 489.72 469.35 492.39 477.63 519.56 488.65 406.47 480.78
      
                                     546.90 486.34 "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x"
 "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x"             "x" "x" "x" "x"
 "x" "x" ] 
 
       ]          
                                                      
  set all-prices list-of-winning-bids-adj     
    ;;; this will be used when learning is off.                                                                                   
    
  ask farmers [set land-value precision((sum values-from patches with [owner = who-of myself ][k-acres * quality]) * 
mean list-of-winning-bids-adj)0] 
  ask farmers [set asset-value precision(land-value + capital-value + cash)0]  
  ask farmers [set equity-value precision (asset-value - debt)0]               
     
end 
   
  ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
  ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; SIMULATION PHASE CONTROL  ;;;;;;;;;;;; 
  ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 
to simulation-phase 
 
  set year year + 1 
   
  update-retirees-parameters 
  update-farmers-parameters 
  crop-production-module 
  farm-accounting-module 
  form-expectations 
  continue-farming-module?     
  farm-expansion-contraction 
  reservation-price-calculation-module 
  land-purchase-auction-module   
  export-data                              
  ifelse year < simulation-length 
     [simulation-phase]    
     [ifelse simulation < number-of-simulations 
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       [  set simulation simulation + 1 
          reset 
          create-plots 
          initialize-farm-agents 
          import-crop-arrays 
          simulation-phase 
      ]                                                      
      [user-message "complete"] 
     ]   
end 
 
to update-retirees-parameters 
 
  ask retirees 
      [ 
        set years-retired (years-retired + 1) 
        set color black  
        set exit true 
        ask patches with [owner = who-of myself] 
         [   
            set for-sale? true 
            set pcolor blue 
            set farmstead? false 
         ] 
        if years-retired <= 2 [set attitude 3 set urgency 0.85]                                                                     
        if (years-retired > 2 and years-retired <= 5) [set attitude 2 set urgency 0.75]                                                      
        if (years-retired > 5) [set attitude 1 set urgency 0.65]    
        ;;; maybe this should be a function of farmsize as well? Small farms more urgent. 
        ;;; Dick says yes, Peter and I say no.                                                                
    
     ]   
end 
 
to update-farmers-parameters 
   error-calculation 
   ask farmers [if age <= 30 [set attitude 3]]                                                                    ;;; least risk averse 
   ask farmers [if (age > 30 and age <= 40) [set attitude 2]]                                                     ;;;  
   ask farmers [if (age > 40) [set attitude 1]]                                                                   ;;; most risk averse 
    
   ask farmers [if attitude = 3[set risk-aversion 0.95]]                                                           
   ask farmers [if attitude = 2[set risk-aversion 0.90]]                                                          ;;; risk avesion parameters 
used in bidding 
   ask farmers [if attitude = 1[set risk-aversion 0.85]]    
end 
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; CROP PRODUCTION MODULE  ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
  
 to crop-production-module 
 
  simulate-crop-revenue 
  simulate-variable-prodn-costs 
  simulate-hired-labour-cost 
  simulate-transport-cost 
  simulate-capital-replacement-charge 
  simulate-living-deductions 
  set-net-cash-flow-before-investment   
     
end 
 
    
to simulate-crop-revenue 
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  set tot-vc-prodn 0                                                                                            ;;; these are values for ALL AGENTS in 
the simulation 
  set avg-vc-prodn 0                                                                                            ;;; used to keep track of aggregate totals 
  set tot-prodn-crop 0 
  set avg-prodn-crop 0 
  set tot-crop-revenue 0 
  set avg-crop-revenue 0 
   
  ask patches [set rain random-normal 1 0.05]                                            
    diffuse rain 0.75 
  ask patches [set rain precision rain 2]      
   
  ask patches [set annual-multiplier rain * quality]                                                                                               
  ;;; calculates yield multiplier (annual and fixed growing condition)  
  ask farmers [set acres-total-crop sum values-from patches with [owner = who-of myself][k-acres]]                                                 
  ;;; calculates total crop acreage of farm 
  ask farmers [set average-multiplier  
              precision ((sum values-from patches with [owner = who-of myself][annual-multiplier * k-acres]) / acres-
total-crop) 2]    
  ask farmers [set average-soil-quality  
              precision ((sum values-from patches with [owner = who-of myself][quality * k-acres]) / acres-total-crop)2] 
                 
  ask farmers [set prodn-crop precision (acres-total-crop * average-multiplier * skill * (item (year) yield-crop))2]                                
 ;;; calculates volume of production in tonnes for all k-acres owned of crop  
   
  set tot-prodn-crop sum values-from turtles [prodn-crop]                                                                                            
;;; calculates the total production by all agents 
  set avg-prodn-crop (tot-prodn-crop / 422)                                                                                                         
 ;;; calculates the average production by all agents 
   
  ask farmers [set crop-revenue precision (prodn-crop * (item (year) price-crop))2]                                                                  
;;; calculates crop revenue 
   
  set past-crop-prices fput (item (year) price-crop) past-crop-prices                                                                                
;;; adds current crop price to a vector of past prices 
  set past-crop-prices but-last past-crop-prices 
  set past-crop-yields fput (item (year) yield-crop) past-crop-yields                                                                                
;;; adds current crop yield to a vector of past yields  
  set past-crop-yields but-last past-crop-yields           
  set tot-crop-revenue sum values-from turtles [crop-revenue]                                                                                        
;;; calculates total crop revenue for all agents 
  set avg-crop-revenue (tot-crop-revenue / 422)                                                                                                      
;;; calculates average crop revenue for all agents   
  ask farmers [ask patches with [owner = who-of myself][set prodn-volume (annual-multiplier / average-multiplier-of 
myself) *                       
 ;;; calculates volume of production on each plot of land (TOTAL: ALL K ACRES) 
                                                                        (prodn-crop-of myself / acres-total-crop-of myself) *                        
                                                                         k-acres]]                                                                             
end 
to simulate-variable-prodn-costs 
  ask farmers [set variable-prodn-costs precision (acres-total-crop * per-acre-vc)0]  
  set tot-vc-prodn sum values-from turtles [variable-prodn-costs]                                                                             
  set avg-vc-prodn (tot-vc-prodn / 422)     
end 
to simulate-hired-labour-cost 
  ask farmers [set hired-labour precision ((((0.8 / (1 + 14500 * exp (-0.009 * acres-total-crop))) + 0.03) * acres-total-
crop) * 6.75)0] 
 
end 
to simulate-transport-cost 
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  ask farmers [set travel-cost (sum values-from patches with [owner = who-of myself][distance-to-farmstead]) * 
travel-adjustment] 
  ask farmers [set trucking-cost precision (sum values-from patches with [owner = who-of myself]                                                                                          
            [prodn-volume * distance-to-farmstead] * trucking-rate)0]             
end 
to simulate-capital-replacement-charge 
  ask farmers [set capital-replacement-charge capital-value * depreciation-rate] 
end 
 
to simulate-living-deductions    
  ask farmers [set family-withdrawal precision(min-family-withdrawal + 0.068 * crop-revenue + 125 * (plots-
owned))0] 
   
end 
 
to set-net-cash-flow-before-investment 
  set tot-cost-prodn 0                                                                                                                                    
  set avg-cost-prodn 0 
  ask farmers [ set tc-prodn 0] 
  ask farmers [ set tc-prodn (variable-prodn-costs + hired-labour + travel-cost + trucking-cost + capital-replacement-
charge)] 
  ask farmers [ if debt = 0   
              [set NCFBI  precision(crop-revenue - tc-prodn - debt-payment-amount - family-withdrawal)0]] 
  ask farmers [ if debt > 0 and debt >= debt-payment-amount  
              [set NCFBI  precision(crop-revenue - tc-prodn - debt-payment-amount - family-withdrawal)0]] 
  ask farmers [ if debt > 0 and debt < debt-payment-amount 
              [set NCFBI  precision(crop-revenue - tc-prodn - debt - family-withdrawal)0]] 
  ask farmers [set cash (cash + NCFBI)] 
  ask farmers [set list-NCFBI fput NCFBI list-NCFBI] 
  ask farmers [set list-NCFBI butlast list-NCFBI] 
   
  ask farmers [ifelse (cash < 0)             
                [set years-neg-cash years-neg-cash + 1][set years-neg-cash 0]]                                               
  ask farmers [if cash < 0 [ set debt (debt + (cash * -1)) set cash 0]]  
                                                                
  ask farmers [ifelse (NCFBI < 0)  
              [set years-neg-ncfbi years-neg-ncfbi + 1][set years-neg-ncfbi 0]]                                                              
   
  ask farmers [set principal-paid precision(debt-payment-amount - (principal * Int-Rate))0 
               set debt debt - principal-paid] 
   
  ask farmers [ if debt <= 0  
              [set debt 0 set principal 0 set debt-payment-amount 0 set years-paid-debt 0 set principal-paid 0]] 
                                                                                                   
  set tot-cost-prodn sum values-from turtles [tc-prodn] 
  set avg-cost-prodn mean values-from turtles [tc-prodn]                      
end 
 
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; FARM ACCOUNTING MODULE ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 
to farm-accounting-module 
 
  ask farmers [determine-land-market-value] 
  ask farmers [determine-asset-value] 
  ask farmers [determine-equity-value] 
 
end 
 
to determine-land-market-value  
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  set land-value precision((sum values-from patches with [owner = who-of myself ][k-acres * quality]) * mean list-
of-winning-bids-adj)0                                    
end 
 
to determine-asset-value 
  set asset-value precision(land-value + capital-value + cash)0   
end   
 
to determine-equity-value 
  set equity-value precision (asset-value - debt)0                   
end  
 
 
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; EXPECTATIONS MODULE? ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
  
 to form-expectations 
ask farmers [set residual-to-land-labor precision  
                   (((crop-revenue / average-soil-quality)  
                     - variable-prodn-costs  
                     - capital-replacement-charge 
                     - (0.068 * crop-revenue) 
                     - (125 * (plots-owned)))  
                     / acres-total-crop)2] 
                      
  ask farmers [ifelse residual-to-land-labor >= residual-to-land-labor-exp  
                  [set residual-to-land-labor-exp (residual-to-land-labor-exp * (1 - expectation-weight) 
                                                 + (expectation-weight * residual-to-land-labor))]                     
                  [set residual-to-land-labor-exp (residual-to-land-labor-exp * (1 - (1 * expectation-weight)) 
                                                 + ((1 * expectation-weight) * residual-to-land-labor))]] 
   
  ask farmers [set expected-production-volume precision 
                   ((expected-production-volume * (1 - expectation-weight))  + 
                    (prodn-crop / average-soil-quality / acres-total-crop)* expectation-weight)0]  
 
  ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; LAND PRICE EXPECTATION INFORMATION ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
   
   
  if Information-Diffusion = "on" 
  [ask patches 
    [ 
       set expected-price-per-acre-adj-p (.7 * ((0.38 * item 0 local-price-info-of turtle owner) +  
                                                (0.28 * item 1 local-price-info-of turtle owner) + 
                                                (0.16 * item 2 local-price-info-of turtle owner) + 
                                                (0.08 * item 3 local-price-info-of turtle owner) + 
                                                (0.07 * item 4 local-price-info-of turtle owner) + 
                                                (0.03 * item 5 local-price-info-of turtle owner)) + .3 *  ((0.38 * item 0 global-price-
info-of turtle owner) +  
                                                                                                           (0.28 * item 1 global-price-info-of turtle owner) + 
                                                                                                           (0.16 * item 2 global-price-info-of turtle owner) + 
                                                                                                           (0.08 * item 3 global-price-info-of turtle owner) + 
                                                                                                           (0.07 * item 4 global-price-info-of turtle owner) + 
                                                                                                           (0.03 * item 5 global-price-info-of turtle owner)))     
    ] 
   ask turtles                                                                                                     
    [ 
       set expected-price-per-acre-adj   (.7 * ((0.38 * item 0 local-price-info) +  
                                                (0.28 * item 1 local-price-info) + 
                                                (0.16 * item 2 local-price-info) + 
                                                (0.08 * item 3 local-price-info) + 
                                                (0.07 * item 4 local-price-info) + 
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                                                (0.03 * item 5 local-price-info)) + .3 *  ((0.38 * item 0 global-price-info) +  
                                                                                           (0.28 * item 1 global-price-info) + 
                                                                                           (0.16 * item 2 global-price-info) + 
                                                                                           (0.08 * item 3 global-price-info) + 
                                                                                           (0.07 * item 4 global-price-info) + 
                                                                                           (0.03 * item 5 global-price-info)))                 
    ] 
   ]  
    
   if Information-Diffusion = "off" 
   [ask patches 
    [ 
       let standard-dev standard-deviation all-prices 
       let average mean all-prices 
       set expected-price-per-acre-adj-p precision(random-normal average standard-dev)2                                                               
    ] 
   ask turtles                                                                                                     
    [ 
       let standard-dev standard-deviation all-prices 
       let average mean all-prices 
       set expected-price-per-acre-adj precision(random-normal average standard-dev)2                
    ] 
   ]    
  ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; OUTPUT PRICE AND YIELD EXPECTATION INFORMATION ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;   
   
   ask patches 
   [ 
       set expected-price-p precision(((0.40 * (item 0 past-crop-prices))+(0.20 * (item 1 past-crop-prices))+ 
                                     (0.15 * (item 2 past-crop-prices)) + (0.15 * (item 3 past-crop-prices))+ 
                                     (0.10 * (item 4 past-crop-prices))) * (1 + error2-of turtle owner))2 
       set expected-yield-p precision(((0.40 * (item 0 past-crop-yields))+(0.20 * (item 1 past-crop-yields))+ 
                                     (0.15 * (item 2 past-crop-yields)) + (0.15 * (item 3 past-crop-yields))+ 
                                     (0.10 * (item 4 past-crop-yields))) * (1 + error2-of turtle owner))2 
   ]    
  ask turtles 
     [ 
       set expected-price precision(((0.40 * (item 0 past-crop-prices))+(0.20 * (item 1 past-crop-prices))+ 
                                     (0.15 * (item 2 past-crop-prices)) + (0.15 * (item 3 past-crop-prices))+ 
                                     (0.10 * (item 4 past-crop-prices))) * (1 + error2))2      
       set expected-yield precision(((0.40 * (item 0 past-crop-yields))+(0.20 * (item 1 past-crop-yields))+ 
                                     (0.15 * (item 2 past-crop-yields)) + (0.15 * (item 3 past-crop-yields))+ 
                                     (0.10 * (item 4 past-crop-yields))) * (1 + error2))2       
     ] 
   
 end 
    
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; CONTINUE FARMING MODULE? ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
  
 to continue-farming-module?                                                                                          
     
    ask farmers [set exit false] 
    ask farmers [set buyer? "na"]  
                 
    ask farmers with [ years-neg-cash = 0][set urgency 1]                                                                  
    ask farmers with [ years-neg-cash = 1][set urgency 0.80] 
    ask farmers with [ years-neg-cash = 2][set urgency 0.60] 
    ask farmers with [ years-neg-cash >= 3][set urgency 0.50]     
    ;;; years-neg-cash not yet used --> urgency not used for farmers yet either.       
     
  
128 
 
    ask farmers with [(age >= 55) and (age < 60)][if (random 100 < retirement-tendency-55-59 * 100)  [set exit true 
set type-of-exit 1]]                                      
    ask farmers with [(age >= 60) and (age < 65)][if (random 100 < retirement-tendency-60-64 * 100)  [set exit true 
set type-of-exit 1]] 
    ask farmers with [(age >= 65) and (age < 70)][if (random 100 < retirement-tendency-65-69 * 100)  [set exit true 
set type-of-exit 1]] 
    ask farmers with [age >= 70]                 [if (random 100 < retirement-tendency-70-over * 100)[set exit true set 
type-of-exit 1]] 
    ask farmers with [age >= 80]                                                                     [set exit true set type-of-exit 1] 
          
    ask farmers with [exit = true] [if (random 100 < percent-pass-down and equity-value / asset-value > 0.6)   
 [set exit false set type-of-exit 0 next-generation]]        
                                    ;;; random X% of farmers with equity/asst > 60% pass down land 
     
    ask farmers [if years-neg-ncfbi >= (random 5 + 5)[set exit true set type-of-exit 2]]                             ;;; Voluntary 
exit b/c of equity erosion 
    ask farmers [if (debt) > (0.9 * asset-value)[set exit true set type-of-exit 3]]                                  ;;; Forced exit b/c 
of Insolvency                                                        
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
   ask farmers with [exit = true]                                                                  
     [ 
      let to-print (list "1" simulation year who age breed type-of-exit generation skill attitude plots-owned average-soil-
quality 
                             risk-aversion debt asset-value years-neg-ncfbi "1") 
     file-open "retiree-info.txt"     
     file-print to-print                                                                                    
     file-close  
      
    set breed retirees 
    set color black 
    set years-retired 1 
    set attitude 3  
    set urgency 0.85 
    ask patches with [owner = who-of myself] 
     [   
        set for-sale? true 
        set pcolor blue 
        set farmstead? false 
     ] 
   ]      
    
 end   
  
 to next-generation                                                                                                       
             
  without-interruption 
  [   
     let to-print (list "1" simulation year who age generation skill attitude risk-aversion debt asset-value "1") 
     file-open "pass-on-stats.txt"     
     file-print to-print                                                                                    
     file-close  
                      
     set generation generation + 1                                                                                         
     set age age - 30 
       if age < 20 [set age 20] 
     set age int age 
     set attitude 3 
     set risk-aversion 0.95 
                
  ]                    
 end 
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 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;FARM EXPANSION/CONTRACTION MODULE ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
  
 to farm-expansion-contraction  
 set plots-unsold-this-tick 0 
 set plots-sold-this-tick   0 
 set credit-constrained 0  
 ask farmers [ 
 without-interruption 
   [                                                                           
   ask farmers with [buyer? != "seller"][screen-farmers] 
   ask farmers with [buyer? = "seller"][farm-contraction]                               
                                                             
   ]]    
 end 
  
 to screen-farmers  
 if ((cash > (10 * acres-total-crop + 150 * mean list-of-winning-bids-adj * downpayment))                                  ;;; 
Liquidity check             
  
                       and ((debt / asset-value) < D-A-ratio)                                                              ;;; Solvency check 
                       and ((debt-payment-amount + min-family-withdrawal) < (residual-to-land-labor-exp * acres-total-
crop)) 
                       and (age <= 55) )                           
                      [set buyer? "buyer" farm-expansion]  
 end 
  
 to farm-expansion  
    set color pink     
 end 
  
 to farm-contraction  
    without-interruption 
     [         
       set color yellow                                                                                             
       if plots-owned = 1 [ask patches with [owner = who-of myself][set farmstead? false]]                                        
        
       set plot-for-sale patch-id-of min-one-of patches with [owner = who-of myself and farmstead? = false][distance-
to-farmstead]      
       ask patches with [patch-id = plot-for-sale-of myself] [set for-sale? true set pcolor blue] 
     ]  
 end 
  
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;RESERVATION PRICE CALCULATION MODULE ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
  
 to reservation-price-calculation-module  
 ifelse reservation-price? 
 [ 
 without-interruption 
 [ask patches with [for-sale? = true] 
   [        
       set reservation-price 0       
       set reservation-price precision (expected-price-per-acre-adj-p * k-acres-of self * quality-of self *  
                                        skill-of turtle owner * urgency-of turtle owner * (1 + error2-of turtle owner))2        
       without-interruption  
       [ 
       let to-print (list "1" simulation year quality k-acres reservation-price "1") 
       file-open "reservation-prices.txt" 
       file-print to-print 
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       file-close        
       ] 
   ] 
 ]]  
 [ask patches with [for-sale? = true] 
   [set reservation-price 0] 
 ]    
 end 
   
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; LAND PURCHASE AUCTION MODULE  ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
  
 to land-purchase-auction-module  
       ask farmers [set active-bidder? false] 
       set current-winning-bid 0                                                                                          
       set current-winner 0                                                                                                
       set current-list-of-bids []                                                                                         
       set price-paid 0 
       set auction-winner "na" 
       set auction-seller "na"       
        
 set plots-for-sale (count patches with [for-sale? = true])        
 ifelse count patches with [for-sale? = true] > 0 [set land-for-sale? true][set land-for-sale? false] 
 if land-for-sale? = true 
 [ 
 auction-block 
 decide-to-bid  
 ifelse bidders > 0                                                              
      [max-bid-calculation]      
      [ask patches with [on-auction-block? = true]  
        [                                                                        
          set for-sale? false  
          set current-plot-bid-on "" 
          set on-auction-block? false  
          set pcolor green  
          set auction-seller "na" 
          set auction-plot-acres "" 
          set auction-plot-quality "" 
          set xloc "" 
          set yloc "" 
          ask farmers with [who = owner-of myself][set buyer? "na" set color red set plot-for-sale false]        
          set total-plots-unsold total-plots-unsold + 1 
          set plots-unsold-this-tick plots-unsold-this-tick + 1 
        ] 
      ]       
 ifelse bidders > 0                                      
       [compare-bids submit-highest-bid]   
       [ask patches with [on-auction-block? = true]  
          [ 
            set for-sale? false  
            set current-plot-bid-on "" 
            set on-auction-block? false  
            set pcolor green  
            set auction-seller "na" 
            set auction-plot-acres "" 
            set auction-plot-quality "" 
            set xloc "" 
            set yloc "" 
            ask farmers with [who = owner-of myself][set buyer? "na" set color red set plot-for-sale false]        
            set total-plots-unsold total-plots-unsold + 1 
            set plots-unsold-this-tick plots-unsold-this-tick + 1 
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         ]]                 
       land-purchase-auction-module               
     ]  
 end 
  
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; FIND LAND AND BUYERS MODULE  ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;  
   
 to auction-block    
   ask one-of patches with [for-sale? = true] [set on-auction-block? true  
                                               set current-plot-bid-on patch-id-of self  
                                               set auction-seller owner-of self     
                                               set auction-plot-acres k-acres-of self  
                                               set auction-plot-quality quality-of self                   
                                               set xloc pxcor-of self 
                                               set yloc pycor-of self 
                                               watch-me]     
 end 
  to decide-to-bid 
    ask farmers with [buyer? = "buyer"] 
     [ 
      set winning? false  
      set winner? false 
      set credit-constrained? false 
       
      set distance-to-plot-bid-on distancexy xloc yloc 
      ifelse distance-to-plot-bid-on <= max-distance-travel 
        [set active-bidder? true] 
        [set active-bidder? false] 
     ]      
   set bidders count farmers with [active-bidder? = true]                                                             
 end 
  
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; COMPARE AND SUBMIT BIDS MODULE  ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 
  
 to compare-bids 
   if bidders = 1                              
   [ 
   without-interruption[ 
    ask farmers with [active-bidder? = true][   
         set times-bid times-bid + 1   
    set won-last 2 
     
       
            set auction-winner who-of self 
            set winning? true 
            set winner? true 
            set current-bid ((bid + reservation-price-of patch xloc yloc) / 2) 
            set highest-bid current-bid 
            set price-paid current-bid         
    ]]] 
        
   if bidders > 1 
   [ 
   without-interruption[ 
   ask farmers with [active-bidder? = true][        
   set times-bid times-bid + 1   
   set won-last 2    
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   if Type-of-Auction = "TPSB" 
     [        
       if bidders < 3  
         [set bidders 3 set current-list-of-bids lput reservation-price-of patch xloc yloc current-list-of-bids 
                        set current-list-of-bids lput reservation-price-of patch xloc yloc current-list-of-bids]          
       let N bidders 
       set bid precision(value-of-land-bid-on * ((N - 1)/(N - 2)))2        
       ifelse bid >= max-bid  
         [set current-bid max-bid] 
         [set current-bid bid]                                                                                                     
       set current-list-of-bids lput current-bid current-list-of-bids 
       if current-bid > current-winning-bid  
         [ set current-winning-bid current-bid set current-winner who-of self ]                                                                                                  
                                                            
       ifelse current-winner = who-of self                                                                                  
         [set winning? true set winner? true] 
         [set winning? false set winner? false]                                                                          
          
       set highest-bid current-winning-bid 
       set auction-winner current-winner               
     ]      
   if Type-of-Auction = "FPSB" 
     [ 
       let N bidders 
       set bid precision((value-of-land-bid-on * (N - 1))/ N)2        
       ifelse bid >= max-bid  
         [set current-bid max-bid] 
         [set current-bid bid]         
       set current-list-of-bids lput current-bid current-list-of-bids 
       if current-bid > current-winning-bid  
         [ set current-winning-bid current-bid set current-winner who-of self ]                                                                                                      
                                                            
       ifelse current-winner = who-of self                                                                                  
         [set winning? true set winner? true] 
         [set winning? false set winner? false]                                                                           
          
       set highest-bid current-winning-bid 
       set price-paid current-winning-bid 
       set auction-winner current-winner        
     ]      
   if Type-of-Auction = "English" 
     [        
       if value-of-land-bid-on-per-acre < max-bid-per-acre        ;;; 
          [set bid value-of-land-bid-on set abs-max-bid max-bid]  ;;;  
                                                                  ;;;  
       if value-of-land-bid-on-per-acre > max-bid-per-acre        ;;;  
          [set bid max-bid set abs-max-bid max-bid]               ;;;      
       set current-bid bid                                                                                          
               
       set current-list-of-bids lput current-bid current-list-of-bids  
       if current-bid > current-winning-bid  
         [ set second-highest-bid current-winning-bid set current-winning-bid current-bid set current-winner who-of self 
]     
          
       ifelse current-winner = who-of self                                                                                  
         [set winning? true] 
         [set winning? false]            
       set highest-bid (second-highest-bid * (1 + (minimum-bid-increment / 100)))  
                         
       ;;; All farmers have calculated and submitted highest bid. They now wait here until they are all done and then 
       ;;; move on to the next part of the English auction below.                                   
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     ]                                                              
   
   if Type-of-Auction = "SPSB" 
     [         
      if value-of-land-bid-on-per-acre < max-bid-per-acre      ; 
        [set bid value-of-land-bid-on]                         ;   
                                                               ; Bid set bid min of MaxWTP and Est. Value 
      if value-of-land-bid-on-per-acre > max-bid-per-acre      ; Optimal Strategy is to "tell the truth" 
        [set bid max-bid]                                      ;  
      
       set current-bid bid                                                                                            
       set current-list-of-bids lput current-bid current-list-of-bids  
       if current-bid > current-winning-bid  
         [ set second-highest-bid current-winning-bid set current-winning-bid current-bid set current-winner who-of self 
]     
          
       ifelse current-winner = who-of self                                                                                  
         [set winning? true set winner? true] 
         [set winning? false set winner? false]   
          
       set highest-bid current-winning-bid 
       set price-paid second-highest-bid 
       set auction-winner current-winner                                                                                                                
     ]        
 ]]]    
 ;;; Part two of English Auction. Begins only AFTER all first round bids have been submitted and a leader is chosen. 
  
if Type-of-Auction = "English"  
[ 
 set current-winning-bid highest-bid  
 ask farmers with [active-bidder? = true and abs-max-bid >= highest-bid] 
 [    
     ifelse (attitude = 1 and random 100 < 20)    
          [set current-bid abs-max-bid] 
          [set current-bid bid]                
     ifelse (attitude = 2 and random 100 < 50)    
          [set current-bid abs-max-bid] 
          [set current-bid bid]                 
     ifelse (attitude = 3 and random 100 < 80)    
          [set current-bid abs-max-bid] 
          [set current-bid bid]        
 ]  
 ask farmers with [active-bidder? = true and current-bid >= highest-bid] 
 [       
   without-interruption [ 
            set current-list-of-bids lput "X" current-list-of-bids 
            set current-list-of-bids lput current-bid current-list-of-bids 
            if current-bid > current-winning-bid  
              [set second-highest-bid current-winning-bid set current-winning-bid current-bid set current-winner who-of 
self]               
            ifelse current-winner = who-of self                                                                                  
             [set winning? true set winner? true] 
             [set winning? false set winner? false]              
            set highest-bid (second-highest-bid * (1 + (minimum-bid-increment / 100))) 
            set price-paid highest-bid             
            set auction-winner current-winner              
          ]          
    ] 
]   
 
 end  
 to submit-highest-bid  
  
134 
 
 if Type-of-Auction = "TPSB" 
   [let list-bids sort current-list-of-bids  
   set list-bids but-last list-bids  
   set list-bids but-last list-bids  
   set price-paid last list-bids]  
 ifelse price-paid >= reservation-price-of patch xloc yloc 
   [    
       let to-print (list "1" simulation year current-plot-bid-on auction-seller auction-plot-acres 
                          auction-plot-quality auction-winner highest-bid price-paid second-highest-bid "1") 
       file-open "bidding-details.txt" 
       file-print to-print 
       file-close        
       let to-print6 (list "1" simulation year current-plot-bid-on bidders auction-winner auction-seller  
reservation-price-of patch xloc yloc distance-to-plot-bid-on-of turtle auction-winner 
                           max-bid-of turtle auction-winner max-bid-credit-constraint-of turtle auction-winner  
value-of-land-bid-on-of turtle auction-winner bid-of turtle auction-winner 
                           current-bid-of turtle auction-winner abs-max-bid-of turtle auction-winner price-paid  
credit-constrained?-of turtle auction-winner (max-bid-of turtle auction-winner - price-paid)  
                           (price-paid - reservation-price-of patch xloc yloc) times-bid-of turtle auction-winner  
won-last-of turtle auction-winner "1") 
       file-open "winner-details.txt" 
       file-print to-print6 
       file-close                  
        
       transfer-ownership 
   ] 
   [ 
       let to-print (list "1" simulation year price-paid reservation-price-of patch xloc yloc "1") 
       file-open "unmet-reservations.txt" 
       file-print to-print 
       file-close        
       ask patches with [on-auction-block? = true]  
          [ 
            set for-sale? false  
            set current-plot-bid-on "" 
            set on-auction-block? false  
            set pcolor green  
            set auction-seller "na" 
            set auction-plot-acres "" 
            set auction-plot-quality "" 
            set xloc "" 
            set yloc "" 
            ask farmers with [who = owner-of myself][set buyer? "na" set color red set plot-for-sale false]        
            set total-plots-unsold total-plots-unsold + 1 
            set plots-unsold-this-tick plots-unsold-this-tick + 1 
            set reservation-not-met reservation-not-met + 1 
         ] 
     ]     
 end 
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; BID FORMATION AND LEARNING MODULE  ;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;  
  to max-bid-calculation 
  
without-interruption[ 
   ask farmers with [active-bidder? = true] 
     [ 
       set upper-bound 0 
       set lower-bound 0 
       set max-bid 0 
       set max-bid-per-acre 0 
       set value-of-land-bid-on-per-acre 0 
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       set value-of-land-bid-on 0 
       set bid 0 
       set current-bid 0 
       set expected-salvage-value 0 
       set annuity 0 
       set distance-to-plot-bid-on precision(distancexy xloc yloc)2       
       set credit-constrained? false       
               
       
       set expected-gross-rev precision (expected-price * expected-yield * 150 * 1 * risk-aversion * skill)0          
                                                                                                                   
       set expected-variable-prodn-costs precision (per-acre-vc * 150)0                                                                                                            
 
       set expected-hired-labour-cost precision ((((0.8 / (1 + 14500 * exp (-0.009 * 150))) + 0.03) * 150) * 6.75)0  
        
       set expected-transport-cost precision ((distance-to-plot-bid-on * travel-adjustment) +  
  (150 * distance-to-plot-bid-on * trucking-rate * expected-yield))0        
       set expected-capital-replacement-charge precision (capital-per-acre * depreciation-rate * 150)0        
       set expected-netrev-per-acre precision (( expected-gross-rev  
                                               - expected-variable-prodn-costs  
                                               - expected-hired-labour-cost  
                                               - expected-transport-cost 
                                               - expected-capital-replacement-charge) / 150)0                        ;;; E[Net Rev]/acre        
       set initial-capital-investment capital-per-acre                                                               ;;; capital/acre cost of 
purchasing this land        
       set expected-salvage-value precision((expected-price-per-acre-adj * skill * (1 + error2))  
                                             / ((1 + Int-Rate) ^ (72 - age)))0                                     
        
       set annuity precision ((1 - (1 / (1 + Int-Rate) ^ (72 - age))) * (expected-netrev-per-acre / Int-Rate))0      ;;; 
annuity/acre                                                                                                                     
        
       set max-bid-per-acre precision (annuity + expected-salvage-value - initial-capital-investment)2               
   ;;; maximum bid per acre for this particular plot of land   
                                                                                                                     ;;; based on ability to generate income from 
E[Y,P]              
               
       set max-bid precision (max-bid-per-acre * auction-plot-acres * auction-plot-quality)2                          
  ;;; maximum bid for this particular plot of land 
                                                                                                                     ;;; based on ability to generate income from 
E[Y,P]                                                                                                                      
       set max-bid-credit-constraint precision ((mean list-NCFBI * ((1 - ( 1 / (1 + int-rate) ^ repayment))) / int-rate) / (1 
- downpayment))2               
                                                                                                                     ;;; maximum bid for this particular plot of 
land                                                                                                 
                                                                                                                     ;;; based on borrowing constraints 
                                                                                                                      
       if max-bid-credit-constraint <= max-bid [                                                                     ;;; if credit constraints are 
binding adjust max-bid 
                                                 set max-bid max-bid-credit-constraint                               ;;; and max-bid-per-acre 
                                                 set max-bid-per-acre precision  
                                                   (max-bid / auction-plot-acres / auction-plot-quality)2 
                                                 set credit-constrained? true 
                                                 set credit-constrained credit-constrained + 1   
                                                ]                                                                                                                                                                  
                                                                                                                          
       if (max-bid <= 0 or cash < (max-bid * downpayment)) [set active-bidder?  false set max-bid 0 set max-bid-per-
acre 0] 
                                                                                                                     ;;; check that bid is > 0 and that there is 
enough  
                                                                                                                     ;;; cash for a downpayment 
       set bidders count farmers with [active-bidder? = true]        
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    ]]      
 ask farmers with [active-bidder? = true][determine-land-value]    
 end 
  
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; LAND VALUATION MODULE ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
  
 to determine-land-value  
 set list-prices sentence local-price-info global-price-info 
 set std-dev-land standard-deviation list-prices 
  if attitude = 2 and distance-to-plot-bid-on <= 16 
   [ 
   set upper-bound precision(expected-price-per-acre-adj + (2 * std-dev-land))2      
   set lower-bound precision(expected-price-per-acre-adj - (2 * std-dev-land))2 
   ] 
  
  if attitude = 2 and distance-to-plot-bid-on > 16     [ 
   set upper-bound precision(expected-price-per-acre-adj + (1 * std-dev-land))2      
   set lower-bound precision(expected-price-per-acre-adj - (3 * std-dev-land))2 
   ]   
    
 if attitude = 1 and distance-to-plot-bid-on <= 16  
   [ 
   set upper-bound precision(expected-price-per-acre-adj + (1 * std-dev-land))2      
   set lower-bound precision(expected-price-per-acre-adj - (3 * std-dev-land))2 
   ] 
    
 if attitude = 1 and distance-to-plot-bid-on > 16  
   [ 
   set upper-bound precision(expected-price-per-acre-adj + (0.3 * std-dev-land))2      
   set lower-bound precision(expected-price-per-acre-adj - (3 * std-dev-land))2 
   ]   
    
 if attitude = 3 and distance-to-plot-bid-on <= 16 
   [ 
   set upper-bound precision(expected-price-per-acre-adj + (3 * std-dev-land))2      
   set lower-bound precision(expected-price-per-acre-adj - (1 * std-dev-land))2 
   ]   
    
if attitude = 3 and distance-to-plot-bid-on > 16 
   [ 
   set upper-bound precision(expected-price-per-acre-adj + (2 * std-dev-land))2      
   set lower-bound precision(expected-price-per-acre-adj - (2 * std-dev-land))2 
   ]    
     set value-of-land-bid-on-per-acre precision (random-normal expected-price-per-acre-adj std-dev-land)2 
  
       if Bid-Adjustment-Strategy = "learning-direction-theory" 
          [ 
            if won-last = 0   [set value-of-land-bid-on-per-acre value-of-land-bid-on-per-acre] 
            if won-last = 2   [set value-of-land-bid-on-per-acre precision(value-of-land-bid-on-per-acre * (1 + (bidding-
adjustment / 100)))2]  
            if won-last = 1   [set value-of-land-bid-on-per-acre precision(value-of-land-bid-on-per-acre * (1 - (bidding-
adjustment / 100)))2]                       
          ]                                                                                      
           
           
 if value-of-land-bid-on-per-acre >= upper-bound 
   [set value-of-land-bid-on-per-acre upper-bound] 
 if value-of-land-bid-on-per-acre <= lower-bound 
   [set value-of-land-bid-on-per-acre lower-bound] 
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 if (value-of-land-bid-on-per-acre <= 0)  
 [set active-bidder?  false set max-bid 0 set value-of-land-bid-on-per-acre 0 set upper-bound 0 set lower-
bound 0]   
 set value-of-land-bid-on precision (value-of-land-bid-on-per-acre * auction-plot-acres * auction-plot-quality)2        
 set bidders count farmers with [active-bidder? = true]   
  
 end 
  
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; LAND TRANSFER AND UPDATES  ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
  
 to transfer-ownership  
 set adj-winning-bid precision ((price-paid / auction-plot-acres) / auction-plot-quality ) 2  
 let to-print (list "1" simulation year adj-winning-bid "1") 
 file-open "adjusted-winning-bids.txt" 
 file-print to-print 
 file-close                       
 ;;; This takes the winning bid and converts it to per acre quality =1 (risk and skill = 1)  
 set list-of-winning-bids-adj fput adj-winning-bid list-of-winning-bids-adj 
 set list-of-winning-bids-adj but-last list-of-winning-bids-adj 
   ;;; list of winning bids decays - has memory  
 set all-prices fput adj-winning-bid all-prices       
   ;;; all-prices does not deday                                     
 
 local-global-price-information  
 ask turtle auction-winner                            
   [               
     set cash precision(cash - (downpayment * price-paid))0 
     set debt precision(debt + ((1 - downpayment) * price-paid))0 
     set principal debt      
     refinance-debt 
     set winning-bids fput price-paid winning-bids 
     set plots-owned plots-owned + 1  
     set plots-purchased plots-purchased + 1 
     set acres-total-crop acres-total-crop + k-acres-of patch xloc yloc 
     set buyer? "NA"  
     set active-bidder? false  
     set winning? false  
     set winner? false  
     set color red 
     set won-last 1 
     capital-purchases-module      
     set total-plots-sold total-plots-sold + 1 
     set plots-sold-this-tick plots-sold-this-tick + 1        
     if ((cash > (10 * acres-total-crop + 150 * mean list-of-winning-bids-adj * downpayment))                                  ;;; 
Liquidity check 
                       and ((debt / asset-value) < D-A-ratio)                                                                  ;;; Solvency check 
                       and ((debt-payment-amount + min-family-withdrawal) < (residual-to-land-labor-exp * acres-total-
crop)) 
                       and (age <= 55) )                           
                      [set buyer? "buyer" set color pink]    
   ] 
    
 ask turtle auction-seller 
   [ 
     set cash cash + price-paid  
     set plots-owned plots-owned - 1  
     set plots-sold plots-sold + 1  
     set acres-total-crop acres-total-crop - k-acres-of patch xloc yloc 
     set plot-for-sale false  
     set buyer? "NA"  
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     if breed = farmers [set color red] 
   ]    
  ask patch xloc yloc 
   [ 
     set times-sold times-sold + 1 
     set owner auction-winner  
     set for-sale? false 
     set distance-to-farmstead distancexy xcor-of turtle owner ycor-of turtle owner                                  
     set current-plot-bid-on "" 
     set on-auction-block? false  
     set pcolor green  
     set auction-plot-acres "" 
     set auction-plot-quality "" 
     set xloc "" 
     set yloc ""      
     ask turtle auction-seller 
       [ determine-land-market-value 
         determine-asset-value 
         determine-equity-value  
         set auction-seller "na"]      
   ]                                                          
    
   ask turtles  
     [ set credit-constrained? "na" 
       if plots-owned <= 0 
         [ 
           let to-print2 (list "1" simulation year who breed age type-of-exit generation plots-sold skill attitude risk-
aversion asset-value debt "1") 
           file-open "exit-stats.txt" 
           file-print to-print2 
           file-close  
           if type-of-exit = 1 [set retired-exit retired-exit + 1] 
           if type-of-exit = 2 [set voluntary-exit voluntary-exit + 1] 
           if type-of-exit = 3 [set forced-exit forced-exit + 1] 
           die 
         ] 
     ] 
  
 end 
  
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 ;;;;;;;;;DIFFUSION: LOCAL AND GLOBAL PRICE INFORMATION  ;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
  
 to local-global-price-information 
  
 ask retirees[ 
   without-interruption[ 
       set local-price-info fput adj-winning-bid local-price-info 
       set local-price-info but-last local-price-info 
       ]] 
  
 if Information-Diffusion = "on" 
   [ 
     without-interruption 
       [ 
         ask turtles with [active-bidder? = false]    ;;; Farmers present in auction do not get noisy price b/c they know 
true price 
           [ 
             let true-price adj-winning-bid 
             let X distancexy xloc yloc 
             let skew one-of [1 -1] 
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             let error (skew * (X ^ 1 / 2))                  
             let observed-price precision(true-price + error)2 
             set global-price-info fput observed-price global-price-info 
             set global-price-info but-last global-price-info 
           ] 
       ]  
        
     ask farmers with [active-bidder?] 
       [ 
         set local-price-info fput adj-winning-bid local-price-info 
         set local-price-info but-last local-price-info 
       ]      
   ] 
  
 end 
  
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; PAYMENTS AND PURCHASES MODULE ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
  
 to capital-purchases-module 
  
 let capital-purchase capital-per-acre * k-acres-of patch xloc yloc 
 set capital-value precision(capital-value + capital-purchase)0 
 set cash precision(cash - capital-purchase)0 
 set capital-purchases fput capital-purchase capital-purchases 
  
 determine-land-market-value 
 determine-asset-value 
 determine-equity-value 
  
 end 
  
  
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; REFINANCE DEBT MODULE ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
  
 to refinance-debt 
   
 set debt-payment-amount precision(debt * (Int-Rate / (1 - (1 / (1 + Int-Rate)^ repayment))))0 
 ifelse debt > 0 
   [  
     ifelse debt > debt-payment-amount  
     [set debt-payment-amount debt-payment-amount][set debt-payment-amount debt] 
   ][set debt-payment-amount 0]     
 end 
   
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; ERROR CALCULATION ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
  
 to error-calculation  
 ask farmers 
   [ 
     let skew one-of [1 -1]      ;; rethink these. 
     if skill > 1.08 [set error2 (random-float 5 * skew) / 100] 
     if skill >= 1 and skill <= 1.08 [set error2 (random-float 10 * skew) / 100] 
     if skill < 1 and skill >= 0.92 [set error2 (random-float 15 * skew) / 100] 
     if skill < 0.92 [set error2 (random-float 20 * skew) / 100 ]  
   ] 
 end   
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 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; UPDATE DATA AND PARAMETERS  ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 
 to export-data 
   
  ask turtles [set age age + 1]                                 
  ask farmers with [cash > 0][set cash precision(cash * 1.02) 0]  
  ask farmers with [buyer? = "buyer"] 
    [ set color red set buyer? "na"]     
     
  ask farmers [determine-land-market-value]  
  ask farmers [determine-asset-value]   
  ask farmers [determine-equity-value]      
   
   let to-print7 (list "1" simulation year mean values-from farmers [residual-to-land-labor-exp] mean values-from 
farmers [residual-to-land-labor] "1" )  
   file-open "financial-information.txt" 
   file-print to-print7 
   file-close       
     
    without-interruption[ 
  ask farmers[ 
   let to-print (list "1" simulation year who skill acres-total-crop average-soil-quality prodn-crop crop-revenue tc-
prodn debt-payment-amount  
                 family-withdrawal NCFBI principal debt asset-value cash capital-value land-value  
                 (debt / asset-value) times-bid plots-purchased plots-sold"1") 
   file-open "production-information.txt" 
   file-print to-print 
   file-close 
   ]] 
 
  set dead (422 - (count turtles))   
   
  let to-print3 (list "1" simulation year mean values-from farmers [(debt / asset-value)] mean values-from farmers 
[land-value] mean values-from farmers [capital-value] 
                          mean values-from farmers [cash] mean values-from farmers [debt] mean values-from farmers [acres-
total-crop] 
                          mean values-from farmers [skill] mean values-from farmers [ncfbi / acres-total-crop] "1") 
  file-open "mean-info.txt" 
  file-print to-print3 
  file-close   
   
  let to-print4 (list "1" simulation year dead retired-exit voluntary-exit forced-exit plots-sold-this-tick plots-unsold-
this-tick  
                   reservation-not-met credit-constrained count farmers with [generation > 1] "1") 
  file-open "general-info.txt" 
  file-print to-print4 
  file-close   
   
end 
 
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; DELETE OUTPUT FILES ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 
to delete-files 
if "yes" = (user-one-of 
                   "Do You Want to Erase all Output Files?" 
                   ["no" "yes"]) 
  [ delete ] 
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end 
 
to delete 
  file-open "pass-on-stats.txt" 
  file-write "" 
  file-close 
  file-open "bidding-details.txt" 
  file-write "" 
  file-close 
  file-open "exit-stats.txt" 
  file-write "" 
  file-close 
  file-open "unmet-reservations.txt" 
  file-write "" 
  file-close 
  file-open "reservation-prices.txt" 
  file-write "" 
  file-close 
  file-open "adjusted-winning-bids.txt" 
  file-write "" 
  file-close 
  file-open "financial-information.txt" 
  file-write "" 
  file-close 
  file-open "production-information.txt" 
  file-write "" 
  file-close 
  file-open "general-info.txt" 
  file-write "" 
  file-close 
  file-open "mean-info.txt" 
  file-print "" 
  file-close 
  file-open "retiree-info.txt"     
  file-print ""                                                                                 
  file-close 
  file-open "winner-details.txt" 
  file-print "" 
  file-close 
   
  
  file-delete "pass-on-stats.txt" 
  file-delete "bidding-details.txt" 
  file-delete "exit-stats.txt" 
  file-delete "unmet-reservations.txt" 
  file-delete "reservation-prices.txt" 
  file-delete "adjusted-winning-bids.txt" 
  file-delete "financial-information.txt" 
  file-delete "production-information.txt" 
  file-delete "general-info.txt" 
  file-delete "mean-info.txt" 
  file-delete "retiree-info.txt" 
  file-delete "winner-details.txt"   
end 
 
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; PREPARE OUTPUT FILES ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 
  to prepare-output-files   
  file-open "pass-on-stats.txt" 
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  file-write (list "1" "simulation" "year" "who" "age" "generation" "skill" "attitude" "risk-aversion" "debt" "asset-
value" "1") 
  file-close 
  file-open "bidding-details.txt" 
  file-write (list "1" "simulation" "year" "current-plot-bid-on" "auction-seller" "auction-plot-acres" 
                          "auction-plot-quality" "auction-winner" "highest-bid" "price-paid" "second-highest-bid" "1") 
  file-close 
  file-open "exit-stats.txt" 
  file-write (list "1" "simulation" "year" "who" "breed" "age" "type-of-exit" "generation" "plots-sold" "skill"  
 "attitude" "risk-aversion" "asset-value" "debt" "1") 
  file-close 
  file-open "unmet-reservations.txt" 
  file-write (list "1" "simulation" "year" "price-paid" "reservation-price" "1") 
  file-close 
  file-open "reservation-prices.txt" 
  file-write (list "1" "simulation" "year" "quality" "k-acres" "reservation-price" "1") 
  file-close 
  file-open "adjusted-winning-bids.txt" 
  file-write (list "1" "simulation" "year" "adj-winning-bid" "1") 
  file-close 
  file-open "financial-information.txt" 
  file-write (list "1" "simulation" "year" "Mean-E[PM]" "Mean-[PM]" "1" )  
  file-close 
  file-open "production-information.txt" 
  file-write (list "1" "simulation" "year" "who" "skill" "acres-total-crop" "average-soil-quality" "prodn-crop" "crop-
revenue" "tc-prodn"  
             "debt-payment-amount" "family-withdrawal" "NCFBI" "principal" "debt" "asset-value" "cash" "capital-
value" 
                  "land-value" "D/A" "times-bid" "plots-purchased" "plots-sold" "1") 
  file-close 
  file-open "general-info.txt" 
  file-write (list "1" "simulation" "year" "dead" "retired-exit" "voluntary-exit" "forced-exit" "plots-sold"  
                  "plots-unsold" "reservation-not-met" "credit-constrained" "farmers with generation > 1" "1") 
  file-close 
  file-open "mean-info.txt" 
  file-print (list "1" "simulation" "year" "mean-D/A" "mean-land-value" "mean-capital-value" "mean-cash" "mean-
debt" "Mean-Acres-Cropped"  "Mean-Skill" "Mean-NCFBI/Acre" "1") 
  file-close 
  file-open "retiree-info.txt"     
  file-print (list "1" "simulation" "year" "who" "age" "breed" "type-of-exit" "generation" "skill" "attitude" "plots-
owned" "average-soil-quality"  "risk-aversion"  "debt" "asset-value" "years-neg-ncfbi" "1")                                                                               
  file-close   
  file-open "winner-details.txt" 
  file-print (list "1" "simulation" "year" "current-plot-bid-on" "bidders" "auction-winner" "auction-seller" 
"reservation-price"   
 "distance- to-plot-bid-on" "max-bid" "max-bid-credit-constraint" "value-of-land-bid-on" "bid" 
"current-bid" 
  "abs-max-bid" "price-paid" "credit-constrained?" "buyer-gain" "seller-gain" "times-bid" "won-last" "1")               
  file-close 
   
  end                           
 
 
 
 
